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Summary 
 
During Gulf War II, the American government implemented new media policies which, 
due to their potentially manipulative impact, became a subject of concern to academics, 
social commentators and the media alike. Key to these policies was the Department of 
Defense's Embedded Media Program which allowed hundreds of selected reporters to 
accompany US forces to the war front. The US openly tried to win international support 
for the war, and critics felt that this policy was designed to saturate the media with 
reports supporting the American point of view. This study examines these policies, the 
history of war reporting as a separate news genre, as well as the fluctuating relations 
between the US military and the media. Because of the US media policies, the fact that 
only one South African newspaper reporter was in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
phase of the war and South African newspapers' consequent reliance on foreign news 
sources, there was a real possibility that the American position would be propagated in 
the local press. To test whether this was the case, the way the war was reported on in 
four leading South African newspapers is examined in terms of gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing. Using an adapted version op Propp's fairytale analysis as a 
standard, it compares the slant and content of the South African coverage to the way 
four senior US government officials presented the war. Also, the coverage of the 
newspapers is compared to one another. The analyses indicate that while most of the 
information published by the newspapers came from American sources, the news 
reports generally did not mirror the US standpoint, but instead criticised President Bush 
and the war on Iraq. Neither the frequency of the newspapers, nor its cultural 
background showed any correlation with the way the war was depicted by the different 
newspapers. It is therefore concluded that while the US might have been successful in 
their attempt to "occupy the media territory" in terms of sources cited, they were not 
able to sway the opinion of the South African press in their favour. However, the US is 
aware of these failures and plans to rectify the mistakes made in Gulf War II by means 
of proactive global operations started in times of peace. 
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Opsomming 
 
Tydens die Tweede Golfoorlog het die Amerikaanse regering 'n nuwe mediabeleid 
ingestel wat weens die potensieel manipulerende impak daarvan ’n bron van kommer 
vir akademici, sosiale kommentators en die media self geword het. Sentraal tot hierdie 
nuwe beleid was die Departement van Verdediging se sogenaamde "Embedded Media 
Program" wat honderde uitgesoekte joernaliste toegelaat het om Amerikaanse magte na 
die oorlogsfront te vergesel. Die VSA het openlik probeer om internasionale steun vir 
die oorlog te werf en kritici het gevoel dat dié beleid ontwerp is om die media met 
nuusberigte wat die Amerikaanse standpunt steun, te versadig. Hierdie studie ondersoek 
dié beleid, die geskiedenis van oorlogsverslaggewing as afsonderlike nuus-genre, asook 
die wisselvallige verhouding tussen die Amerikaanse weermag en die media. Weens die 
Amerikaanse mediabeleid, die feit dat slegs een Suid-Afrikaanse koerantverslaggewer 
tydens die Operation Iraqi Freedom fase van die oorlog in Irak was en Suid-Afrikaanse 
koerante gevolglik van buitelandse nuusbronne afhanklik was, was daar 'n werklike 
moontlikheid dat die Amerikaanse posisie deur die plaaslike pers gepropageer kon 
word. Om te toets of dit die geval was, is die manier waarop in vier vooraanstaande 
Suid-Afrikaanse koerante oor die oorlog berig is, ondersoek in terme van 
hekwagterskap, agendastelling en raamskepping. Deur 'n aangepaste weergawe van 
Propp se feëverhaalanalise as maatstaf te gebruik, is die neiging en inhoud van die Suid-
Afrikaanse dekking vergelyk met die manier waarop vier senior Amerikaanse 
amptenare die oorlog voorgehou het. Die koerante se dekking is ook met mekaar 
vergelyk. Die analises wys dat hoewel die meeste van die inligting wat deur die 
koerante gepubliseer is van Amerikaanse bronne kom, die nuusberigte oor die algemeen 
nie die Amerikaanse standpunt weerspieël nie, maar eerder krities teenoor President 
Bush en die oorlog teen Irak is. Nie die frekwensie van die koerante of die kulturele 
agtergrond daarvan het enige korrelasie getoon met die manier waarop die oorlog deur 
die verskillende koerante uitgebeeld is nie. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat hoewel 
die VSA moontlik daarin geslaag het om die "mediaterrein te okkupeer" in terme van 
aangehaalde bronne, het hulle nie daarin geslaag om die Suid-Afrikaanse pers se opinie 
in hul guns te swaai nie. Die VSA is egter bewus van die foute wat tydens die Tweede 
Golfoorlog  gemaak is en beplan om dit  deur middel van proaktiewe globale operasies 
in vredestyd reg te stel. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Problem statement and motivation 
During Gulf War II1, the United States (US) government implemented new media 
policies, which, due to their potentially manipulative impact, became a subject of 
concern to academics, social commentators and the media alike (see Diemand, 2003; 
Hafez, 2003; Misken, Rayner & Lalic, 2003; Robinson, Goddard, Brown & Taylor, 
2006).  
 
This study will examine these policies, the history of relations between the US and the 
media in times of war, and will attempt to determine whether and to what extent the 
American point of view was reflected in reports published by four leading South 
African newspapers during the Operation Iraqi Freedom phase of the Gulf War II.  
 
The key concern of detractors of the new US media policies centred around the 
Department of Defense's Embedded Media Program which allowed hundreds of 
selected reporters to accompany the US forces to the war front to "tell the factual story – 
good or bad – before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they 
most certainly will continue to do" (Rumsfeld, 2003a). The US made no secret of its 
desire to gain the support of the international community for the American led war on 
Iraq, and critics were of the opinion that this policy in particular was designed to 
saturate the international media with news reports biased towards the American point of 
view (Diemand, 2003; Misken et al., 2003). 
    
Being geographically and politically removed from the conflict, the South African 
media was in a good position to bring balance through impartiality into reports, but with 
only three local reporters in Iraq, and then for a very brief period (Schoonakker, 2003), 
there was an increased likelihood of the American stance being promoted through 
reports received from foreign sources. Apart from Bonny Schoonakker who reported for 
the Sunday Times from Baghdad during the first weeks of the war, South African 
newspapers relied on news agencies (Business Day, 2003), foreign media reports and 
the views of local experts, few of whom had ever set foot in Iraq.2 Questions were 
therefore raised about the content of the reports published by newspapers which did not 
have the opportunity to witness the events first-hand and had to publish information 
provided by journalists embedded with and contractually bound to the US Department 
of Defense. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The name "Gulf War II" is popularly used by both the military and the media to refer to the 2003 US led 
war in Iraq, and is therefore preferred in this study even though in the Middle East the war is popularly 
referred to as Gulf War III – Gulf War I being the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. This study focuses on 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the term "Gulf War II" is used where the timeframe referred to transcends 
this phase of the war.  
2 René Horn and Arnold Spangenberg of SABC2 were the only other South African reporters in Iraq – 
and then very briefly – but they represented television broadcasting and not the newspaper industry. 
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1.2 Preliminary reading 
When this study commenced in 2003, no scholarly research had been done on this issue 
in South Africa, but communication scientist Kai Hafez of University of Erfurt, 
Germany (2003) had conducted a preliminary study on the impartiality and objectivity 
of the media of countries that did or did not participate in the war in Iraq, namely the 
US, United Kingdom (UK), and Germany.  
 
Hafez (2003) indicated that in Germany, which was not involved militarily, there was 
little evidence of any mechanism that "manufactured consent" about the war:  
 
governments have a political target that they follow; the media work 
according to their own inborn ideological and professional or commercial 
orientation; and the public decides on matters of war and peace according 
to their own values and attitudes that are rooted in the political culture and 
history of the relevant country.  
 
In the US, which was the main military player during the war, the media as well as the 
public moved closer to the government's stance, but in the UK, which fully supported 
the US, a pattern very similar to that of Germany was exhibited, with little 
interdependence between government, media and public opinion (Hafez, 2003). The 
study determined that it is not possible to establish a general and direct correlation 
between a government's involvement in a war, and the support to the war effort of that 
particular country's media and citizens.  
 
However, in their report to the Australian Parliament, Sarah Misken of the Politics and 
Public Administration Group, and Laura Rayner and Maria Lalic of the 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group of the Department of the Parliamentary 
Library of Australia (2003) expressed concern that media and public opinion about the 
war might be influenced by the US military's invitation to the media to join them on the 
battlefield. Referring to past wars, they felt that the privilege of accompanying the US 
military might impair the media's objectivity and result in self-censorship:  "The result 
is that the public may not be offered the alternative views that would help them to 
decide whether or not to support a conflict".  
 
Due to the recency of the war in Iraq when the preliminary reading was done in 2003, 
no South African studies were yet available about news coverage of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, nor had any books been published on the subject. This situation made it 
pressing to try to understand 
 
• the US government's media policies during Operation Iraqi Freedom,  
• the history of the relationship between the US military and the media,  
• the history of the media policies and how they came into being, but also  
• how these policies translated into reports that were eventually printed by South 
African newspapers.  
 
Since 2003, only a few journal articles and book chapters have dealt with news 
coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom by the South African media. None of these 
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qualitative studies made the connection between coverage and the US government's 
concerted effort to win global support for the war effort.  
 
Head of the media section of University of Cape Town's Centre for Film and Media Ian 
Glenn (2004:128-131) analysed South African and international media coverage of the 
war and how it was received by viewers. He found that South African coverage was 
surprisingly balanced and politically in the middle of the spectrum, but remarked that it 
might be argued that people with strong political feelings might find fair and balanced 
reporting less compelling.  
 
In their analysis of war coverage, Arnold de Beer, Herman Wasserman and Nicolene 
Botha of the Journalism Department at the University of Stellenbosch (2004:185-186) 
also remarked on how balanced South African coverage was, and noted that although 
South Africans were mostly against the American attacks on Iraq, coverage – even by 
some of the most critical South African newspapers – was not biased against the United 
States.  
 
Christine Buchinger, Herman Wasserman and Arnold de Beer of the Journalism 
Department at the University of Stellenbosch (2004) asked how the South African 
media had fared in its coverage of the war, and whether or not it was influenced by the 
Western sources from which it obtained much of its information. They too came to the 
conclusion that the South African television broadcasters kept to the centre of the 
political spectrum (Buchinger et al., 2004:220). This study focused only on televised 
reports, and not on newspaper coverage. 
 
Leopold Scholtz, military expert, Professor Extraordinaire of History at University of 
Stellenbosch and Deputy Editor, Die Burger, (2005:34-38) touched on the "most 
interesting experiment ... namely to 'embed' journalists with certain units" in an article 
on the US military strategy during Gulf War II, of which the policy of embedding 
formed a part. Scholtz (2005:38) came to the conclusion that 
 
Allowing the independent media to be embedded may have been an attempt 
to co-opt them in a subtle state propaganda campaign. If so, it failed, 
because the journalists, by and large, kept their professionalism and 
reported mostly objectively, including writing or saying things that were 
unflattering to their hosts.  
 
1.3 Research problem, research questions and hypothesis 
The aim of this study is to test the hypothesis that the novel media policies implemented 
by the US during Operation Iraqi Freedom had resulted in pro-American coverage by 
South African newspapers.  
 
In order to achieve this objective, questions about the origin and history of war 
reporting as a news genre will be answered, with special reference to the historical 
relationship between the US military and the media, the policies that shaped this 
relationship and the policies during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The origin, flow and 
content of Gulf War II reports will be examined in terms of gatekeeping, agendasetting 
and framing, especially as they were published by four leading South African 
 4
newspapers. An attempt will be made to determine whether either the frequency or the 
cultural background of the South African newspapers (determined in terms of language) 
had an effect on the coverage. 
 
It is expected that this study will show that the US message about the war in Iraq had 
largely found its way to South African newspapers, resulting in coverage leaning 
towards the American government's point of view.  
 
1.4 Research design and methodology 
To understand the current relationship between the military and the media, a media 
historiographical study will be done on the origin and evolution of war reporting as a 
distinctive news genre. This will be augmented with a focused examination of the 
interaction between the media and the US military during various conflicts since the 
American Civil War.  
 
This examination will be elucidated with the views of a number of international war 
correspondents who personally experienced the outcome of the US media policy during 
different conflicts, namely Peter Arnett, Paul Watson, Martin Savidge, Robert Fisk, and 
Bonny Schoonakker. The US media policy will be assessed, with special reference to 
the Embedded Media Program, its ground rules and the media boot camp.  
 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to analyse the 
content of all Operation Iraqi Freedom news reports published by the leading English 
and Afrikaans daily and Sunday newspapers, namely The Star (English, daily), and Die 
Burger (Afrikaans, daily), as well as Sunday Times (English, Sunday), and Rapport 
(Afrikaans, Sunday) between 21 March 2003 (the day after the start of the Operation 
Iraqi Freedom) and until the first publication date of the respective newspapers after the 
end of major combat operations was announced. This will be done to establish whether 
and to what extent the US's take on the war found its way to South Africa. The 
newspaper reports will be classified into news agency reports, reports written by own 
reporters or local experts, and reports compiled from various news sources.  
 
The content analyses will be done using selected theoretical models of gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing as parameters.  Russian linguist Vladimir Propp's (1968) 
fairytale analysis will be employed to enumerate elements in the news agenda of major 
role players during Operation Iraqi Freedom for the purpose of analysis.  
 
1.5 Theoretical background 
Three classical models of news theory will be employed in this study to examine the 
origin, flow and content of reports on Operation Iraqi Freedom that were published in 
four major South African newspapers: 
 
The first model is American Public Communications Professor Pamela Shoemaker's 
(1991) model of gatekeeping. This model is based on a compilation of various models 
of gatekeeping, most of which are founded on the "model of selective gatekeeping" of 
the Norwegian Peace and Conflict researchers Johan Galtung and Marie Holmboe Ruge 
(1965), which in turn originated from the gatekeeper model of David Manning White, 
(1950), a former journalist and mass communications scientist and educator. Although 
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earlier research focused on individual news judgements (Dimitrikova, Connolly-Ahern, 
Williams, Kaid & Reid, 2003:402; Kim, 2002:432), this study will examine the extent 
to which these judgements were transferred through the news channel.  
 
The second model to be used for the content analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
coverage is the 1972 agendasetting approach of communication and public opinion 
researcher Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, communication historian and theorist, 
as expanded by McCombs (1999). Agendasetting refers to the mass media's tendency to 
pay attention to certain issues, but neglect others. The expanded model (McCombs, 
1999) to be used in this study identifies two levels of agendasetting: 
 
• The first level of agendasetting is concerned with the salience of news issues, or 
"objects", while  
• the second level of agendasetting pertains to the salience of the attributes of news 
topics.  
 
The third model that will be employed in the analysis of the war reports is framing. 
Although there is much contention about the exact nature of framing (Roefs, 1998; 
Scheufele, 1999:103), it is generally accepted to be related to the model of 
agendasetting, and especially to second level agendasetting. Framing can be described 
as the presentation of selected elements of a news story in such a way that a particular 
view of the problem, or causality, or moral evaluation, or course of action is promoted 
(Entman, 1993:52)   
 
A conspicuous frame that emerged from Operation Iraqi Freedom media coverage is 
what is called the Hollywoodisation (Knight, 2004) of the war. This refers to the many 
ways Operation Iraqi Freedom was presented to and interpreted by the public as an 
event akin to a Hollywood action-adventure with a hero fighting against an evil empire 
to save the world. Because of indications by US military sources that "storytelling" is 
considered to be a useful tool for influencing public opinion (Casebeer & Russell, 
2005), a structure of story elements was sought for the analysis of the story frame. Such 
a structure was found in the seminal fairytale analysis of Vladimir Propp (1968), which 
will be employed not only to examine the proposed news frame, but also as a yardstick 
against which agendasetting will be measured as part of the process of news flow.  
 
1.6 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 1: In the introductory chapter the research problem will be stated, the 
motivation for the study will be provided and the preliminary literature study will be 
addressed. A brief synopsis of the research design and methodology will be given, as 
well as an outline of the chapters of the study. 
 
Chapter 2: Key concepts of this study will be explained and the theoretical framework 
for the study will be provided, with special reference to the models of gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing that will be used in Chapter 7 to analyse the news flow 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom from the sources of information to the South African 
newspapers. This chapter will also explain Propp's fairytale analysis and how it can be 
applied to the analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom news coverage.  
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Chapter 3: An overview of the literature available on gatekeeping, agendasetting and 
framing during Operation Iraqi Freedom will be given, and the use of Propp's fairytale 
model to analyse news reports will be discussed. 
 
Chapter 4: The design of the study and the methodology to be followed will be 
described. 
 
Chapter 5:  The historical evolution of war reporting as a news genre will be studied, 
as well as the inevitable interaction between the military and the media. The media 
policies and relationships between the US military and the media during conflicts from 
the American Civil War to the war in Afghanistan preceding Gulf War II will 
subsequently be investigated. This will be augmented with the views of renowned war 
correspondents. 
 
Chapter 6: The intricacies of the US strategic communication network during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom will be investigated. The US Department of Defense's media 
policy will be described, with special reference to the Embedded Media Program, its 
ground rules and the media boot camp. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
position of embedded reporters will be weighed against that of unilateral reporters. This 
will be supplemented with the views of war correspondents. 
 
Chapter 7: The content of all news reports pertaining to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
published by four South African newspapers during the first weeks of the war will be 
analysed in terms of gatekeeping, agendasetting, and framing and compared to analysis 
of public addresses and news briefings by four prominent US government officials. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions about the results of the analysis will be drawn, on the basis of 
which recommendations will be made. 
 
1.7  Summary 
In this study the potentially manipulative media policies implemented by the US 
government and military during Operation Iraqi Freedom will be examined. The 
history of relations between the US and the media in times of war will be investigated 
by means of a historiographical study, and an attempt will ultimately be made to 
determine whether and to what extent the American point of view was reflected by the 
South African press.  
 
Initially, no scholarly literature was available on the South African media's coverage of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and there still are very few completed studies on the subject. 
Since 2003, more international studies had become available on gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing in coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but none of these 
dealt with the interaction between US media policies and coverage in South Africa. This 
study will therefore contribute to the knowledge base of international news flow. 
 
Using the classical news theory models of gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing as 
functions of the news flow process as parameters, the origin, flow and content of reports 
on Operation Iraqi Freedom that were published in South African newspapers will be 
analysed through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Elements of 
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Propp's fairytale analysis will be used as a standard to quantify newspaper reports in 
terms of the selected news theories.  
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
 
In Chapter 2, the theoretical models of gatekeeping, framing and agendasetting, with 
special reference to research on news coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom will be 
examined. Propp's fairytale analysis and how it can be applied to the news coverage will 
also be discussed.  
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical background  
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The US government actively promoted certain views of Gulf War II by using the media 
as a strategic weapon (Hill, 1997:25; Belknap, 2002:110; Martin, 2003:1, 9; Lewis, 
2006:149). To determine whether and to what extent this portrayal of the war and 
especially of Operation Iraqi Freedom had found its way to South African newspapers, 
the theoretical models of gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing that will be used to 
analyse news documents in Chapter 7, are discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, because 
of the alleged "Hollywoodisation" of the war (Knight, 2004; Watkins, 2007) Propp's 
fairytale analysis is examined and an argument is made for its application to the analysis 
of coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
 
2.2 From practice to theory 
Journalism is inherently about the creation and distribution of meaning in society, and 
as such a study of journalism – and therefore war reporting as a genre of journalism – 
necessarily has much in common with communication studies (Skinner, Gasher & 
Compton, 2001:342, 345).  
 
Canadian media and mass communication experts David Skinner, Michael Gasher and 
James Compton (2001:349) state that 
 
Journalists do not simply "find" meaning in the raw data – "the facts", 
interviews, etc. – they use to write stories. Rather, they create meaning out 
of, or from, this information ... from choosing to cover one event over 
another, to the choice of language used in a story, to where the story is 
finally placed in the newspaper or programme line-up, news production is a 
complex process of selection through which journalists produce meaning. 
 
American former journalist and mass communication scholar Peter Parisi (1992:8) 
explains that from the perspective of critical or cultural studies 
 
news writing represents a set of choices: choices that (a) define an issue as 
newsworthy and certain questions as relevant; (b) admit, mute, or reject 
information, sources, and perspectives; and (c) decide the level and extent 
of detail and "color" with which to render a person, community, region, or 
issue.  
 
These choices can be described by the models of gatekeeping, agendasetting and 
framing:  
 
(a)  gatekeepers define the newsworthiness and salience of an issue,  
(b)  news agendas is the result of admission and/or negation of certain issues, and 
consist of  
(c) a series of news stories portrayed in particular frames, which are determined by 
detail, colour and emphasis of the report. 
 9
These three models of news theory will be used in this study to analyse news on 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
 
2.3 News flow and gatekeeping  
The theory of gatekeeping goes hand in hand with news flow, as gatekeepers are 
responsible for the flow of news from its sources to the consumer. Almost half a century 
ago, Journalism and Mass Communication Professor John T. McNelly (1959:102-103) 
addressed the fact that between the event and the audience, news flows through the 
hands of many gatekeepers, who may be correspondents, news bureau personnel or 
various levels of editors. This observation is still true today. 
 
McNelly's (1959) model illustrates how a foreign news event might be covered by a 
correspondent, who sends it to a regional bureau, where it is shortened before it is 
passed to the agency’s central bureau. At the central bureau it may be altered or 
combined with another story before it is transferred through to the national bureau of a 
country, where it may once again be changed before it is dispatched to a newspaper or 
radio station that may modify it again, or even reject it, before publication or broadcast. 
The audience, in turn, may also act as gatekeepers by passing snippets of information on 
to other people. Throughout the process, feedback in various guises may or may not 
have a further effect on the manipulation of the news report. 
 
Since McNelly’s (1959) study, very little has changed in the way international news 
flow is perceived (Hjarvard, 1995):  
 
News flow analysis has implicitly or explicitly understood the news process 
to be a question about selection, at least in a very general sense of the term; 
for empirical analysis the point of departure has been a simple, but 
important observation: international news ... [is] transported around the 
globe between countries and between social actors and the volume and 
content of this flow is continuously subject to a kind of selection process:  
something is added, removed or changed from the flow depending on the 
countries and actors involved.  
 
In 1965 Galtung and Ruge identified factors used in the selection of news in the news 
flow process, and subsequent studies (e.g. Boyd-Barrett, 1980;  Fenby, 1986; Friedland, 
1992; quoted by Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1995) determined that these and other 
"gatekeeping factors" were predominantly in the hands Western news agencies, 
particularly in the US. By 1995 the US still dominated the news scene, but other 
regions, including Africa, were starting to partake in the previously North/West oriented 
and geographically separated news flow in an attempt to provide a "contra-flow" to the 
major Western news flow (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1995). This development did not go 
far and today international news flow is no more symmetrical than 30 years ago, with 
the US still at the centre of news output (Kleinsteuber, 2002:9). 
 
Because of the inseparable bond between news flow and gatekeeping McNelly’s model 
was integrated by Shoemaker into her 1991 model of gatekeeping – which will be used 
in the present study. 
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The term "gatekeeper" was first used in 1947 by the American social psychologist Kurt 
Lewin who studied the way food was selected for household consumption (Lewin, 
1947:145). He referred to the person who selected the food as the "gatekeeper", adding 
that the theory of gates "holds not only for food channels but also for the travelling of a 
news item through certain communication channels in a group" (Lewin, 1947:145). 
 
In 1950, White used this idea in his study of the selection processes involved in the flow 
of news from the source to the audience past the various filters or "gatekeepers" (White, 
1950:66). This made him the first scholar to study gatekeeping in the journalistic sense 
of the word (Zhou, 2001).  White specifically studied what he called "the last 
'gatekeeper'" – a wire-editor, referred to as Mr Gates, who was responsible for the 
selection of national and international news for the front and jump pages of the 
newspaper (White, 1950:67). White concluded that the communication of news is a 
highly subjective exercise, closely associated with the gatekeeper’s own experiences, 
attitudes and expectations (White, 1950:72).  
 
This study was replicated in 1966 by American communication scientist Paul B. Snider, 
who found that since White’s study, little had changed: "Mr Gates still picks the stories 
he likes and believes his readers want" (Snider, 1995:286). However, the nature of the 
news had changed, as in 1966 the press was more interested in hard news and 
international conflicts than was the case in 1950. 
 
Many researchers have since re-examined Lewin’s "gates", including various other 
elements that have an impact on the flow of news, such as Gieber (1964), Bass (1969), 
Brown (1979), Gans (1980), Chang (2004), Berkowitz (1990) and Roberts (2006).  
 
Sociologist Walter Gieber, as one example, found that as gatekeepers, wire editors’ 
selection of news was not driven by his feelings about the social meaning or impact of 
the news items, but rather by pressures of getting the news copy in the paper – although 
his employer’s values did play a significant role (Gieber, 1964:219). Gieber focused on 
reporters and their sources as two gatekeepers in the channel of news flow, but he, like 
White, came to the conclusion that the news is "very subjective", stating that news does 
not have an independent existence and that it is in fact the product of the members of a 
"news-gathering bureaucracy" (Gieber, 1964: 218, 223). News, Gieber declared, is what 
the media make it.  
 
2.3.1 Selective gatekeeping 
Galtung and Ruge's (1965) model of selective gatekeeping addresses an aspect of news 
flow and gatekeeping that was largely ignored by most other gatekeeping models, 
namely the  criteria used by gatekeepers to select or reject news items to, referred to as 
"news values" (McQuail & Windahl, 1989:105).  
 
In 1965, Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge from the Peace Research Institute in 
Oslo studied the international flow of news about three conflicted regions, namely 
Cuba, Congo, and Cyprus, to Norway (Galtung & Ruge, 1965:64-91). Extrapolating 
factors identified as conducive to attracting attention on a psychological level, Galtung 
and Ruge postulated eight hypotheses about news selection. Using radio signals as 
metaphor, they referred to frequency, amplitude, unambiguity, meaningfulness, 
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consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, and composition. These factors were regarded 
as internationally applicable, but the authors granted that the selection of events as news 
may also be influenced by culture-bound factors, which for the Norwegian community 
included reference to elite nations, to elite people, to people, and to something negative. 
The authors stressed that these twelve factors are mere hypotheses and that "no claim is 
made for completeness" (Galtung & Ruge, 1965:64).  
 
In the light of Galtung and Ruge’s own ambivalence about the news values that they 
have identified, it is remarkable that over the past four decades this work has 
consistently been embraced as the Holy Writ of newsworthiness. Virtually all 
discussions of news values refer to this list, whether or not such studies pertain to 
international news flow as the 1965 study did (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001:264).  
  
News scientists have since attempted to produce alternative lists of news values (Harcup 
& O’Neill, 2001:266). For example, in his study of domestic news German-born 
American sociologist and educator Herbert Gans (1980:146) found that journalists use a 
range of interrelated considerations to determine the newsworthiness of a story. He 
divided these criteria into three groups, namely  
 
• substantive considerations, which deal with content and newsworthiness;  
• product considerations, which deal with the quality of the information; and  
• competitive considerations, which deal with a story’s worth measured against the 
rivalry between news organisations to find the most suitable news.  
 
Gans (1980:147-152) further identified four substantive considerations used to judge the 
importance of a news story:  
 
• rank in government and other hierarchies,  
• impact on the nation and national interest,  
• impact on large numbers of people, and  
• significance for the past and future.  
 
Gans (1980:155-157) also referred to interesting stories, which generally are what he 
called "people stories". Whereas "important" stories often tend to be "bad", "interesting" 
stories are generally "good" or at least "light". News selectors are inclined to choose 
these stories based on personal reaction, but a number of story types are more likely to 
be included in a publication, namely: 
 
• people stories,  
• role reversals,  
• human-interest stories,  
• exposé anecdotes,  
• hero stories and  
• "gee-whiz" stories. 
 
One of the more recent studies of news values is that of British journalism scholars 
Tony Harcup and Deirdre O’Neill (2001:261-280), who examined three British daily 
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newspapers to establish which news values are currently used the gatekeepers of the 
British press. Using the news values proposed by Galtung and Ruge (1965:4-91), they 
analysed 1 276 news articles to determine what may or may not have led to their 
selection (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001:66-267).  
 
While recognising that many of Galtung and Ruge’s news values still remain valid, they 
preferred to rename some of them (Harcup & O’Neill 2001:77). In their updated list of 
ten contemporary news values, Harcup and O’Neill (2001:79) found that generally news 
stories had to address one or more of the following issues to be considered newsworthy 
by gatekeepers:  
 
 
• Entertainment. Stories concerning sex, show 
business, human interest, animals, an unfolding 
drama, or offering opportunities for humorous 
treatment, entertaining photographs or witty 
headlines. This includes press conferences of 
Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed 
Saeed al-Sahaf, also known as "Comical Ali" 
because of the way he "bemused the West with 
his litany of claimed victories over coalition 
troops, and amused Arabs with his bottomless 
dictionary of insults". It would also include 
stories about the fate of the animals at the 
Baghdad zoo (Russell, 2003); and the drama of 
12 year old Ali Ismaeel Abbas who lost his arms 
and received burns over 60% of his body when 
his home was bombed by the coalition forces 
(The Star, 2003a). 
Figure 1. Iraqi Information 
Minister Mohammed Saeed al-
Sahaf  (Photo: CBS, 2003a). 
  
• The power elite. Stories concerning powerful 
individuals, organisations or institutions. In the 
context of Gulf War II, that would refer to news 
about people like US President George W. 
Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, about 
organisations such as the United Nations, the 
US Department of Defense, as well as some of 
the most influential media corporations, such as 
CNN and the BBC.  
 
  
Figure 2. George W. Bush 
delivering his 2003 State of the 
Nation address (Photo: CBC, 
2003). 
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• Relevance. Stories about issues, groups and 
nations perceived to be relevant to the audience. 
South Africa is a remarkably Americanised 
country, especially in consumerism and the arts 
(Cuthbertson, 1998). According to Bush there is 
"a vital and strong relationship" between the two 
countries (The White House, 2003), making 
matters of concern to the US important to South 
Africa. This, however, did not necessarily 
amount to favourable coverage of the US (De 
Beer, Wasserman & Botha, 2004:179-187).  
Figure 3. Politically and 
economically, there are strong 
ties between the USA and South 
Africa (Photo: The White 
House, 2003). 
  
• Good news. Stories with particular positive 
overtones such as rescues or cures. One of the 
most significant events during the war was the 
now controversial rescue of Army Pfc Jessica 
Lynch from the Saddam Hospital in Nasiryia, 
which prompted newspapers world-wide to wax 
lyrical about both her bravery and the heroism 
of her rescuers (Lamprecht, 2003a:8). 
Figure 4. Army Pfc Jessica 
Lynch (Photo: CNN, 2003a). 
 
• Bad news. Stories with particular negative 
overtones, such as conflict or tragedy. In times 
of conflict, definitions of "good" or "bad" news 
depends on point of view. Caskets draped with 
the US flag arriving at air bases is clearly bad 
news to the US (Milbank, 2003). Few of these 
images were published, as the Pentagon 
instructed US military bases that "there will be 
no arrival ceremonies for, or media coverage of, 
deceased military personnel returning to or 
departing from Ramstein (Germany) airbase or 
Dover (Del.) base, to include interim stops" 
(Milbank, 2003). These are the most important 
ports for the returning remains of soldiers who 
died in Iraq. Such images were the source of 
great joy amongst people harbouring anti-
American sentiments (Die Burger, 2003b:11).  
Figure 5. A rare photograph of 
flag-draped coffins inside a 
cargo plane at Kuwait 
International Airport. Tami 
Silico, the contract-worker who 
photographed the coffins, was 
released from her position 
shortly after the publication of 
this image (Photo: Bernton, 
2003). 
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• Magnitude. Stories that are perceived as 
sufficiently significant either in the numbers of 
people involved or in potential impact. The 
"shock and awe" attack was newsworthy not 
only because of the governmental and media 
hype beforehand,  but  also  for  the  more  than 
1 300 missiles and bombs that were exploded by 
the US military forces on selected targets in and 
around Baghdad on the night of 20 March 2003 
(Rapport, 2003a). 
Figure 6. The commencement of 
Gulf War II, designed to cause 
"shock and awe" (Photo: BBC 
News, 2003b). 
• Surprise. Stories that have an element of 
surprise and/or contrast. Although president 
George W. Bush already enjoys "important 
person" status in terms of newsworthiness, his 
Thanksgiving visit to his troops in Baghdad 
(Lamprecht, 2003b:6) was a fail-safe move to 
ensure wide media coverage, especially because 
of the clandestine nature of the visit.  
Figure 7. President Bush serves 
his troops (Photo: Associated 
Press, 2003a). 
  
• Media agenda. Stories that set or fit the news 
organisation’s own agenda. Global coverage of 
Gulf War II shows clear differences in the news 
agendas. The agendas of South African 
television broadcasters were so different that at 
times it seemed like they were covering 
different wars: while the government-owned 
SABC tended to portray the US in a fairly 
positive light, the news programmes by 
privately owned e-tv was harshly critical, 
verging on anti-American propaganda (De Beer, 
Wasserman & Botha, 2004:184).  
 
    
Figure 8. Newspapers of 22 
March 2003 (Newseum, 2003). 
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• Follow-up. Stories about subjects already in the 
news. One of the most prominent series of 
follow-up stories during Gulf War II dealt with 
"weapons of mass destruction", the presumed 
presence of which was given by the US and UK 
as raison d’etre to attack Iraq (The Star, 2003b; 
The Star, 2003c), despite reports to the contrary 
by the United Nation’s weapons inspectorate 
(Du Toit, 2003:4).  
Figure 9. The continued search 
for weapons of mass destruction 
(Photo: CNN, 2004). 
 
 
2.3.2 Shoemaker's model of gatekeeping 
In 1991, Pamela Shoemaker reviewed existing gatekeeping theories and research, most 
of which are based on the 1965 "model of selective gatekeeping" of Galtung and Ruge 
(1965), in a comprehensive summary (Shoemaker, 1991:74-76). She condensed and 
integrated these models into a detailed model of gatekeeping, which agreed with 
McNelly that news flow through various channels to news organisations, such as wire 
services, newspapers and television networks, where the messages are either rejected or 
selected and adapted before it is passed on to the next person or organisation.  
 
Recognising the complexity of the gatekeeping process, Shoemaker (1991) 
acknowledged the distinct traits and characteristics of the gatekeeper – people in a news 
organisation who select and shape news messages, such as reporters, news editors, sub-
editors and editors. These idiosyncrasies are based on the individuals’ life experiences 
and include personal likes and dislikes, values, attitudes, views of the profession, 
socialisation, approaches to problems and strategies of decision-making, which all 
impact on how news articles will be selected and adjusted (Figure 10).  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Intra-individual gatekeeping processes (illustration redrawn as in 
Shoemaker, 1991:76). 
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In the case of journalists reporting on Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of the factors that 
may have had an impact on the way potential news items were handled was access 
(Baker, 2003; Ghaffar & Feinstein, 2005; Wolff, 2003a): 
 
• some reporters were embedded with the military,  
• others were "unilaterals" travelling without protection,  
• quite a few were "embedded" in the Palestine Hotel in the heart of Baghdad,  
• hundreds reported from neighbouring countries,  
• many attended the regular briefings held by the US Department of Defense,  
• while others reported from the White House in Washington.  
 
In each case, fear, excitement, camaraderie, alcohol, exposure, frustration, exhaustion, 
disenchantment, patriotism, anger and even groupthink might have had an effect on 
what was reported (Baker, 2003; Ghaffar & Feinstein, 2005; Wolff, 2003a). 
 
As seen in Figure 11, these reporters must comply with the limitations of their news 
routines, and with their employers' priorities (Shoemaker, 1991:75). For example, when 
veteran Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus questioned whether the US government 
had proof that Saddam was hiding weapons of mass destruction, his editors refused to 
publish his story and only did so when forced by assistant managing editor Bob 
Woodward (Kurtz, 2004). Reporters accused the Washington Post of printing 
government views on the front page, while anything contradicting the administration 
was placed "on A18 on Sunday or A24 on Monday" (Kurz, 2004).  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Gatekeeping within an organisation is embedded in communication 
organisational characteristics (illustration redrawn as in Shoemaker, 1991:75). 
 
 
The demands of influential forces outside news organisations are equally important in 
news selection (Shoemaker, 1991:76). In Iraq embedded reporters had to comply with 
the Pentagon ground rules, which prohibited the publication of information on e.g. 
geographical position, troop strengths, equipment, current or future operations, and 
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unique military tactics (United States Department of Defense, 2003). Because Fox 
News correspondent Geraldo Rivera broke these rules by drawing a map in the sand 
indicating his location with the 101st Airborne unit relatively to Baghdad, as well as 
their destination, he was asked by the Pentagon to voluntarily leave Iraq (Plante, 2003).   
 
In this section of the model, Shoemaker also made provision for the "groupthink" 
phenomenon first described by psychologist Irving Janis in 1972, who defined it as  
 
a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a 
cohesive group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.   
 
This phenomenon is of particular interest in coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as 
two prominent US newspapers, namely Washington Post (Kurtz, 2004) and The New 
York Times (2004) both used the word "groupthink" when apologising for their 
erroneous reporting on weapons of mass destruction as justification for the war on Iraq.  
 
As indicated in Figure 12, surviving news items that were fashioned to suit the needs 
and characteristics of the organisation, are subsequently either transmitted directly to the 
audience, or passed to a next news organisation, where it is subjected to a similar series 
of gatekeeping procedures (Shoemaker, 1991:74).  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Gatekeeping between organisations is embedded in social system ideology 
and culture and is influenced by social and institutional factors (illustration redrawn as 
in Shoemaker, 1991:74). 
 
 
The first section of Shoemaker’s (1991) model of gatekeeping can be applied to the war 
in Iraq, where war news flowed along various lines from the sources to the public in 
South Africa. The Sunday Times had their own unilateral reporter in Baghdad 
(Schoonakker, 2003), which cut down considerably the number of gates and the 
consequent sifting and alterations to the messages. The Star as part of the international 
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Independent group, received its reports from sister publications in the United Kingdom 
(Harber, 2003), which to an extent also reduced the number of external gates. All the 
other newspapers, however, relied solely on agency material, which some newspapers 
adapted to their readership, while others, such as The Citizen, published wire reports 
without rewriting them.  
 
As indicated by the feedback loops in Figure 12, news organisations do not act in 
isolation, but form part of the ideology and social system in which they function, and 
their news agenda is therefore subjected to sanctioning by their audience as 
representatives of this community (Shoemaker, 1991:74). They are also under pressure 
from external institutions such as advertisers, shareholders, and government bodies. 
 
The extent of these pressures can best be illustrated by the dismissal of Pulitzer Prize 
winning news correspondent Peter Arnett by US broadcaster NBC after he made critical 
comments about the US war effort when interviewed on Iraqi television (Sales, 2003).  
Initially NBC defended Arnett, but within 24 hours yielded to outside pressure to fire 
their only correspondent in Baghdad. The front of organisations outside a media 
company that may exert pressure to influence news content is extremely complex: for 
example, NBC belongs to General Electric (General Electric, 2005), the manufacturer of 
amongst other things, engines for F-16 fighters and Apache Longbow helicopters (GE 
Transportation, 2005) and holder of contracts with the US Department of Defense to the 
value of $4.4 billion for the period 2003-2004 (Department of Defense, 2003a). While 
one cannot allege that General Electric in any way perpetuated the war, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that a company would strive to protect its relationship with such 
an important client (Deserano, 2003; Ireland, 2003). 
 
Other gatekeeping criteria deal with issues such as the size and preferences of the target 
market, and editorial policies of the news organisations (Elliot & Lester, 2003). A news 
organisation’s ability in terms of staff, technology and funds to cover events or issues is 
equally important. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, this played a crucial role in the 
coverage by the different South African media companies: while Johnnic’s Sunday 
Times sent reporter Bonny Schoonakker to Baghdad at a cost in excess of R5 000 per 
day, while Media24 preferred to use agency reports (Harber, 2003):  
 
“It would have been ideal to have someone there. Only your own person 
knows what will speak to your readers,” said Beeld deputy editor Henry 
Jeffreys. “But when we looked at the resources required to do it ourselves, 
we decided it wasn’t worth our while.” 
 
Once a message has passed through a "gate", it is transferred to the next gatekeeper in 
the news flow channel, and lastly to the audience, as a news story. Through selection 
and the assignment of salience by e.g. position on the page and in the newspaper, as 
well as headline size, the gatekeepers set the newspaper’s agenda (McCombs, 2000). 
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2.4 Agendasetting 
"Agendasetting" describes the media’s powerful ability to focus public attention on 
specific issues (McQuail & Windahl, 1981:62).  This ability was first recognised by 
newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann, who referred to "the pictures in our heads" in 
his book Public Opinion (Lippmann, 1922): "The only feeling that anyone can have 
about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that 
event" – an image to a large extent created by the news media.  
 
This view was confirmed in 1948 by US sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert 
Merton (1971) who referred to one of the mass media's roles in society as "status-
conferral" function, which means that  
 
the mass media confer status on public issues, persons, organizations, and 
social movements. Common experience as well as research testifies that the 
social standing of persons or social policies is raised when these command 
favorable attention in the mass media ... The mass media bestow prestige 
and enhance the authority of individuals and groups by legitimizing their 
status (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1971:560-561). 
 
Examining this idea in his 1963 book The press and foreign policy, which dealt with the 
media's role in the foreign policy decision-making process, Bernard Cohen, a political 
scientist from the University of Wisconsin, observed that the press "may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about" (1963:12-13): 
 
It is here, in the description of the political environment and the suggestion 
of the policy alternatives that give the best promise of managing the 
environment, that we shall find the press playing such an important role in 
current thinking about foreign policy ... For most of the foreign policy 
audience, the really effective political map of the world – that is to say, their 
operational map of the world – is drawn by the reporter and the editor, not 
by the cartographer. 
  
It was US reporter and author Walter Lippmann’s (1922) insight that directly resulted in 
the agendasetting theory of McCombs and Shaw (1972), which deals with "the 
relationship between the media agenda - the prominence of issues in the media - and 
perceptions of the importance of those among the public" (McCombs, 2006). By the 
emphasis placed on events through coverage, the media indicate the importance of an 
issue to the public, which sets an agenda for public attention and consequently lays the 
foundation for the public’s opinion on a particular issue (McCombs, 1999).  
 
It must be noted that the term "agenda", according to McCombs (2000), is not intended 
to imply that a news organisation has a premeditated, often evil, "agenda" that it pursues 
relentlessly, but is merely a descriptive term, referring to the result over time of 
numerous day-to-day decisions by all the gatekeepers in a news organisation, from the 
reporter in the field to the sub-editor and the editor. It includes the influence of 
advertisers, shareholders, company directors, and the organisation’s target audience.  
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In their seminal agendasetting study, McCombs and Shaw (1972) over a period of 20 
days matched the images 100 voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, had of the central 
issues in the 1968 presidential election campaign, with the media content of the time 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972: 321).  
 
[W]e conducted a public opinion survey to see what voters in Chapel Hill 
thought were the important issues ... and then indeed we found a near-
perfect correspondence in the pattern of issues on the public agenda, the 
array of issues - the issues the public thought was most important, the one 
they thought second-most important, et cetera. That the line-up of issues on 
the public agenda was very similar to the line-up of issues that was in the 
new coverage of the previous month ...  (McCombs, 2006). 
 
According to McCombs (2000) newspapers provide various cues about the salience of a 
particular news event through the placement of a report on a page, the page it is printed 
on, and the size of the headline, for example. When the same cues regarding the 
importance of an issue recur over a period of days, weeks, months, or even longer, it 
becomes possible to identify the agenda of a news organisation.  
 
Since that first study almost four decades ago, and more than 350 empirical studies later 
(Weaver, 2007:143), the agendasetting theory has expanded into five distinct stages 
(McCombs, 2000; McCombs, 2006). These are: 
 
• first level agendasetting, which is the basic transfer of the salience of objects;  
• need for orientation, or the audience's psychological level of awareness or 
knowledge;  
• second level agendasetting, which refers to the transfer of attribute salience;  
• inter-media agendasetting, which deals with the transfer of salience among the 
media;  
• priming, which addresses the consequences of the pictures created in the public's 
mind. 
 
2.4.1 First level agendasetting  
First level agendasetting refers to the relationship between the media's agenda of salient 
issues and the public's perception of the importance of those same issues – which is still 
regarded as the crux of the agendasetting theory (McCombs, 2006). The idea of first 
level agendasetting resulted from the theory initiated by McCombs and Shaw after their 
1968 Chapel Hill research project which dealt with the prominence or salience of 
objects: "public issues, political candidates, other public figures. It could be any set of 
objects that you might be interested in" (McCombs, 2006). 
 
Other first level agendasetting studies include those by Winter and Eyal (1981), Iyengar 
and Kinder (1987), Eaton (1989) and Brosius and Kepplinger (1990). 
 
2.4.2 Need for orientation  
The concept of "need for orientation" asserts that the media's influence on perceptions 
of object salience is greatly affected by people's psychological need to be familiar with 
their mental and physical surroundings (McCombs, 2006). This insight came during an 
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agendasetting study of the 1972 US presidential election, when McCombs and Shaw 
realised that the media agenda did not have a sweeping or general effect on public 
opinion, but that it was determined by the differences in individuals' levels of interest in 
an issue, and their knowledge thereof.  
 
When people are in an unfamiliar situation, they experience a "need for orientation" 
which makes them turn to the news media to orient themselves (McCombs, 2006). 
Highly knowledgeable people will be less likely to be influenced by the news agenda, 
but interested people who have little knowledge would have a strong need for 
orientation, resulting in a very strong correspondence between the media agenda and 
those people's opinions about an issue. 
 
Studies on "need for orientation" were done by Weaver (1977), Erbring, Goldenberg & 
Miller (1980), Wanta (1997), Poindexter, McCombs and Smith (2003) and Matthes 
(2006). 
 
2.4.3 Second level agendasetting  
The idea of a "second level" of agendasetting appeared soon after the first agendasetting 
theory was formulated (McCombs, 2006), although the name was only formalised in the 
mid-1990s (Lee, 2005:17). In recent years, studies of agendasetting increasingly moved 
away from first level agendasetting, or the media telling the audience ''what to think 
about'', to focus on second level or attribute agendasetting, which means the media is 
telling the audience "how to think about" issues or objects (Sheafer, 2007:22).  
 
Stated differently, while the first level of agendasetting refers to the transmission of 
object salience, a second level of agendasetting involves the transmission of attribute 
salience, which in fact may guide people in what to think (McCombs, 2000). An 
"object" refers to for example topics, issues, and persons, which may each have various 
attributes, i.e. characteristics and properties that make up the multi-dimensional image 
of an object. Just as objects may be presented by the news media as more or less 
important, so too may attributes vary in salience, which makes them equally powerful as 
agendasetting tools.  
 
Perhaps a quick way to summarize the difference between the basic agenda-
setting effect, and what's now come to be called attribute agendasetting, is 
in terms of Lippman's phrase "the pictures in our heads". The object 
agenda, in effect, says "What are the pictures about? What are they pictures 
of?" The attribute agendasetting really says "What are the pictures? What 
does this really look like?" (McCombs, 2006).  
 
Second level agendasetting studies (e.g. Kiousis, Bantimaroudis, & Ban, 1999; Kim, 
Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002) found that the object attributes emphasised by the media 
impact on the public’s perception the saliency of attributes such as a political 
candidate’s credentials and views on political issues (Sheafer, 2007:22).  
 
According to McCombs (quoted in Sheafer, 2007:23) two broad groups of attributes can 
be identified at the second level of agendasetting, namely  
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• cognitive or substantive attributes which deals with "the definition of issues (or 
objects in general) in the media", and  
• affective attributes which deals with "the tone of media presentation, with 
evaluation of issues (i.e., positive, negative, or neutral)". 
 
Empirical studies, however, do not draw a clear distinction between cognitive and 
affective attributes (Sheafer, 2007:23). 
 
Other recent studies on second level agendasetting include those by Scheufele (2000), 
Golan and Wanta (2001) and Kiousis (2005).  
 
2.4.4 Inter-media agendasetting  
The third stage of agendasetting, namely inter-media agendasetting, refers to the impact 
of one media's agenda on that of others (McCombs, Lopez-Escobar, & Llamas, 2000). 
This means that the salience of an object or its attributes in the stories published by one 
medium will be mirrored by other media. 
 
Once it became obvious that media reports influence the public's perception of the 
importance of various issues, media researchers wanted to know who is responsible for 
the media's agenda (McCombs, 2006). This is a complex question with many answers: 
most importantly, the media's agenda is shaped by news values and journalistic 
tradition. The agenda is also shaped by outside influences, such as various sources: 
press spokespersons, government officials, politicians, and the ubiquitous public 
relations agencies. However, an agenda is also shaped by  
 
the whole mix of different media - the relationship that exists, for instance, 
between blogs and news media, both Internet and traditional ... [which] in 
the jargon of the research, is called "inter-media agendasetting" – that is, 
the influence of one news media on another in setting the agenda 
(McCombs, 2006). 
 
Studies on inter-media agendasetting were done by Reese and Danielian (1989), 
Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, and Weaver (1991), Roberts and McCombs, (1994); 
Lopez-Escobar, Llamas, McCombs and Lennon (1998), Golan (2006) and Zhang 
(2006), amongst others.  
 
2.4.5 Priming  
Priming, regarded by McCombs (2006) as the fourth stage of agendasetting, refers to a 
process by which the media gives more attention to some issues, while ignoring others, 
thereby influencing “the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and 
candidates for public office are judged” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987:63): 
 
By priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others, news sets 
the terms by which political judgments are rendered and political choices 
are made … When the news focuses on a problem, the public’s priorities 
are altered and altered again as it moves to something else (Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987:33). 
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Attention to the effect of agendasetting on the audience dates back to the study by US 
journalism and mass communication specialists David H. Weaver (Indiana University), 
Maxwell E. McCombs (Syracuse University) and Charles Spellman (Rutgers 
University)(1975) on the effects of the news coverage of the Watergate scandal 
(Weaver, 2007:145). Although Weaver et al. (1975) proposed that the news media 
might suggest to the audience which issues should be used to evaluate the politicians, 
they did not use the term "priming". Political Science and Communication Studies 
Professor at the University of California, Shanto Iyengar and University of Michigan 
Political Science Chair Donald R. Kinder (1987) associated the effects of television 
agendasetting with perceptions of the US President "in a demonstration of what some 
cognitive psychologists have called priming – making certain issues or attributes more 
salient and more likely to be accessed in forming opinions" (Weaver, 2007:145). 
 
Priming is similar to first level agendasetting, but goes further by addressing the effect 
of these agendas on the audience's perceptions of an issue (Lee, 2005:17-18). It begs the 
question: "What are the consequences of creating these pictures in the public's mind?" 
(McCombs, 2006).  Priming is based on the assumption that people's perceptions of 
other individuals, events or issues rely on information that can be easily accessed from 
memory (Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2001:4). According to this view, people will therefore 
make evaluations or judgements based on what they regard as being more important, or 
what is discussed most in the media, as this information is the easiest to access. 
 
It must be noted that some authors disagree with the notion that priming is an extension 
of agendasetting, e.g. in their study, Political Communication Professor (University of 
Pennsylvania) Vincent Price and David Tewksbury of the Department of Speech 
Communication (University of Illinois) (1997:176) came to the conclusion that 
agendasetting is a variation of priming, and not the other way around. 
 
Priming was also studied by Brewer, Graf and Willnat (2003), Druckman (2004), 
Sheafer and Weimann (2005), Kelleher and Wolak (2006) and Edy and Meirick (2007). 
 
2.5 Framing  
There is a close relationship between agendasetting – especially second level 
agendasetting – and framing. This relationship is apparent from McCombs's 
(1999) definition, which describes framing as  
 
the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes 
for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is 
discussed.  
 
A generally accepted definition of framing is, however, problematic. Although there 
exists abundant literature on framing – some 350 articles are indexed in Communication 
Abstracts for the period 1971 to 2005 (Weaver, 2007:143-144) – analysts differ in their 
interpretation of the concept when dealing with the different approaches to and theories 
of frames, framing devices, models of framing, framing analyses and framing effects 
(Kinder, 2007:158).  
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Frame analysis is neither a full-fledged theoretical paradigm, nor a 
coherent methodological approach. Rather, frame analyses are a number of 
related, even though sometimes partially incompatible methods for the 
analysis of discourses (Scheufele, 1999:18).  
 
American sociologist Erving Goffman (1974:21) is one of the first scholars to define 
framing, which he explains as the many ways in which the media create the context 
within which the audience may "locate, perceive, identify and label" world affairs, in 
other words, to make sense of those events.  
 
Columbia University Journalism and Sociology Professor Todd Gitlin (1980:7) points 
out that the largely invisible frames organises the world for journalists, who report on 
world events, by enabling them to quickly and routinely process large amounts of 
information. Conversely, frames also help the audience to understand the world.  
 
Framing – that is, making sense of the world by  
 
• the selection of news stories,  
• the shaping of its content, and  
• the highlighting important, novel, dramatic, and distinctive information, while  
• ignoring or under-emphasising the ordinary or expected,  
 
is therefore inherent to the journalistic profession (Gans, 1980:199-201). This does not 
necessarily mean that journalists endeavour to "spin a story or deceive their audiences" 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007:11). On the contrary, some form of media frame is 
essential to the understanding of the world – without it, much of what happens and what 
is said would remain "mere talk and incomprehensible sounds" (Tuchman, 1978:192).  
 
American Media and Public Affairs Professor Robert M. Entman (1993:55) describes 
framing as basically involving selection and salience: 
 
To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more 
salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described. Frames, then, define 
problems – determine what a causal agent is doing and costs and benefits, 
usually measured in terms of cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the 
forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal 
agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments 
for the problem and predict their likely effects.  
 
In order to analyse frames present in coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is 
necessary to decide on an applicable frame. This is rather problematic, as just like the 
definition of framing is vague in literature (Scheufele, 1999:18; Hyun, 2004; Kinder, 
2007:158), so is the identification of frames: "We are not told how to identify a frame" 
(Carvalho, 2000). This "conceptual conundrum" often leaves it to the researcher to 
"propose their own definition of frames and approaches to framing study before they 
begin their research" (Hyun, 2004). 
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The result of this is what Kinder (2007:158) calls the "operational thinness" of empirical 
literature on framing, which "typically operationalizes frame in an emaciated way. 
Alternative frames are represented by a single presentation of a sentence or two, 
reminders of how an issue might be understood." He suggests a return to Gamson and 
Lasch's (1983:399) original formulation of framing, which Gamson and Modigliani 
(1989:3-4) refined to five framing devices "that suggest how to think about the issue"  
 
• metaphors  
• exemplars (historical examples from which lessons are drawn) 
• catchphrases  
• depictions  
• visual images (icons)  
 
and three reasoning devices "that justify what should be done about it" 
 
• roots (i.e., a causal analysis),  
• consequences (i.e., a particular type of effect), and  
• appeals to principle (i.e., a set of moral claims) (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989:3-4). 
 
This study focuses on how international news flows and not on the effects of the news 
on the audience. Therefore, framing devices are particularly important to this research. 
 
In this regard, American public relations scholar Kirk Hallahan (1999) proposes three 
types of frames, of which the last is especially interesting for the purposes of this study: 
 
• valence framing – information is presented as opposing valences, i.e. it is put 
either in  a positive or a negative light, for example Bush protects his people, 
Saddam kills his people; 
• semantic framing – the simple alternative phrasing of terms, e.g. "terrorist" versus 
"freedom fighter"; 
• story framing – the most complex form of framing that involves  
 - the selection of key themes as the focus of the message 
 - the incorporation of various techniques of storytelling to support the theme 
(Hallahan, 1999:207-208). 
 
2.5.1 Story frame 
The media presented Operation Iraqi Freedom as a story or an action film (Figure 13, 
next page), complete with heroes and villains, which led to allegations of the 
"Hollywoodisation" of the war (Knight, 2004; Watkins, 2007).  
 
Coalition forces were characterised as freedom loving, working hard to 
avoid civilian casualties and seeking to protect religious diversity ... The 
Iraqi military were meanwhile depicted as brutal, tyrannical, corrupt, 
unethical and deploying “weapons of mass murder” ... Saddam Hussein 
and his sons, like a gang of Hollywood rustlers, were given forty eight hours 
to get out of town (Knight, 2004: 1, 5-6). 
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By the time of writing, no clear definition existed of the term "Hollywoodisation" but it 
is understood by this author as the presentation of newsworthy events as a story akin to 
a Hollywood film in order to make it more comprehensible to the public.  
 
 
Figure 13. Mad Magazine (2003) 
satirised the "Hollywoodisation" of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom by framing 
it as a fairytale akin to the Star Wars 
epic. 
 
 
There are many reasons for the use of the story frame in the production of news. It is 
employed to attract attention by provoking feeling in the audience, "inducing him to feel 
a sense of personal identification" (Lippmann, 1922:10). It is also a consequence of the 
mass media's continuous need for more news (Boorstin, 1961:16). To satisfy this need, 
"bogus dramas and humbug heroes" are created which spawn an "empty world of 
celebrity" (Hanson, 1999).  
 
We expect new heroes every season, a literary masterpiece every month, a 
dramatic spectacular every week, a rare sensation every night (Boorstin, 
1961:16).  
 
Jamie Shea, NATO spokesman during the Balkan war, told business leaders in 
Switzerland, in a talk named Selling a conflict – the ultimate PR challenge, that he 
credited his successful media campaign in the Balkans to giving the public what they 
loved: "daily soap operas with good characters". Whenever things grew quiet on the war 
front, he used the time "to explain again who's the good guy and who's the bad guy". An 
important PR principle, according to Shea, is: "If you don't have a story, make a story" 
(Berlin Online, 2000). 
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To present hard news as entertainment, journalists use traditional story elements in 
investigative reports (Ettema & Glasser, 1988). The usefulness of the story frame was 
tested by Massachusetts Institute of Technology political scientist Alan J. Berinsky and 
Kinder (2006) in their study of the decision making process. They found that 
 
citizens understand particular event sequences when they can organize the 
relevant information into coherent stories. Citizens should therefore 
understand a political event better when the event is framed by the media to 
conform to a narrative structure (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006:640-641).  
 
As illustrated by Shea's statement above (Berlin Online, 2000), the groundwork for the 
story frames that appear in the media is laid by people who have the most interest in the 
current events (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006:641, 654). Political leaders, analysts and 
government officials tend to frame their views and statements – to be transferred to the 
public through all the various sectors of mass media – with the audience in mind, 
thereby shaping the way the public process and store information that would contribute 
to their understanding of politics.  
 
In a study on how people make sense of politics, Berinsky and Kinder (2006:654) found 
that when information is framed as a good story, the audience's understanding of the 
data changes, which in turn appears to shape opinion. These frames  
 
do not need to present strong arguments for one side or another in order to 
change public opinion. Small and subtle differences in the presentation of 
information can sometimes do the trick.  
 
Berinsky and Kinder (2006:642) declares that  
 
[a] good frame is at its heart a good story. To understand why some frames 
succeed and others fail, we need to understand what makes an effective 
story.  
 
According to Kinder (2007:159)  
 
[p]eople know what makes a good story, and this knowledge influences how 
they understand text and how they represent such text in their minds ... a 
good story organizes and orders the jumble of facts and claims. Evidence is 
unscrambled. Causal and intentional relations are established. Gaps are 
filled. Plot turns are identified. 
 
Thus, the story frame is a useful device to create desired perceptions about current 
issues, and its utilisation as a strategic tool is advocated by US military scholars 
William Casebeer and James A. Russell (2005):  
 
 
if military force is to play the appropriate role in our national security 
strategy and the “Global War on Terror,” we need a more comprehensive 
understanding of how a failure to tell good stories can lead to an increased 
risk of insurgencies, violent social movements, and terrorist action .... 
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there’s ample evidence that stories influence our ability to recall events, 
motivate people to act, modulate our emotional reactions to events, cue 
certain heuristics and biases, structure our problem-solving capabilities, 
and ultimately perhaps even constitute our very identity. 
 
Because the story frame has become a weapon in the hands of government officials and 
military strategists who use the media to disseminate carefully constructed tales (Payne, 
2005:81), it became imperative to determine what the elements of a good story are.   
 
There is no generally accepted definition for a story (Casebeer & Russell, 2005), but the 
first true attempt to define the structure of stories was made by Vladimir Propp in 1928 
when he analysed Russian fairytales for recurrent plot lines and characters (Propp, 
1968:25-65). Propp’s seminal study is often regarded as the birth of modern narratology 
(Schärfe, 2001:18). As such, Propp's schema will be used in this study to demarcate the 
story frame to be used in the analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom media coverage.1 
Additionally, Propp's model is still commonly used in the analysis of cinematographical 
scripts, and is therefore particularly well suited to the analysis of the story frame in 
news reports (Simpson, 2004:73; Watkins, 2007). 
 
2.5.2 Propp's fairytale analysis 
In 1928, Vladimir Propp pioneered the structural analysis of stories when he analysed a 
collection of Russian tales of magic, or fairytales (Schärfe, 2001:18). He broke down 
100 folktales into their "small component parts" and identified eight character types 
(Table 1) and 31 basic elements or "functions" (Table 21, next page) in the stories 
(Propp, 1968:25-65, 71-91). Not all the elements were present in all the folktales, but 
those that were, always recurred in the same order.  
 
 
Table 1. Propp's dramatis personae – the basic character types (Propp, 1968:71-91) 
Hero suffers from actions of  the villain  
is aware that something is missing 
agrees to fight for the sake of another  
may be supplied with a magic agent  
Villain fights with the hero, threatens the victim   
Donor provides hero with magic agent that will that eventually end misfortune 
Helper helps the hero to solve his task by assisting, rescuing, solving 
Magical Agent transforms hero by giving him supernatural powers  
Dispatcher sends the hero on his quest  
Princess the princess brings luck and a "happy ever after" 
Victim has to be rescued, often rewards the hero and/or punishes the villain 
 
                                                 
1 It is not the purpose of this study to delve into the intricate realm of the narratology, nor is it to advocate 
any narratological or structuralist theory. Therefore, despite the merits of the work by authors such as 
Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BC), Freytag (1863), Lévi-Strauss (1963), Foucault (1966) and Barthes (1975), 
the historical development, advantages and reciprocal critiques of different approaches to narratology will 
not be discussed.  
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Table 2. Propp's 31 basic functions (Propp, 1968:25-65) 
1. One of the members of a family absents himself from home. 
2. An interdiction is addressed to the hero.  
3. The interdiction is violated  
4. The villain makes an attempt at reconnaissance.  
5. The villain receives information about his victim.  
6. The villain attempts to deceive his victim as to capture him or his belongings.  
7. The victim submits to deception and thereby unwittingly helps his enemy.  
8. The villain causes harm or injury to a member of a family.  
9. One member of a family either lacks something or desires to have something.  
10. Misfortune or lack is made known; the hero is approached with a request or command; he 
is allowed to go or he is dispatched.  
11. The seeker agrees to or decides upon counteraction.  
12. The hero leaves home.  
13. The hero is tested, which prepares him to receive either a magical agent or helper.  
14. The hero acquires the use of a magical agent.  
15. The hero is transferred, delivered, or led to the whereabouts of an object of search.  
16. The hero and the villain join in direct combat.  
17. The hero is branded.  
18. The villain is defeated.  
19. The initial misfortune or lack is liquidated.  
20. The hero returns.  
21. The hero is pursued.  
22. Rescue of the hero from pursuit.  
23. The hero, unrecognized, arrives home or in another country.  
24. A false hero presents unfounded claims.  
25. A difficult task is proposed to the hero.  
26. The task is resolved.  
27. The hero is recognized.  
28. The false hero or villain is exposed.  
29. The hero is given a new appearance.  
30. The villain is punished.  
31. The hero is married and ascends the throne. 
 
 
When these elements are distilled into a simpler form, the most common story told is 
that of a villain who harms a victim, prompting the hero to go on a quest. The hero 
receives a magic agent from a donor, which he uses to defeat the villain in order to right 
the initial wrong and ultimately to win the hand of the princess (Propp, 1968:135-143). 
While these stories have enduring appeal as fairytales, they also form the backbone of 
popular cinema. Propp’s model has been used for the analysis of films such as 
Apocalypse Now, Star Wars and 2001: A Space Odyssey (Film Education, 2005a & b), 
but may also serve as a frame for the analysis of international news (Propp, 1968: 143). 
 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom the author, as an ordinary member of the global 
audience, was struck by the strong "story-like" coverage by the media. Broadly 
speaking, the events in Iraq were apparently framed by the Anglo-American news 
media – especially CNN, BBC and Sky News, the three television news channels 
available via the South African satellite channel DSTV – as an attempt by Bush, as the 
leader of the only "super power" in the world, to protect his country, and maybe even 
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the whole world, against the evil deeds and aspirations of Saddam Hussein. This fits 
comfortably into Propp’s fairytale frame, in terms of which the Operation Iraqi 
Freedom story might read as follows:   
 
The hero. In this case, President George W. Bush is the indisputable hero. The Wall 
Street Journal described Bush as  
 
not only of strong moral character himself, but … he actually believes in 
things ... He sees rights and wrongs … and has a clear vision of what is and 
is not in America's interest and does not hesitate to act accordingly (Du 
Pont, 2002).  
 
In his January 2003 State of the Union address, Bush pledged:   
 
Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the 
freedom and security of the American people (Bush, 2003a). 
 
 
Figure 14. Against the backdrop of a 
painting of Jesus, with his body-
language mirroring that of the 
Saviour, Bush is by association 
framed as everything that is heroic, 
noble, good, fair, honest, and 
blameless (Photo: Spiegel Online, 
2004). 
 
 
According to White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer (2003a), however,  
 
nobody, but nobody, is more reluctant to go to war than President Bush 
…He hopes it can be averted, but he is also clear about the fact that one way 
to save American lives is to prevent Saddam Hussein from engaging in 
something that can be far, far worse than the price we saw on September 11.  
 
Despite this reluctance, Bush (2003b) told the press at his ranch in Texas:  
 
I'm going to continue doing the job the American people expect, which is to 
safeguard America and Americans ... My job is to protect the American 
people ... I've got my mind on the peace and security of the American 
people.  
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When he met Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, he pledged: 
 
My most important obligation is to protect the American people from 
further harm.  And I will do that (Bush, 2003c).  
 
For this, the US Senate and House of Representatives gave him the authority to  
 
take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist 
organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who 
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001 or harbored such persons or organizations (The 
White House, 2002).  
 
The hero is often assisted by a trustworthy side-kick (Propp, 1968: 152) – a role which 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair assumed during Gulf War II.  
 
The villain. Saddam Hussein is the villain in this tale, "the man who tried to kill my 
dad", according to George W. Bush, referring to an alleged plot to assassinate Bush 
Senior in Kuwait in 1993 (Lyon, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 15. With his dark suit, fedora 
and moustache, the gun-toting Saddam 
Hussein apparently fits in his frame as 
a Brando-esque villain (Photo: CNN, 
2001). 
 
 
In the words of Bush’s national security adviser Condoleezza Rice (Mail & Guardian, 
2002), Saddam is 
 
an evil man who, left to his own devices, will wreak havoc again on his own 
population, his neighbours and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and 
the means to deliver them, all of us.  
 
Richard Perle, chair of the Department of Defense’s Defense Policy Board, reminded 
readers in an article in The Telegraph that  
 
he has invaded two countries and killed with impunity. His brutal rule 
includes slaughter, rape, mutilation and the destruction of families … 
Saddam is working feverishly to acquire nuclear weapons (Perle, 2002a).  
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US Secretary of State Colin Powell was quoted saying that  
 
Saddam Hussein's inhumanity knows no limits … [He] has investigated 
dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gangrene, plague, 
typhus, tetanus, cholera, camel-pox and haemorrhagic fever, and he also 
has the wherewithal to develop smallpox (Powell, 2003).  
 
The Iraqi leader’s alleged links with Al Qaeda, who was held responsible for the 11 
September 2001 attacks, were also widely published:  
 
Bush said the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein should be 
considered part of the war on terror "because of the nature of Saddam 
Hussein … because of his Al Qaeda connections, because of his history, he 
is a danger to Americans" (CNN, 2003b).  
 
Even Saddam’s taste in art was used to vilify him: The Guardian’s art critic Jonathan 
Jones (2003) described him as "a miniature Hitler, a cut-price Nero", but whose taste is 
less elevated than that of Hitler. "These are art for the barely literate, or the barely 
sentient, dredged from some red-lit back alley of the brain".  
 
Much the same images were portrayed during Gulf War I, when Saddam was referred to 
as a Hitler, a dictator, a military strongman, a madman who was a menace to world 
peace and the American way of life, a beast and a monster that Bush Senior had to 
destroy (Kellner, 1991).  
 
The victim or princess. In his 7 October 2002 speech in Cincinnati Bush (2002) laid a 
perfect foundation for the future portrayal of the American nation as a victim in the Gulf 
War II "fairytale", who must be saved from the villain. In this speech, Bush reminded 
the American people of 11 September 2001, when  
 
America felt its vulnerability – even to threats that gather on the other side 
of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront 
every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering 
to America.  
 
 
Figure 16. During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, US government officials 
often reminded the American people 
of the tragedy of 11 September2001, 
thereby framing them as the victim: 
vulnerable and in need of a saviour 
(Photo: New York Newsday, 2001). 
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He continued to say that "the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America 
… with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons" and that the threat 
against the US already significant, and that continues to grow (Bush, 2002). 
  
We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical 
agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam 
Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons.  
 
Bush (2002) told Americans that Iraq and Al Qaeda shared a common enemy: the USA, 
and that on 11 September 2001, "Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the 
terrorist attacks on America". He warned that if Iraqi could obtain the smallest amount 
of enriched uranium, it could produce a nuclear weapon in less than a year:  
 
We've experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that 
those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of 
innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would 
be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon (Bush, 2002).  
 
These views were repeated in January 2003, when Bush again reminded the American 
people of their vulnerability and the threat Saddam posed:  
 
because of Al Qaeda connections, because of his history, he's a danger to 
the American people, and we've got to deal with him before it is too late 
(CBS, 2003b).  
 
The quest. The hero’s quest in the fairytale frame was to topple Saddam Hussein, and 
thereby to remove the threat of his weapons of mass destruction. Bush was quoted 
saying that Saddam was producing and hiding weapons that would enable him to 
dominate the region and intimidate "the civilized world – and we will not allow it" 
(Bush, 2003d).  
 
He continued to say that if Saddam’s government did not meet UN demands  
we are prepared to disarm Iraq by force … The safety of the American 
people depends on ending this direct and growing threat (Bush, 2003d).  
 
 
Figure 17. Bush announced the start 
of the war from the Oval Office, and 
told his nation that his quest was to 
disarm Saddam in order to protect 
the Americans  
(Photo: The Boston Globe, 2003a).  
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In his widely publicised address of 17 March 2003 Bush declared that the US  
 
has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national 
security. That duty falls to me as commander-in-chief by the oath I have 
sworn, by the oath I will keep. The terrorist threat to America and the world 
will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed (Bush, 
2003e).  
 
In his quest to quickly find and neutralise Saddam, Bush gave his permission to launch 
some 40 missiles against a "target of opportunity - house in suburban Baghdad where 
Saddam was suspected to be, thereby moving the strikes against Iraq ahead of schedule 
(Gellman & Priest, 2003:1). 
  
The donor. The US government acted as the donor of the magic agent that helped the 
hero in his quest. The US Congress recognised "the threat to [their] country" and "voted 
overwhelmingly … to support the use of force against Iraq" (Bush, 2003f).  
 
 
Figure 18. Framed as donors in the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom fairytale, 
members of the US Congress 
congratulate Bush after they agreed to 
foot a military bill in excess of $74 
billion (Photo: NRK, 2003). 
 
 
Members of Congress also told the media that "they will quickly approve President 
Bush's $74.7 billion request for war spending", although many were uncertain about 
how the funds would be spent (USA Today, 2003:11). Fully supportive of the war, 
despite a few in-house squabbles, "the House and Senate have been doing more 
cheerleading than debating or legislating when it comes to war-related issues" since the 
bombs started exploding over Baghdad (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2003).  
 
Congress exercised its war power "by building and maintaining the military through the 
budget – deciding what bombers to build and what tanks to buy". The reason given for 
this united front was that  
 
once U.S. troops are committed, Congress will give them whatever they 
need, whether they agree with the military engagement or not ... Congress is 
not likely to leave them in a lurch (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2003).  
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The magic agent. In this instance, the US military acted as the magic agent provided by 
the government, the donor, to aid the hero in succeeding in his quest. This "magic 
agent" was described in the media as an "immense force" that Bush was about to 
unleash (Walczak, 2003), acting with "breathtaking precision, almost eyewatering 
speed, persistence, agility and lethality" (Sullivan, 2003a) in order to "to disarm Iraq, to 
free its people and to defend the world from grave danger" (Bush, 2003g). 
 
 
Figure 19. President Bush gives the 
thumbs-up sign to his troops, framed 
as the magic agent with which he 
planned to obliterate the villain 
(Photo: The Boston Globe, 2003b). 
 
 
The "peace of a troubled world" became the responsibility of the US military as Bush 
promised Saddam that he will use the "full force and might of the US military" against 
him, referring to the 280 000 coalition troops, six carrier battle groups, and more than 
700 aircraft that were ready to "pummel Iraq" (Walczak, 2003). As the offensive stages 
of the war drew to a close, Bush told the troops onboard USS Abraham Lincoln that  
 
we have fought for the cause of liberty and for the peace of the world. Our 
nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment, yet it is you, the 
members of the United States military, who achieved it ... Because of you 
our Nation is more secure. Because of you the tyrant has fallen and Iraq is 
free (Bush, 2003h).  
 
The victory. The Iraq "fairytale" frame produced two iconic moments of "victory", the 
first being the toppling of the Saddam statue, which was "irresistible for a media that 
remain hungry for iconic images" (Gilbert & Ryan, 2003).  
 
This was the moment when the "magic agent" brought the evil villain to a fall in a scene 
rich in symbolism: the US tanks rolling up to the statue on the Al Firdos square, a 
Marine covering the face of Saddam with the American flag, then removing it to replace 
it with the Iraqi flag, the Iraqis trying but not succeeding to pull down the statue, the US 
Marines coming to the rescue, the giant Saddam that dominated the scene bowing to the 
American forces, falling, and ultimately revealing that it is nothing but an empty shell.  
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Figure 20. The statue of Saddam on 
the Al Firdos square in Baghdad was 
toppled with the aid of an American 
tank, signalling victory to the 
Americans (Photo: CBS, 2003c). 
 
 
The fall of this last statue became symbolic of the fall of the Iraqi government, even 
though Saddam himself had not been captured at that stage (CNN, 2003c). The White 
House and 10 Downing Street agreed that these images did not represent the end of the 
war and, in Blair’s words, that victory was "far from complete" (BBC News, 2003a). 
When asked by the media when the instant of victory might come, the reply was: "I 
think we will know that moment when we see it". 
 
That moment of victory apparently did not require either the apprehension of Saddam 
Hussein or the discovery of weapons of mass destruction. Instead, in another made-for-
the-media scene, reminiscent of the film Top Gun, Bush dressed in a green flight suit 
and holding a helmet, got off a navy plane after it landed on the aircraft carrier USS 
Abraham Lincoln (CNN, 2003d).  
 
 
Figure 21. Despite the 
perception that the war ended 
when the statue was toppled in 
the heart of Baghdad, Bush 
received a hero’s welcome 
when he landed on the deck of 
the USS Abraham Lincoln to 
announce "the end of major 
combat operations" in Iraq  
(Photo: Guardian, 2003) 
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He saluted those on the flight deck, shaking hands with some, while on the tower above 
him, a huge sign declared: "Mission Accomplished". Hours later, he told the carrier’s 
crew that "major combat operations have ended", but admitted that they did not know 
"the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide" (Fox News, 2003). 
This message was however overshadowed by Bush’s earlier triumphant fly-past and 
hero’s arrival on the scene.  
 
Although this happened outside the time frame of this study, it can be argued that the 
hero, Bush, finally won the hand of the victim or princess, namely the American people, 
when they re-elected him as president in the 2004 elections. 
 
2.6  Summary 
In Chapter 2, key news theories that will be employed in the analysis of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom news coverage were examined. Firstly, it was established why a theoretical 
approach is necessary for a study of practical journalism. The news flow models of 
gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing were subsequently examined. The process of 
gatekeeping was discussed with special reference to Harcup and O’Neill's (2001) 
updated version of Galtung and Ruge's (1965) model of selective gatekeeping, as well 
as Pamela Shoemaker's (1991) model, while agendasetting was studied in terms of 
McComb's five stages of agendasetting. An exploration of framing failed to identify a 
single generally acceptable definition of the concept, but it was determined that various 
authors agreed that news may be framed as a story. Consequently, Vladimir Propp's 
(1968) seminal analysis of folktales was discussed and applied to general coverage of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
 
In Chapter 3, literature pertaining to the theoretical models of journalism that were 
examined in Chapter 2 will be discussed, especially with reference to war reporting in 
general or Operation Iraqi Freedom coverage in particular.     
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Chapter 3 
Literature review 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter an overview is given of scholarly literature available on the theoretical 
aspect of the research subject, namely the news theory models of gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing that are used in Chapter 7 to analyse the news flow during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom from the sources of information to the South African 
newspapers. Also, studies are examined that employ story analyses reminiscent of 
Propp's fairytale analysis to investigate news coverage. 
 
The primary objective of a literature review is to determine what has been done in the 
field of study and could therefore actually be referred to as a "scholarship review" 
(Mouton, 2005:87). The current study commenced in 2003, shortly after Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Due to the recency of the war, completed studies of news coverage 
during the war was practically non-existent, with the exception of Hafez's (2003) case 
study of the effects of military involvement in conflict perception. Initially, therefore, 
the review of scholarship on the key issues of news flow and gatekeeping, agendasetting 
and framing was done on studies that had nothing to do with either Gulf War II in 
general or specifically Operation Iraqi Freedom, but which showed similarities in some 
respect.  
 
However, by the end of the current study, a large corpus of research on Gulf War II 
news coverage became available in academic journals. These scholarships were 
reviewed post hoc, and the most relevant works are included in this study for the sake of 
completeness. In other words, much of the literature was reviewed not to determine 
possible duplication of research or the methodology used by those authors as it is done 
traditionally (Mouton, 2005:87), but to indicate various approaches that were followed 
in studies that ran parallel to the current study.  
 
Interestingly, shortly before the present study was concluded, the first results from a 
similar study conducted in the UK was published. The study by Robinson et al. (2006), 
entitled Media wars: Media performance and media management during the 2003 Iraq 
war, focused on the framing of the war in the British media, the identification of key 
government information management strategies, and the media agendas during the 
conflict. It was a joint project between the Universities of Manchester, Liverpool and 
Leeds, and was funded by a British Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
grant of £119 169.07 (R1 713 070). The Robinson et al. (2006) project shows that while 
the present study was general and not quite on the scale of its British counterpart, the 
research ideas and approach is valid and in fact worthy of a full research programme.  
 
Literature employed in the current study covers a wide field, as the study itself deals 
with war reporting from different angles, which necessitates a wide range of sources: 
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• Scholarly documents and monographs were consulted to support the theoretical 
approach to the study. 
• Books, newspaper and magazine articles were included in the historiographical 
part of the study, but also in the theoretical study. 
• Official documents from the US government were included to prove the 
intentionality of media management practices during the war. 
• Interviews were conducted to give eyewitness accounts of the result of the media 
policies. 
• Video recordings of the television coverage of the war were used to refresh the 
author's memory with regard to the coverage of certain incidents during the war. 
 
3.2  Sources of literature 
A variety of primary sources (eyewitness accounts, unedited political speeches and 
interviews), secondary sources (textbooks and press reports) and tertiary sources 
(analytical articles) were consulted (see Mouton, 2005). The following were the main 
sources of information that was accessed and the locations where they were sourced:  
 
• Books, journal articles, as well as theses and dissertations were sourced from the 
libraries of the University of Stellenbosch and the Journalism Department at the 
University of Stellenbosch.  
• Online library databases were also consulted, especially EBSCOHost, ERIC, and 
JStor. Theses, dissertations, conference papers and refereed journal articles were 
consulted through the internet.  
• US government, White House and Department of Defense policy papers, speech 
transcripts and other official documents were accessed via the internet. 
• Google was invariably used as search engine, as it consistently produced the most 
useful sources.  
• Hard copies and internet media archives of national and international newspapers, 
magazines and academic journals were studied. 
• Approximately 170 hours of video recordings of mostly CNN coverage of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (own collection) was studied. 
• Five interviews were conducted, four by e-mail and one telephonically. 
 
3.3  Scholarship review  
3.3.1 News flow and gatekeeping 
In this study news flow and gatekeeping will be treated as an integrated field of 
research, as news flow even in its most basic form refers to the transfer of newsworthy 
information from one person to another, both of whom can be considered to be 
gatekeepers (Sparkes & Winter, 1980:150; Wu, 2003:9; Nossek, 2004:346).  
 
In the flow of news from its sources to the audience reporters and editors are 
responsible for the selection of news; therefore they are gatekeepers (Nossek, 
2004:346). Journalists and editors are employed by media organisations, with their own 
priorities, and which form part of the greater media as institution. In turn, the media as a 
whole is part of the social structure, and as such interacts with and is influenced by 
other societal constructs. 
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Although news flow and gatekeeping will be treated as a unit, research articles dealing 
with the two concepts will be reviewed separately, as the approach to these studies 
differ. When relevant news flow studies were identified, studies dealing with news flow 
to South Africa were also considered, even though none of them deal with news flow 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The gatekeeping studies that were reviewed only refer 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom coverage. 
 
3.3.1.1 News flow 
As no comparable research results were available on the news flow from Gulf War II to 
South Africa when the present study was conducted, general studies on news flow to 
Africa and South Africa in particular were examined. The most notable of these, e.g. De 
Beer, Serfontein, Naudé & Steyn (1996) and Eribo (1999) stemmed from the global 
news flow study of British media scientist Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi (1995), 
which in turn was based on the 1953 news flow study International Press Institute (cited 
by Robinson & Sparkes, 1976:203-204). Because they form the basis of the analyses in 
the present study, the work done by the International Press Institute and Sreberny-
Mohammadi (1995) is discussed briefly. 
 
One of the earliest news flow studies was undertaken by the International Press Institute 
(1953, cited by Robinson & Sparkes, 1976:203-204). It examines the way in which 
international news is reported and circulated, and notes that globally news flows 
irregularly, and that international agencies tend to concentrate on hard news and on 
"elite nations".  War, politics and foreign relations are covered most frequently, while 
cultural activities and smaller nations as a whole are mostly ignored. This led to a 
number of studies that focused on the flow of news from First World to Third World 
countries such as Africa, Asia and Latin America (e.g. Cutlip, 1954; Markham, 1961), 
and eventually the seminal selective news flow study by Galtung and Ruge in 1965 
(Robinson & Sparkes, 1976: 204).  
 
One of the biggest international news flow studies is the joint IAMCR/Unesco study of 
1979 on foreign news in the media, in which researchers of 29 countries participated. Of 
this study Sreberny-Mohammadi as central editor/author wrote:  
 
... we would suggest that it is time to move away from this kind of study, 
since the accumulated data are vast and the central findings reasonably 
validated (1995).  
 
Two of these findings are that politics and political actors dominate international news 
reporting everywhere, and that media across the globe tends to focus on events taking 
place in its immediate geographical region (Stevenson, 2004a). The latter did not apply 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom, when the South African media, like that of hundreds of 
nations across the globe, enthusiastically covered a war that was geographically and 
politically far removed from the audience itself; the reasons for this could be the subject 
of a separate study on news values, news flow and gatekeeping.   
 
Despite Sreberny-Mohammadi’s comments, she also participated in the second, even 
bigger global news flow study, which took place in 1995. This study, involving 
researchers in nearly 50 countries (Stevenson, 2004b), was seen as needed due to drastic 
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changes in global politics during the 1990s, as well as economic changes causing 
political and social upheaval in especially Third World countries (De Beer et al., 1996).  
 
The results of the 1995 news flow study were never published in toto (Schreiner, 
2003:41), but some participants decided to publish their "national" results, such as De 
Beer et al. (1996) from South Africa and Festus Eribo (1999) from Nigeria. These 
results represent two of the very few international studies of news flow to Africa 
(Schreiner, 2003:10-11). Eribo (1999:160) found that in Nigeria the source of most 
foreignreports could not be identified, as the newspapers did not credit news agencies. 
This study also showed that compared to the global news flow study of 1979 coverage 
of international trade and sports increased while global politics received less attention.  
 
In their study of international news flow and events covered by African media, De Beer 
et al. (1996) asked whether the media would mainly focus on negative, disruptive news, 
whether most stories carried a Western dateline and whether the four big Western news 
agencies (Reuters, AP, UPI and AFP) were responsible for most of the news. They 
found that the media did not overly depend on the four agencies and that they used more 
stories from their own reporters and correspondents. This implied a shorter news 
channel with fewer gatekeepers to influence agendas and frames of the coverage.  
 
A more recent news flow study in South Africa is the comprehensive work of South 
African media analyst Wadim Schreiner (2003) who did a quantitative study of news 
flow to, from, and within Africa. He noted that although South African news coverage 
of events outside of Africa is decreasing, intense news incidents such as the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001 tend to confuse the picture 
of news flow to Africa (Schreiner, 2003:164-165). 
 
Internationally, a number of news flow studies were conducted since Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, such as Hamilton and Jenner (2004), Nossek (2004) and Horvit (2006). These 
studies look at the news flow phenomenon from a widely divergent range of viewpoints. 
 
In their study of the changing face of foreign correspondence, American mass 
communication scholars John Maxwell Hamilton and Eric Jenner (2004:301,303) 
delineate changes in international news flow with the aim of elucidating the 
implications of such changes for future researchers who want to study the interplay 
between news and international policy. Based on literature and survey reviews, as well 
as interviews with prominent reporters, media executives, leaders of industry and public 
officials, the authors present three important changes that have impacted on how 
international news and information is circulated (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004: 303-312): 
 
• current financial implications of foreign correspondence, i.e. increased salaries 
and support costs, and competition from other media, including the electronic 
media;  
• global interdependence at the community level, i.e. the blurring of international 
borders which enables local reporters to access foreign sources, and  
• technological innovation, in particular the internet, which makes it financially 
possible for practically anybody to publish or broadcast and gives the audience 
the opportunity to choose as well as to shape the news.  
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Hamilton and Jenner (2004:312) propose a "new typology of foreign correspondence" 
as a first step towards a new model of foreign correspondence. Eight types of "new" 
foreign correspondents are identified (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004:313-14): 
 
• Traditional foreign correspondents – reporters who live in and report from 
foreign countries.  
• Parachute journalists – reporters who are sent to foreign locations to temporarily 
cover events in the area.  
• Foreign foreign correspondent – a foreign national hired to cover events in his/her 
country. 
• Local foreign correspondent – local reporters covering the global angle of a local 
story.  
• Foreign local correspondent – foreign correspondents who works for a foreign 
news organization and whose reports are globally available on the internet or via 
satellite.  
• In-house foreign correspondent – a person who works for a business enterprise 
and reports on the company's affairs.  
• Premium service foreign correspondent – reporters providing high-quality, 
specialized news in real-time to an audience who pays a premium to receive the 
information on their computer terminals. 
• Amateur correspondent – unaffiliated and mostly untrained persons reporting on 
international events, especially via the internet. 
 
The authors of the study might have added a category for "expert non-affiliated foreign 
correspondents", that is, foreigners who are experts in their field, but not journalists per 
se, hypothetically for example, if South African naturalist conservationist Lawrence 
Anthony would write a report for the Washington Post about the plight of the animals in 
the Baghdad Zoo. 
 
Because the term "foreign correspondent" no longer defines the traditional concept, 
Hamilton and Jenner (2004:315-316) concludes:  
 
We cannot assess the health of foreign correspondence merely by counting 
the number of reporters sent abroad by major dailies and the networks or 
by only analyzing stories in The New York Times, Newsweek and CBS 
News.  
 
In a news flow study of particular importance with regard to the embedded media policy 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Israeli media specialist Hillel Nossek (2004) 
addressed the issue of patriotic reporting in the 1995 coverage of three incidents of 
political violence by three newspapers "regarded as 'elite' or 'quality press' and the finest 
models of Western journalism" (Nossek, 2004:353), namely 
 
• The New York Times (US),  
• The Times (London, UK) and  
• Ha’aretz (Israel).  
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Newspapers from these three countries were chosen since the countries had "an indirect 
national connection to some events and no direct connection to others" (Nossek, 
2004:353). None of the incidents occurred in the selected countries, which means that 
they all can be regarded as foreign news.  
 
Nossek's theoretical assumption was that when journalists identify foreign news events 
as their own ("ours"), their professionalism is superseded by patriotism, but when an 
event is defined as "theirs", traditional journalistic professional practices are followed 
(2003:343): 
 
Expressed as a rule, we would say that the more ‘national’ the report is, the 
less ‘professional’ it will be, i.e. the closer the reporters/editors are to a 
given news event in terms of national interest, the further they are from 
applying professional news values.  
 
Nossek's analyses indicate that (2004:631-634): 
 
• After an event has been defined as terrorism, war or violent protest, journalists 
determine whether it is "ours" or "theirs". When it is neither, coverage conforms to 
traditional norms of foreign news coverage. 
• The location of the event is of no special importance as a news value. 
• Not al incidences of political violence become foreign news – it depends on the 
nature of the event and whether it is "ours" or theirs" according to the nationality 
of the reporter and the editorial board. This belies the common notion that acts of 
terrorism guarantees publicity, which is the purpose of the deed.  
• While the victim or target of the act may have an influence on the coverage, the 
perpetrator has no control over whether or how the act will be reported on.  
 
The study is interesting in terms of the flow of foreign news, but it is a pity that more 
recent acts of violence, such as the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and the 2003 
war in Iraq were not included; not only for the sake of recency, but because the media 
landscape – especially in terms of technology – had changed drastically during the past 
decade. Nevertheless, the study gives insight into the logic of reporters during times of 
national crisis.  
 
American journalism academic Beverly Horvit conducted a study from another angle, 
namely to examine how six international news agencies reflected the international 
structure of political power in the period prior to Gulf War II (2006:438). This is done 
to determine in what ways the news that most probably have reached the American 
public differed from news that flowed to the rest of the international community: whose 
perspectives were most salient, and was the coverage for or against the Bush 
administration's foreign policies? 
 
Analysing reports from international news agencies – AP, AFP, Reuters, Xinhua, ITAR-
TASS and the Inter Press Service (IPS) – Horvit (2006:435) determined that all 
agencies except IPS and ITAR-TASS cited US official sources most frequently, and that 
all six agencies used "said" as the most common verb of attribution when citing 
American officials. According to Horvit (2006:436), this is an indication that  
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the news agencies did not work to cast doubt on a source’s credibility by 
using more loaded  terms of attribution. 
 
Horvit also notes that contrary to the views of some critics, Western news agencies 
cover a broader geographical area than their non-Western counterparts, and also 
provided news much more frequently (2006:441). However, the non-Western agencies 
reported on countries that would rarely be covered by Western agencies, such as 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and the Ukraine, as well as Cuba, Cyprus and 
Nicaragua (Horvit, 2006:434).  
 
Four of the agencies reported most frequently from the US and cited US officials more 
often than any other source (Horvit, 2006:441). The study suggests that the Western 
news agencies are even-handed in their reporting, with especially AP, AFP and Reuters 
getting "much closer to balancing positive and negative statements toward the US" 
(Horvit, 2006:442). 
 
Horvit (2006:444) concludes that 
 
[w]hile researchers have long studied the imbalance in the flow of news 
about particular countries, research into source dependency suggests the 
imbalance within the flow of international news should be addressed, as 
well ... An imbalance in sourcing practices is as problematic as – and is a 
reflection of – an overall imbalance in the flow of news. 
 
This study gives a good idea of the leanings of the different news agencies, and it would 
be interesting if this study could be expanded in future to determine how the agency 
stories were eventually used by the media in different countries across the globe. The 
news analysis of the current study partially addresses this issue. The Horvit (2006) 
study also illustrates the importance and effect of news agencies as gatekeepers in the 
channel of news flow. 
 
3.3.1.2 Gatekeeping 
Gatekeeping studies on Gulf War II coverage is not as abundant as expected, although 
several studies deal with the agendasetting phenomenon without direct reference to the 
concept. When reading these articles, however, it is clear that gatekeeping is addressed. 
Two examples of such studies are those by Indian newspaper editor and Fellow at the 
Shorenstein Center at the Kennedy School of Government Narasimhan Ravi (2005) who 
looks at how national interests, patriotism, and cultural values shaped the coverage of 
Gulf War II, and the 2007 study of Jerry Palmer from London Metropolitan University 
and Victoria Fontan, Director at the University for Peace in Costa Rica, on the role of 
translators and/or fixers who work alongside the Western media in Iraq since 2003.  
 
Ravi (2005) studies the gatekeeping role of nationality and elite opinion in the flow of 
news from its sources to the audience. To determine the quality of the reporting in terms 
of truth, independence, scepticism, balance and sensitivity, the author qualitatively 
analyses coverage of seven major incidents during Gulf War II, as well as pre-war 
speeches of Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Bush, in five prominent 
newspapers from the US (New York Times), UK (The Times and The Guardian), India 
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(The Times of India) and Pakistan (The Dawn) (Ravi, 2005:45, 48). The selected 
incidents and public addresses offer valuable points of reference to determine whether 
the newspapers accepted, rejected or digressed from the official US war frame, as well 
as to establish how national points of view and cultural and political differences shaped 
coverage of the war (Ravi, 2005:48). 
 
Seven significant issues emerge from the study (Ravi, 2005:58-61): 
 
• The US war frame dominated coverage, as the rapid advance of the Anglo-
American forces showed that they had the upper hand both strategically and 
operationally.  
• The maxim that history is written by the victors proved true: the Iraqi war frame, 
with statements of fierce resistance and the coalition forces being halted in their 
tracks, was either ignored or derided.  
• Reports seem to echo the values and views of the societies they belong to: US and 
UK coverage avoided images and reports of civilian deaths, as this "would 
represent a callous disregard for innocents and seem out of character with their 
own notion of their countries and their values". Indian and Pakistani reports made 
civilian deaths much more salient "which fitted in with the image of a harsh and 
cruel war". 
• Patriotic coverage is a reality – even reporters opposed to the war became more 
compliant after the war started for fear of being branded unpatriotic: "When a 
nation’s troops are on the ground in a war, support for the troops becomes a value 
that is accepted without question." 
• Elite opinion directly affected coverage, especially in the US where it was divided 
before the war, but unified behind the war effort once the attacks on Iraq began. 
• Specific cultural and societal orientations are reflected in the coverage. Western 
society's emphasis on the individual was mirrored in reports on individual 
casualties or rescue operations, while the South Asian emphasis was on the 
collective, which is in line with the value this society sets on the community, 
rather than the individual. 
• Truth and transparency pay off in information management: the Embedded Media 
Program and high-profile US briefings enhanced the credibility of the US 
military.  
 
Ravi did not consider the possibility that the "openness and truth telling" (2005:60) of 
the US administration's information management was part of a carefully planned 
strategy, aimed specifically at influencing public opinion in favour of the US war effort 
(Rumsfeld, 2003a).  
 
Palmer and Fontan (2007) look at a completely neglected role-player in the gatekeeping 
process, namely the fixer, and examine how this additional link between the source and 
the reporter impacts upon newsgathering in Iraq. 
 
Traditionally, the relay between an event and the reporter is seen as the "source" – the 
person or organisation that gives information about an event or organises a visit to the 
event so that the reporter can experience it first-hand, but whose motives for facilitating 
the reporting are often questioned (Palmer & Fontan, 2007:5-6). Because of the 
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breakdown of security in Iraq since the 2003 war, as well as the language barrier, the 
Western media became highly dependent on fixers, local citizens and reporters to report 
from Iraq. These Iraqi’s also form a relay between the event and the reporter. 
 
The interaction between the reporter and the fixer has for various reasons been the cause 
of some concern (Palmer & Fontan, 2007:6-7):  
 
• The safety and security of reporters and their colleagues: between March 2003 
and mid-2006, 80 reporters and 28 interpreters, drivers and fixers were killed in 
Iraq and many more were abducted (CPJ, 2006 cited by Palmer & Fontan, 2007). 
• The reliability of interpreters and translators: in the light of the 11 September 
2001 attacks on the US there are doubts about the trustworthiness of Arabic-
speaking personnel hired in Iraq, as well as the linguistic competence of the 
fixers, as they act as interpreters in a country where few Western reporters 
understand the local language. 
• The reduced quality of the reporting resulting from the relationship with the 
fixers. 
 
To determine the key issues in the minds of reporters and fixers Palmer and Fontan 
(2007:7) conducted semi-structured interviews with 17 French and British reporters and 
14 Iraqi fixers working for US, UK and Japanese print and audio-visual media.  
 
The interviews highlight five key issues (Palmer & Fontan, 2007:8-21):  
 
• Language: hardly any of the Western journalists spoke Arabic. 
• Recruitment: in most cases competent fixers were employed after coincidental or 
friendship-based meetings. 
• The fixer’s role: fixers are needed where reporters work in unfamiliar areas, in 
dangerous situations and they interact with ordinary Iraqi citizens. They arrange 
and even conduct interviews, translate, explain context to reporters, assess the 
security situation, handle dangerous situations and have access to networks of 
local contacts.  
• The perception of risk arising from dependence on fixers: journalists fear 
mistranslation and omission of important information, that they will not blend 
with and understand the local population, and that the fixer will determine the 
reporters’ view of people and events (i.e. abuse gatekeeping powers).  
• Parachute journalism and changes in foreign newsgathering: the traditional way 
foreign reporters operated had changed and now they seldom live long enough in 
an area to get to know the culture of their hosts, building up contacts, etc. (like 
Robert Fisk in Lebanon), but are rather sent on assignment to cover certain 
incidents. Fixers help bridge the knowledge gap that is created by this practice. 
 
Palmer and Fontan conclude that the traditional foreign correspondent had changed 
dramatically during Gulf War II (2007:22). Media bureaus in Iraq are staffed by a 
rotation of reporters, who do not know the country and its people and are unable to 
speak Arabic, which makes fixers indispensable. Although Western reporters fear that 
their fixers would harm the quality of their reporting, an independent analysis is 
necessary to substantiate such a claim.  
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The Palmer and Fontan (2007) study does groundbreaking work on the role of the fixer 
in the channel of news flow. The field of research begs to be expanded upon, for 
example, to determine the extent of the actual gatekeeping done by fixers. It is clear that 
they are invaluable to especially unilateral reporters, but it is also obvious that hostile 
fixers might have a significant impact on the agenda set by a journalist's reports. 
  
Also, in view of the strict rules applied by the US military with regard to what 
embedded reporters were allowed to do, it makes sense that locals who lead reporters to 
stories the military would have preferred to be ignored, might cause problems. It would 
be interesting to study the stresses between the US military's media policies and the 
fixer-phenomenon. 
 
3.3.1.3 General discussion of news flow and gatekeeping studies 
A number of papers on gatekeeping as a theory was published since Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, that is, studies on the theory and not its application to war coverage, for 
example Bruns (2003) and Roberts (2006). Despite the controversy about the 
gatekeeping function of the US military, little research has been done on it. 
Furthermore, research on people in gatekeeping positions does not explain the 
phenomenon in terms of the gatekeeping as a theory, e.g Morris (2005). The reasons for 
this can only be speculated about. 
 
3.3.2 Agendasetting 
In Chapter 2, five stages of McCombs's agendasetting theory were explained. However, 
this study will focus on only two of those stages, namely first and second level 
agendasetting. Also, although agendasetting is an effects theory, the reaction of the 
audience to the set agendas is not tested as the focus of the study is on the flow of news. 
Agendasetting is a popular field of research, and during the period 2001 to 2005 
scholars published the highest number ever (43) of international journal articles that 
refer to agendasetting (Weaver, 2007: 143-144). Obviously, not all of these studies refer 
to Gulf War II, but the controversial nature of the US government's media policies 
during the war proved fertile ground for scholarly studies on agendasetting.  
 
Due to the number of studies that were published since the start of Gulf War II, the 
current study will only focus on agendasetting research done on coverage during the 
war. Research dealing with the period preceding the war includes studies by St. Clair & 
Tajima (2003), Park, Tajima, Nah & Nichols (2004) and Groshek (2005).   
 
3.3.2.1 Agendasetting studies on Gulf War II coverage 
Some of the most recently published studies on agendasetting during Gulf War II were 
conducted by Ayeni (2004), Kang (2006) and Zayani & Ayish (2006). 
 
American mass communication and media scholar Olugbenga Christopher Ayeni (2004) 
examines the agendas set by Fox, CNN, ABC, CBS and NBC before, during and after 
the war, with special attention to the role of official sources. The main issue addressed 
in this study is the sources cited in coverage by the selected television broadcasters. 
Five distinct groups of sources were identified (Ayeni, 2004:9): 
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• official  
• unofficial  
• military 
• non-military 
• expert 
 
The study shows that the five broadcasters consistently relied heavily on "official" and 
"military" sources, with a total of 59% of all sources cited belonging to these two 
groups (Ayeni, 2004:11). This highlights an interesting and very important aspect in the 
debate about partiality in reporting: while reporters may be unbiased in their 
presentation of information, the slant of the story may be determined by the sources 
they choose to cite (Ayeni, 2004:13). 
 
Ayeni (2004:15) notes that the disproportionate number of government and military 
officials cited may be an indication of covert propaganda on the part of the Bush 
administration's "power brokers", which does not bode well to the general public who 
have to accept media reports reflecting the agenda set by the US government. This is a 
reasonable conclusion, although an in-depth study of the government's media strategy 
may prove that this specific matter, namely the number of official sources cited, forms 
part of the more overt part of the US strategy.  
 
Speech, Theatre and Journalism Professor Seok Kang (2006) examines the news 
agendas of three US television news programmes, ABC World News Tonight, CBS 
Evening News, and NBC Nightly News during the war in Iraq. Using second level 
agenda setting and framing Kang (2006) examines whether: 
 
• war coverage was more episodic than thematic  
• war coverage was framed as positive rather than negative  
• positive coverage was more likely to slant public opinion than negative framed. 
 
Results show that the news agenda before the war was dominated by war plans and 
diplomacy issues. After the start of the war the news agenda consisted almost entirely of 
war reports, although in April 2003 criticism of the war plans was high on the agenda. 
In June and July 2003, war intelligence and US casualties were added to the agenda. 
 
The results from Kang's (2006) study shows: 
 
• war coverage was more episodic than thematic, with news viewers assigning 
responsibility for national problems to the actions of particular individuals 
• extensive coverage of the dominant themes, namely war plans, progress of the war 
and US forces, was patriotic and positive rather than negative, but coverage of 
war intelligence, insurgency, US casualties, the economy and antiwar protest was 
more negative. While individual reports seem balanced, the mass of positive 
reports is responsible for the slant of the public opinion  
• all the war news themes were related to public opinion, as both the government 
and leading media emphasized safety and security and broadcasts tended to be 
patriotic. 
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Kang (2006:p.n.) concludes that  
 
the media, under the control of government in news coverage during a war 
time, can be utilized as a sophisticated propaganda tool, which helps to 
legitimize the administration's policy and plans on the conflict with 
positively framed news. 
 
Just like Kang (2006), Critical Theory Professor Mohamed Zayani and Communication 
Professor Muhammad I. Ayish of the United Arab Emirates, also examine the way in 
which three television stations covered the war, but they concentrate on the way the 
Arab media, in particular Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and Abu Dhabi Channel, covered the 
fall of Baghdad and the end of Saddam’s government in Iraq (2006:473).  
 
A narrative analysis of broadcasts by these three channels shows a number of common 
trends, notably (Zayani & Ayish, 2006:487): 
 
• agendasetting  
• framing  
• lack of depth 
• dearth of analysis  
• fragmentation of the news  
• slippage between fact and opinion 
• disproportionate allocation of time to news items  
• lack of contextualization  
• sensationalism 
 
Referring to agendasetting, Zayani and Ayish say that coverage of certain issues to the 
exclusion of others "should not go unnoticed" and that silence about others "is 
meaningful in and of itself" (2006:487). Neither Abu Dhabi Channel nor Al Arabiya 
reported on anything but the war in Iraq, while Al Jazeera reported on Palestinians who 
were killed and injured in Bait Hanoon in clashes with Israelis, as well as an explosion 
at a Palestinian high school that injured 27 pupils. Furthermore, the increased coverage 
of the implication of and accusations against Syria "is also a case of selectivity and 
salience" (Zayani & Ayish, 2006:487). 
 
Zayani and Ayish (2006: 493) conclude that the three television channels established 
themselves as the main Arab source of information on the war and that the mobilisation 
of the channels is seen as a direct challenge to especially the US hegemony. They have 
the power to balance patriotic American coverage (Zayani & Ayish, 2006:494):   
 
... the news values of the Arab satellite channels under consideration were 
also tainted, to various degrees, with cultural, political and historical 
considerations. While no tears were shed on the fall of Saddam (if anything 
the notable condemnation of the toppled Iraqi regime is a significant 
departure from Arab media’s tendency to look the other way when it comes 
to the abuses of Saddam), there is also a felt sadness and even 
disappointment. 
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Zayani and Ayish (2006:494) say the Arab view of reports on the fall of Baghdad   
 
amounts to a visually enhanced narrative about subduing Iraq rather than 
liberating it. Behind the perspective that transpires from the coverage of the 
fall of Baghdad lies arguably a sense of malaise, resentment and frustration 
that emanates from several decades of defeat. 
 
3.3.2.2 General discussion of agendasetting studies 
While reviewing literature on Operation Iraqi Freedom agendasetting studies, an 
interesting phenomenon emerged. From a theoretical perspective, authors often seem to 
drift between theories, especially between second level agendasetting and framing, 
sometimes treating them as variants of the same theory, for example the study by Kang 
(2006). This results in what Dietram Scheufele of the School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and David Tewksbury refer 
to as "a confusing set of concepts and terminologies" (2007:12), which seems to be 
quite common in literature on this field of study.  
 
Of course, second level agendasetting and framing are interrelated and involves very 
similar, yet distinguishable cognitive processes and effects (Weaver, 2007:142,145). 
Both refer to how issues are covered, rather than which issues are covered. This makes it 
all the more confusing. The problem is enhanced by the fact that not even the experts in 
communication research seem to agree about the distinction between the two concepts 
(Weaver, 2007:143). 
 
Because there is no clear, generally accepted definition that distinguishes between 
especially agendasetting and framing (priming also comes into the equation, but is not 
included in the present study) (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007:12; Weaver, 2007:143) 
researchers tend to only superficially link their studies to a particular theory; sometimes 
they do not mention any news theory at all. For example, both Ayeni (2004) and Lars 
Nord and Jesper Strömbäck of the Mid Sweden University and the Swedish Centre for 
Political Communication Research (2006) studied the role of sources in the coverage of 
the war. Ayeni referred to the "agendasetting role" (referred to by name) of the sources 
cited by American television channels, while Nord and Strömbäck, who studied the 
sources cited by Swedish newspaper and television reports, did not even mention the 
existence of an agenda. American Strategic Communication Professor Frank Dardis 
(2006) referred to a "paradigm" when writing about what other scholars would have 
called either an "agenda" or a "frame", depending on the definition they accept.  
 
Because of this conundrum, an attempt will be made – at least for the purpose of this 
study – to clarify the differences between the theories.  
 
3.3.2.3 Personal interpretation 
McCombs (2000) explained that while the first level of agendasetting refers to the 
transmission of object salience, the second level involves the transmission of attribute 
salience, which may guide people in what to think. An "object" refers to topics, issues, 
and persons, which each have various attributes, i.e. characteristics and properties that 
form the multi-dimensional image of an object. Like objects, attributes may also vary in 
salience, which makes them equally powerful as agendasetting tools.  
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In terms of this study, it would mean that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a single object 
in the universe of news items that might have been reported on, and that according to 
the theory of second level agendasetting, coverage of the war will have certain 
characteristics, e.g., is it positive, up-beat, pessimistic or indifferent. However, when the 
war as object is examined closely, it becomes apparent that McCombs’s (2000) first 
level of agendasetting in fact consists of multiple telescopic tiers, and that each tier 
focuses ever more closely on a particular aspect of the war. 
 
The war itself was just one issue of a multitude of news events that could have been 
covered during that period of time and consisted of various incidents, such as the 
reasons for the attack, the much reported official beginning of the war, less reported 
incidents such as the marketplace bombing, hyped issues like the rescue of US Army 
Private Jessica Lynch, and the eventual toppling of the Saddam statue on Al Firdos 
Square, which signified the "capture of the castle" and therefore, the end of the war.  
 
A closer study of these incidents revealed that they too involved different issues. 
Coverage of the beginning of Gulf War II, for example, dealt with the number of 
missiles that were launched, how spectacular the pyrotechnics were, and the depleted 
uranium in some of the rounds that were rained upon the city. The success of the 
operation constituted the second level of the agenda, which was created by frames such 
as myth (the US army as the liberating saviour, striking selected targets with almost 
super-human precision), rites, rituals and traditions (the ever-present American flag), 
jargon ("shock and awe"), and spin (direct declarations by leaders of the positive 
outcome of the operation).  
 
Figure 22 is an attempt by this author to illustrate the perceived multiple tiers that were 
identified within the two levels of agendasetting proposed by McCombs (2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 22. A telescopic view of multiple tiers of agendasetting and framing embedded 
in the two levels of agendasetting proposed by McCombs (2000). 
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3.3.3 Framing 
As seen above (Chapter 3.3.2.2), there still exists controversy about what framing 
exactly is. Because of this lack of agreement amongst even the experts, the prolific 
volume of framing research published during the first five years of 2000 – an 
astounding 165 papers (Weaver, 2007:143) – represents a widely divergent spectrum of 
approaches to the concept. Interestingly, prior to 2000, few academic papers were 
produced that dealt with framing theory (Berenger, 2004:2). The growing popularity of 
the theory in media research may be attributed to its being so well suited for studies in 
propaganda and public relations – issues that became especially prominent because of 
Gulf War II. 
 
3.3.3.1 Framing studies on Gulf War II coverage 
Because of the abundant framing literature available on Gulf War II coverage, it was 
decided to focus on studies that only dealt directly with the war itself. American 
Journalism and Mass Communication professor Ralph Berenger (2004) for example 
attempts to "lay the theoretical and conceptual groundwork to better understand global 
media’s reporting behaviour before, during and after the 2003 Gulf War" (emphasis 
added), and is consequently excluded from the discussion. This still produces a vast 
number of papers, of which only a few of the most applicable studies will be discussed, 
namely Sivek (2004), Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) and Lee, Masog and Kim 
(2006). 
 
Susan Currie Sivek of University of Texas at Austin (2004) compares the way 
embedded and unilateral newspaper reporters framed the 2003 war in Iraq and attempts 
to explain why the frames differed. Three research questions are addressed: 
 
• How did newspaper reporters in Iraq frame their stories?  
• Did the use of particular frames differ based on reporters' status as embedded or 
unilateral?  
• Do other characteristics of the reporters or their newspapers correlate with the use 
of particular frames? 
 
To answer these questions, Sivek (2004) analysed war reports by 57 journalists (whose 
status as "embedded" or "unilateral" is known) that were published in the US, UK, 
Canada and Australia. Eight topic categories are identified: 
 
• Soldiers' lives  
• Reporters' lives  
• Update on movements   
• Iraqi-American relations and future of Iraq  
• Iraqi daily life  
• Surrounding countries and Kurds' concerns  
• Editorial or news analysis  
• Military capability and strategy  
 
Subsequently, Sivek (2004) categorised the reports according to three dominant frames 
that emerged from a pre-test of randomly selected reports, namely:  
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• Liberation  
• Invasion 
• Mixed 
 
The results of the analysis consistently shows that embedded reporters tended to adopt 
the "liberation" frame that was promoted by the US military, while unilateral reporters 
preferred either the "invasion" or "mixed" frames (Sivek, 2004). This suggests that one 
of the most important factors determining the frame of the war reports is the status of 
the reporter as either embedded or unilateral.  
 
Sivek (2004) concludes that reporters and editors involved in embedding programmes, 
whatever its nature, should be conscious how they frame their reports and to make sure 
that it does not merely reflect the viewpoint of those they are embedded with: 
 
The distinctive situation of embedded war correspondents, plunged into a 
situation dangerous both to the quality of their reporting and their lives, 
deserves special attention and even unique training so that these journalists 
can continue to report from a critical standpoint and utilize a variety of 
frames in their work. That attention is especially required given evidence of 
framing effects found in some studies.  
 
In a similar study, American Journalism and Communication scholar Daniela Dimitrova 
and Jesper Strömbäck (2005) look at war coverage from a European perspective when 
they examine the differences between framing Gulf War II in the high quality US 
newspaper The New York Times and the similarly elite Swedish newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter.  
 
Dimitrova and Strömbäck start the paper by highlighting the differences between the 
US and Sweden, especially in terms of government and the media (2005:401-404). 
From this explication it is clear that fundamental cultural differences exist between the 
US and Sweden. For example, Sweden has a high newspaper readership, while the US 
has a low readership. Conversely, Sweden has a low level of television viewing, while 
the US has a high level of television viewing. Sweden saw the war as a violation of 
international law; the US led the "coalition of the willing" against Iraq.  
 
Furthermore, Swedish reporters regard "objectivity" as finding the hard facts on both 
sides of a dispute; US reporters see "objectivity" as remaining impartial (Dimitrova & 
Strömbäck, 2005:403): 
 
That understanding might lead to the consequence that US journalists 
become more dependent on their official sources, and that, when no dispute 
is perceived, they let the official sources set the media agenda.  
 
Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005:405-406) note that the way news is framed depends on 
the national context in which the reporters operate, therefore it was expected that US 
and Swedish reporters would use frames matching the political culture of their 
respective countries. They predicted that war reports in the US and Sweden would differ 
significantly in terms of tone, frames and sources. 
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To examine the way US and Swedish reporters framed the war, Dimitrova and 
Strömbäck sought to answer two research questions (2005:408): 
 
• Can the differences/similarities in news framing be attributed to the perspectives 
of the political leaders in the US and Sweden? 
• Can the differences/similarities in news framing be attributed to the journalistic 
norms and values in the US and Sweden? 
 
Using quantitative content analysis, reports that were published in Dagens Nyheter and 
The New York Times during the period 20 March 2003 to 1 May 2003 are categorised 
according to specific news frames, which include (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005:408-
409): 
 
• military conflict frame  
• human interest frame  
• responsibility frame  
• diagnostic frame  
• prognostic frame  
• violence of war frame  
• anti-war protest  
• media self-referential frame  
 
According to the results of the study, both newspapers published predominantly neutral 
reports, but the tone in Dagens Nyheter is more negative than the tone in The New York 
Times (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005:409-411). The newspapers differed significantly 
with regard to the military conflict, responsibility, anti-war protest and prognostic 
frames, but both used the human interest frame in 17 percent of the stories. They 
equally used the violence of war, media self-referential and diagnostic frames. Neither 
of the newspapers often used the diagnostic frame. Results also showed that The New 
York Times relied much more on official and military sources (92 percent) than Dagens 
Nyheter (40 percent). Interestingly The New York Times cited anonymous sources in as 
many as 78 percent of the reports, while Dagens Nyheter did so in only 54 percent of 
the stories. 
 
The study provides evidence of the differences between the Swedish and US 
newspaper's coverage of Gulf War II in terms of tone, war framing and sources cited 
(Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005:413). The authors propose that these differences in 
coverage may ultimately reinforce and possibly increase global divisions about the war. 
The similarities in reporting, especially about human interest and media self-reference, 
may "suggest a trend toward Americanisation of the journalism process". 
 
Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005:414) conclude with the suggestion that as the war in 
Iraq is still unfolding, new frames might be introduced by the various national media. 
 
As in the two studies above, Seow Ting Lee of the School of Communication, Illinois 
State University, Crispin C. Maslog of the Department of Mass Communication, 
Minnesota State University, and Hun Shik Kim of the School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication, University of Colorado (2006) also examine news frames that were 
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dominant during Gulf War II, but from the perspective of Asian countries. They 
compare 1 558 reports on the war in Iraq and other Asian conflicts published by eight 
newspapers from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines in terms of 
national and international conflict coverage (Lee et al., 2006:499). The "national 
conflicts" conflicts refer to: 
 
• Pakistan and India’s clash about Kashmir 
• the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka  
• the Muslim separatist movement in the southern Philippine province of Mindanao  
• the Aceh and Maluku civil wars in Indonesia 
 
The war reports are analysed according to Galtung's (1998) war and peace journalism 
frameworks (cited by Lee et al., 2006:503), which are oriented along the lines of 
war/violence, propaganda, elites and victory in the case of war frames, and  
peace/conflict, truth, people and solutions in the case of peace frames. 
 
With the above classification in mind, Lee et al. (2006:503) posed three questions: 
 
• Are there significant differences between coverage of the war in Iraq and 
coverage of local conflicts by Asian newspapers, and if so, what are they? 
• What are the most important indicators of war and peace journalism respectively 
in the coverage of the Iraq war and the Asian conflicts? 
• Is there a correlation between war/peace journalism framing and story-specific 
characteristics such as story type, length and source? 
 
Results show that a disproportionate number of stories were framed as war journalism 
and fewer as peace journalism in local Asian reports, while the opposite is true of 
coverage of the war in Iraq (Lee et al., 2006:507-508). According to the study the 
strongest indicators of the war frame in both the coverage of local Asian conflicts and in 
coverage of Gulf War II are:  
 
• a focus on the here and now, which confines the conflict to a particular space and 
time without considering the long-term effects 
• an elite orientation, which focuses on politicians and military leaders, without 
paying attention to the soldiers and civilians who suffer the consequences of elite 
decisions 
• a dichotomy between the good and the bad, which promotes shallow moral 
judgments and blame to whoever started the war. 
 
The strongest indicators of the peace frame that emerged from the analysis of reports on 
both the local Asian conflicts and Gulf War II are (Lee et al., 2006: 508): 
 
• avoidance of emotional language, which implies the use of neutral language   
• non-partisanship, which refers to the avoidance of bias to any side 
• multi-party orientation, which allows all parties to express their views.  
 
With regard to story characteristics and war/peace journalism framing, Lee et al. 
(2006:510) found that the majority of the reports were hard news, with a dominant war 
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frame. Most of the features and opinion pieces have a peace frame. The results also 
show a positive correlation between story length and the peace frame: the longer the 
story, the more likely that it used the peace frame; the shorter the story the more likely it 
is to be framed as war journalism. It also seems that reports from foreign sources are 
more likely to contain war frames and fewer peace frames than local Asian stories. 
 
Other framing studies referring to the war in Iraq were conducted by Fahmy (2004), 
Giffen (2004), Lin (2004) and Boaz (2005). 
 
3.3.3.2 General discussion of framing studies 
There is an abundance of literature on the concept "framing", the different approaches to 
and theories of frames, framing devices, models of framing, framing analyses, and 
framing effects. Some of the authors agree with one another, others disagree, and many 
more write about completely divergent concepts, all referred to as "framing" (Scheufele, 
1999:18). This disparity of approaches is exemplified by the dissimilarity of framing 
studies on war reporting. For example, Denise St. Clair & Atsushi Tajima of the School 
of Journalism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2003) examined the correlation 
between the ideological orientation towards the war in Iraq of six different countries and 
the frames used by their newspapers, while Sivek (2004) compared the frames used by 
reporters in Iraq during the war. In a study of media coverage before and during Gulf 
War I, American Philosophy of Education Professor Douglas Kellner (1991) found that 
the war was framed as "a simple conflict between good and evil", which agrees with 
only one of the aspects addressed by Lee et al. (2006).  
 
A review of the most recent framing analyses on Gulf War II creates an impression of a 
multitude of researchers all working towards a collective goal, but with none knowing 
what the others are doing – which most likely is true. If the same research could be 
undertaken using common parameters for delineating frames, a much better picture 
would emerge of how the war was framed on a global scale. As it stands now, frame 
research on Gulf War II is a collection of disparate and disconnected – albeit often 
excellent – facts and figures. 
 
Because of the confusion about framing (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007:12; Weaver, 
2007:142, 245) it is not the purpose of this study to propose an ultimate model of 
framing, but rather to explore one of the many paths created by the media towards the 
contextualisation and eventual understanding of the events in Iraq. Suggestions by 
scholars such as Hallahan (1999:207-208), Alan Knight, Australian Journalism, Media 
and Communication scholar (2004), Berinsky and Kinder (2006:641,654) and film 
maker and media critic Peter Watkins (2007) about the "story" side of news prompted 
the exploration of the use of the story – as in "folk tale" – as a frame used by US 
government officials and reflected by the media during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
3.3.4 Story frame 
The presentation of Operation Iraqi Freedom as a "Hollywood movie", complete with 
heroes and villains and damsels in distress (e.g. Pfc Jessica Lynch), prompted this 
researcher to look into the possibility of using a story frame for the analysis of war 
coverage. The idea is supported by Berinsky and Kinder (2006), Casebeer & Russell 
(2005) and UN spokesperson Jamie Shea (Berlin Online, 2000) (see Chapter 2.4.1). 
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3.3.4.1 Review of the story frame 
Not many news studies have been done that use the story as a frame for analysis. 
Interesting work has however been done in other fields, such as political studies and 
military studies. 
 
For example, in his book War stories American political scientist Bruce D. Larkin 
(2001) looks at accounts of war from a political – not a media – perspective. According 
to Larkin, "[a]ccounts of wars are 'stories', akin to other kinds of stories" (2001:13). He 
continues to assign events during Gulf War I to the categories suggested by Propp 
(1968) and concludes that "[t]here are startling parallels".  
 
This salience of a story frame in times of conflict is also highlighted by military 
scholars Casebeer and Russell (2005), who look at the attacks of 11 September 2001 as  
 
part of a narrative – or a story – for the American public that shall exist in 
some form forever ... While the public regarded the attacks as defining – 
and a break somehow from the past, the elements of the story making up the 
September 11th attacks are slowly being pried apart and reconstituted by a 
variety of different “communities,” including intelligence professionals, 
academics and the news media. 
 
Casebeer and Russell (2005) propose the creation of a comprehensive "counter-
narrative strategy" to oppose the "Al Qaeda narrative". The Al Qaeda narrative includes 
(Vlahos, quoted by Casebeer & Russell, 2005): 
 
• an heroic journey and a mythic figure – Bin Laden, who portrays himself as 
following in the footsteps of Muhammad. He is on a heroic journey and struggles 
against great odds in a way that makes him almost as mythic in stature as 
Muhammad himself 
• the rhythm of history captured as epic struggle and story – Bin Laden presents 
himself as part of a heroic battle against Western imperialism and decadence, a 
story that forms part of the very fabric of Muslim history 
• the commanded charge of renewal – it is only by opposing the dark forces of the 
West that one can be renewed. "To fail to struggle is to fail to play your part in a 
narrative that ends with Islam triumphing over the infidel West"  
• history revealed and directed through mystic literary form – the mystical 
component of the story, e.g. rewards in the paradise hereafter, means that worldly 
successes do not matter: the struggle should continue despite current triumphs. 
 
The authors suggest that the countering of the Al Qaeda narrative should be  
 
a critical mission requirement of any strategy to confront the organization 
… Myth creation usually involves the effective use of narrative. As we 
formulate an “affective strategy,” we should keep the elements of a 
narrative in mind, for it is only by disrupting the story that you can interfere 
with myth creation. Good stories need protagonists, antagonists, tests for 
the protagonist, a promise of redemption, and a supporting cast of 
characters (at the very least). 
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In one of the few media studies on news and the story frame, British political scientist 
Erik Ringmar (2006) analyses news about the pre-amble to Gulf War II according to 
different types of stories, or narratives. He explains that by treating decision makers as 
storytellers, it is possible to see the conflict between them as a problem of intertextuality 
(2006:404). Ringmar notes that while narratives are often based on the same facts, their 
interpretations and thus their conclusions differ (2006:404): 
 
stories present different agendas for action and thereby different moral 
choices. Consequently, it is not surprising that decision-makers who tell 
different stories end up disagreeing with one another. 
 
Ringmar points out narratives have always followed a predictable plot, which is why it 
grabs and holds the attention of the audience, and why the audience is able to make 
sense of it (2006:404). Four classical types of narratives are examined, namely  
 
• romance  
• tragedy  
• comedy 
• satire. 
 
Romance, the most common fairytale, is currently famous as Hollywood love stories, 
but is best illustrated by the adventure story (Ringmar, 2006:404-405): 
 
a quest undertaken by a chivalric knight, a brave explorer, an ardent lover, 
or some other heroic figure. The hero is dashing and daring … and the 
story unfolds as he searches for something or someone, or tries to conquer 
something or someone. Often there are three stages to the quest: first the 
perilous journey, next the struggle or the conquest, and finally the 
exaltation of the hero. In all these respects the enemy is the hero’s opposite 
… The remaining characters are either for or against the hero, and 
obviously there is never any doubt about whose side the audience is on.  
 
According to Ringmar romance is the story type favoured by "idealists and world-
improvers of all kinds", such as free-market enthusiasts, anti-Communist crusaders, 
Greenpeace activists, Esperanto-speakers and anti-globalization protesters, as well as 
politicians and social elites (2006:404-405): 
 
These are people who believe that evil can be defeated, that the world can 
be made into a better place, and usually also that they are the very 
instruments chosen by God, Providence or History to carry out this task. 
Occasionally, the romantics are pacifists, but more often they are warlike 
and fully prepared to fight for their beliefs. The world as they see it presents 
a struggle between good and evil, and evil must be annihilated for good to 
prevail. 
 
During Gulf War II, the Bush and Blair administrations represented the romantics 
(Ringmar, 2006:407). The story frame based on Propp’s (1968) folk tale analysis that 
will be used in the present study falls in to the “romance” category.  
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Tragedy follows an entirely different plot, with the hero rebelling against the status quo 
only to be destroyed in the end (Ringmar, 2006:405): 
 
The tragic hero … has a ‘flaw’ that sets him apart from others; he is proud, 
passionate or obsessed with some fanciful idea. Following his own mind, he 
comes into conflict with the laws of society or nature, and as the social or 
natural order is re-established the hero is relentlessly crushed. In the end 
no one escapes and no one gets away with anything, no matter how good 
the intentions. In fact, the better the intentions, the more decisive the defeat 
will be.  
 
In the war in Iraq the tragic narrative was promoted by the traditional American foreign 
policy establishment who declared that "[i]f we want peace we have to prepare for war, 
and only we ourselves can guarantee our own preservation" (Ringmar, 2006:405, 407). 
 
Comedy commonly refers to an act designed to elicit laughter, but as a narrative type it 
refers to "a comedy of errors", an account of conflicts and misconceptions that are 
accidentally resolved during the course of the story (Ringmar, 2006: 406-407). In Gulf 
War II, the so-called "old Europeans" were the "comedians" (Ringmar, 2006: 406):   
 
As they see it, the problems of the world are mainly the results of 
misunderstandings, and for that reason the most important task is to 
provide some means by which states can sort out their differences. Our 
enemies should not be destroyed, but instead engaged in conversation; 
hence the importance of international organizations and fora. Working 
through the European Union, the United Nations or the International 
Monetary Fund, a new and better world can indeed be created but only in 
small steps and through painstaking and profoundly non-glamorous effort 
...  One by one our enemies will come to see the advantages of our social 
model and abandon their old ways. Our enemies are mistaken rather than 
evil, and we should interact with them rather than kill them.  
 
Satire refers to an ironic world view which ridicules the established social order, 
exemplified by the other narrative types, and is consequently subversive rather than 
constructive (Ringmar, 2006: 406-407). This was the narrative followed by critics of the 
war in Iraq as well as the newly liberated Iraqis: 
 
The basic strategy is to turn other plot structures inside-out, upside-down, 
or to deconstruct and reassemble them in unrecognizable patterns ...  Since 
romance is the narrative that takes itself most seriously, it has always been 
the satirists’ favourite target ... While political and social elites may dismiss 
these accounts as ‘irresponsible’ or ‘obscene’, they are also often afraid of 
them. They know that if the official narrative fails to unfold as the leaders 
envisioned the satirical narrative will quickly gain credence. The moment 
politicians are made into fools, their power quickly dissipates.  
 
Ringmar (2006:413-414) concludes that variant narratives are not necessarily bad and 
that it is to be expected that there will be different views of an issue as complex as Gulf 
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War II. Such disagreements contribute to the plurality of viewpoints, which ultimately 
improves the global ability to assess a situation. 
 
Other studies that refer to the use of story elements in the analysis of news were done by 
American Journalism and Communication scholar Jack Lule (2001) and Australian 
communication researcher Peter Pugsley (2006). 
 
Lule (2001) explored the differences between news as information and news as myth or 
a story complete with characters, a plot and a theme. Stressing that according to his 
definition news as myth does not suggest a false belief, or a biased, slanted, spun or 
untrue tale (2001: 15), he argued that news stories offer "sacred, societal narratives with 
shared values and beliefs, with lessons and themes, and with exemplary models that 
instruct and inform: they are offering myths" (2001:18). 
 
Pugsley (2006) examined how in China the "hero narrative" is deliberately employed by 
the media during difficult times to mobilise the public and to ultimately create a positive 
outcome in which "the enemy", be it foreigners, corrupt government officials or even 
nature, is defeated. The whole of China’s struggle against the enemy is represented by 
the valiant actions of a chosen person or group. According to Pugsley (2006:78) this is 
purposefully done to control the Chinese mass audience. 
 
3.3.4.2 General discussion of story frame studies 
Despite the general recognition that stories offer a universal structure to understand and 
make sense of complex international political issues (Ringmar, 2006:404), a 
surprisingly small number of media studies examine this phenomenon. The few studies 
that were published give valuable perspective on the way the complexities of world 
politics – and especially Gulf War II – were made comprehensible to world audiences. 
Because of the danger this approach implies in terms of perception management from 
the global political elite (Casebeer & Russell, 2005), more research is needed and the 
results thereof ought to be included in the training of journalists.  
 
3.4 Summary 
In Chapter 3 scholarly papers on the key research areas covered by this study, namely 
news flow and gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing, with special reference to the 
story frame, were reviewed. Most of the papers that used Gulf War II as research case 
were produced not before the present study, but at the same time. The present study 
therefore does not expand on the reviewed literature, but acknowledges it for its 
contribution to the available body of knowledge on news analysis of the war in Iraq. 
 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
 
In Chapter 4, the research design and methodology followed in this study is discussed.  
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Chapter 4 
Research design and methodology 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom it was the US government’s stated objective to 
"occupy the media territory" (see Urrutia-Varhall, 2002). For this purpose they 
implemented the Embedded Media Program, which allowed some 700 selected, trained 
and contractually bound reporters – most of them American – to accompany the military 
to the war front. The new media policies became the subject of much debate amongst 
academics, social commentators as well as the media itself due to its potentially 
propagandistic implementation (Diemand, 2003; Hafez, 2003; Misken et al., 2003; 
Robinson, Goddard, Brown & Taylor, 2006). 
 
As only one South African newspaper reporter was present in Iraq during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom – he operated as a unilateral – the local press had to rely on foreign 
sources for information about the war. This begged the question: where did these 
reports originate and what were the tone and general message of these reports?  
 
In order to find an answer, these policies as well as the historical relationship between 
the US government and the media in times of conflict are examined in this study and an 
attempt is made to determine whether and to what extent the American view found its 
way to war reports published by four major South African newspapers. All relevant 
news reports published in four leading South African newspapers as well as news 
briefings by the White House and Pentagon during Operation Iraqi Freedom were 
analysed in terms of gatekeeping, framing, and agendasetting using the story frame, 
which is an adapted version of Propp's fairytale analysis, as a yardstick. 
 
In Chapter 4 the aim of the research and the research questions pertaining to the above 
are stated. Key concepts are defined and the instruments used to measure these variables 
are explained. Next, the sample design and sampling methods are discussed, along with 
an explanation of the key variables used in the analyses. 
 
4.2  Objective    
The aim of this study is to determine whether and to what extent the novel media 
policies implemented by the US during Gulf War II had resulted in pro-American 
coverage by South African newspapers. 
 
4.3 Conceptualisation  
The key concern of detractors of the new US media policies centred around the 
Department of Defense's Embedded Media Program which allowed hundreds of 
selected reporters to accompany the US forces to the war front to "tell the factual story – 
good or bad – before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they 
most certainly will continue to do" (Rumsfeld, 2003a). The US made no secret of its 
desire to gain the support of the international community for the American led war on 
Iraq and critics were of the opinion that this policy in particular was designed to saturate 
the international media with news reports biased towards the American point of view 
(Diemand, 2003; Misken et al., 2003). 
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To understand the current relationship between the military and the media, a media 
historiographical study is done on the origin and evolution of war reporting as a 
distinctive news genre. This is augmented with a focused examination of the interaction 
between the media and the US military during various conflicts since the American 
Civil War up to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
 
This examination is highlighted the views of international war correspondents, namely 
Peter Arnett, Paul Watson, Martin Savidge, Robert Fisk, and Bonny Schoonakker, who 
personally experienced the outcome of the US media policy during different conflicts. 
US media policies during Operation Iraqi Freedom is the focus of this study, and are 
assessed with special reference to the Embedded Media Program, its ground rules and 
the media boot camp.  
 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods are used to analyse the content of 
all Operation Iraqi Freedom news reports that were published by the leading English 
and Afrikaans daily and Sunday newspapers, namely The Star (English, daily), and Die 
Burger (Afrikaans, daily), as well as Sunday Times (English, Sunday), and Rapport 
(Afrikaans, Sunday) between 21 March 2003 (the day after the commencement of 
Operation Shock and Awe) and 2 May 2003 (the day after the announcement of the end 
of major combat operations) to establish whether and to what extent the US 
government's take on the war found its way to South Africa. The newspaper reports are 
classified into news agency reports, reports written by own reporters or local experts, 
and reports compiled from various news sources.  
 
The content analyses are done using selected theoretical models of gatekeeping, agenda-
setting, and framing as parameters.  Propp's (1968) fairytale analysis is employed to 
enumerate elements in the news agenda of major role players during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, as well as to investigate the "story" as a news frame.  
 
Thus, this study comprises two main sections:  
 
• A historiographical overview of the development of war reporting as a separate 
news genre, with special attention to the US government's policies towards the 
media during war or war-like situations. This was done by studying books, journal 
articles and internet archives, as well as interviewing five international war 
reporters who covered military operations that the US was involved in  
• An in-depth study of the result of these policies and interactions on the news 
reports that were eventually published in South African newspapers. This was 
done by means of content analyses of Operation Iraqi Freedom reports published 
by four leading South African newspapers. 
 
4.4 Research questions 
In order to achieve the objective stated above, the following research questions are 
addressed: 
 
• What are the origins of war reporting and how did functions of this news genre 
evolve through history?  
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• How did the relationship between the US and the media evolve during conflicts 
prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and what are the origins of US media policies 
during this war?   
• How did war correspondents perceive the media policies and the relationship 
between the military and the media during Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as 
previous conflicts?  
• Where did the reports on Operation Iraqi Freedom originate and through which 
nodes of gatekeeping did the news flow before reaching the South African 
public? 
• How can the presence of a story frame be tested in news coverage of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom? 
• What elements of this framing model were present in US governmental speeches 
and news briefings? Which ones were the most salient? Were the same elements 
evident in news agency reports published by the South African newspapers, and 
in the overall coverage by these newspapers?  
• Did the content and orientation of Operation Iraqi Freedom reports printed in 
Afrikaans newspapers differ from those published by the English papers?  
• Did the daily newspapers present the same profile in terms of issues and 
orientation as the Sunday newspapers?  
• What first and second level news agendas emerged from US government officials' 
speeches, news agency reports and selected South African newspaper reports? 
 
4.5 Key concepts  
Because of the jargon inherent to the military and the media as social institutions, some 
of the terms used in this study may be unclear to members of either community. 
Therefore, an extensive list of terms will be supplied in the next chapter. Following in 
the present chapter, the most important concepts referred to in this study, namely news 
flow, gatekeeping, agendasetting, framing and the story frame, as they are understood 
by the author, will first be discussed. 
 
4.5.1 News flow 
Since the publication of French journalist and researcher Jacques Kayser’s comparative 
study called One week’s news and the International Press Institute (IPI)'s study titled 
The flow of the news in 1953, numerous researchers have investigated the news flow 
phenomenon and they all came to the same conclusion, namely that the dominance of 
Western news agencies was a vital issue (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985:9-10).  This is 
still the case (Kleinsteuber, 2002:9). Despite more than half a century’s research on 
news flow, apparently no formal definition has yet been formulated (Archetti, 2007:30). 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study the term "news flow" will be used in its most 
basic sense, referring to the transfer of newsworthy information from the event through 
various gatekeepers to the audience (derived from Sparkes & Winter, 1980:150; Wu, 
2003:9; Nossek, 2004:346 and others). 
 
4.5.2 Gatekeeping 
During the process of news flow, information about an issue or event is transferred from 
one "gatekeeper" to the next. A gatekeeper is a person in the channel of news flow who 
sorts, selects and rejects information on news stories by dismissing unwanted, 
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uninteresting and unimportant information and focusing on important or interesting 
stories (Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey & Richardson, 2005:92). For a message to 
reach a target audience, it has to pass through numerous gates (Watson & Hill, 
2003:114-115). 
 
In this study, the term "gatekeeping" will refer to the actions taken by the "gatekeepers" 
in the news flow process, namely the source (e.g. US government officials), reporters 
(embedded and unilateral), sub-editors and editors who "man the gates" at various 
points in the news flow channel, e.g. news agencies, news bureaus and home offices.  
 
4.5.3 Agendasetting 
The media’s very powerful ability to focus public attention on specific issues is referred 
to as "agendasetting" (McQuail & Windahl, 1981:62). According to Lazarsfeld and 
Merton (1971:560-561) the media has the ability to give prominence to issues, people 
and social institutions through coverage thereof. The emphasis placed by the news 
media leads the public's understanding of the salience of an issue and ultimately lays the 
foundation for the public’s opinion on that matter (McCombs, 1999).  
 
According to McCombs (2000) the term "agenda" is not intended to imply that a news 
organisation has an evil premeditated schema that it pursues relentlessly. It is purely a 
descriptive term which refers to the result over time of numerous day-to-day decisions 
by all the gatekeepers in a news organisation, from the reporter in the field to the sub-
editor and the editor. This is the definition of agendasetting that will be used in this 
study. 
 
This study will address two types of agendasetting, namely first and second level 
agendasetting. While first level agendasetting refers to the transmission of object 
(topics, issues, and persons) salience, second level agendasetting involves the 
transmission of attribute (characteristics and properties) (McCombs, 2000). 
 
4.5.4 Framing 
Despite the large corpus of papers on framing, a single universally accepted definition 
of framing still does not exist (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007:12; Weaver, 2007:143). 
 
When people do not have first-hand knowledge of issues or events they rely on the news 
media for information, but also for the clarifying and interpretation of the information 
(Franklin et al., 2005:84). This is done by finding a common ground, which is essential 
to gain the interest and attention – even the assent and approval – of the audience for 
successful communication to take place (Watson & Hill, 2003:110). The communicator 
presents the information in such a manner that it fits into the audience's existing frame 
of reference. 
 
Framing is understood in this study as the selection of certain aspects of an issue to 
promote a particular view of the problem (Entman, 1993:52). 
 
4.5.5 Story frame 
The media appeared to have presented Operation Iraqi Freedom as a story akin to a 
Hollywood action film complete with heroes and villains, which led critics to accuse the 
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media of the "Hollywoodisation" of the war (Knight, 2004; Watkins, 2007) and 
consequently, the presence of a story frame. 
 
For this reason, the general elements present in most stories were sought and found in 
the seminal work by Vladimir Propp, who in 1928 analysed a collection of 100 Russian 
fairytales. He deconstructed the stories into their "small component parts" and identified 
31 basic elements or "functions" (Table 1, p. 38) and eight character types (Table 2, p. 
39) that occurred in the collection of stories (Propp, 1968:25-65, 71-91).  
 
For the purpose of this study, these elements and character types are distilled to find the 
single most common story. This was done by comparing the frequency that elements 
and characters occurred in stories according to Propp's analysis (1968:135-143). These 
story elements are used as markers in the identification of a story frame. 
 
4.6 Issues of measurement 
4.6.1 Coding instrument 
The instrument used to code the key variables in this study is based on the instruments 
applied by Sreberny-Mohammadi and co-workers in 1985 to analyse international 
media reports from 29 countries. That instrument which Sreberny-Mohammadi referred 
to as "a general purpose technique for quantification of news content" in turn had its 
roots in the 1979 International Broadcast Institute's study by British communication 
scientists Peter Golding and Philip Elliott, and communication theorist Denis McQuail’s 
1977 Analysis of newspaper for the Royal Commission (quoted by Sreberny-
Mohammadi, 1985:14-15).  
 
While there are obviously many ways to categorise news content (Sreberny-
Mohammadi, 1985:14), the instrument used in this study was selected because it was 
tried and tested over time in decidedly more extensive research projects.  
 
4.6.2 Sampling 
4.6.2.1 Newspapers 
The newspapers included in the study are the daily newspapers The Star (English) and 
Die Burger (Afrikaans), as well as the Sunday newspapers the Sunday Times (English) 
and Rapport (Afrikaans). In accordance with the instructions for the 1985 Unesco study, 
the newspapers are selected by including those with the largest circulation (Sreberny-
Mohammadi, 1985:13). Thus, the selected newspapers are respectively the largest 
English and Afrikaans daily and Sunday newspapers in South Africa during the period 
of study (Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3.  South African newspapers included in the study  
Name Language Publisher at the time Circulation* 
Sunday Times 
Rapport 
The Star 
Die Burger 
English 
Afrikaans 
English 
Afrikaans 
Times Media  
RCP Media 
Independent Newspapers 
Media 24 
504 295 
338 702 
164 364 
106 499 
*Audit Bureau of Circulation figures quoted in the South Africa Yearbook 2003/2004 (Burger, 
2003: 148-149) 
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4.6.2.2 News reports 
The basic unit of analysis is a news report, which is selected by using the internet 
archives of the four newspapers included in the study, as well as transcripts of US 
officials' speeches and public briefings that are obtained from the White House and 
Pentagon archives. All relevant news reports available in these archives were analysed 
and compared to one another as well as to transcripts of public appearances by President 
George W. Bush and White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer, as well as by the 
Pentagon’s Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs Victoria Clarke (Table 4a and Table 4b).  
 
 
Table 4a. Location of newspaper reports in the internet archives 
 
 
Table 4b. Web addresses of archives 
Institution Web address 
Sunday Times http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/specialreports/iraq-sreport-
template.aspx?Page=ST6P14480 
Rapport http://152.111.1.251/cgi-bin/rapport.cgi?cs=iso-8859-
1&ul=http%3A%2F%2F152.111.1.251%2Fargief%2Fberigte 
%2Frapport%2F%25&s=date&ad=off&ps=50&dx=1&dd=&dm=0&dy=20
06&dt=range&db=21%2F03%2F2003&de=03%2F05%2F2003&q=iraq+%
7C+bush+%7C+saddam 
The Star http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fPage=0&fSectionId=2522&fSearch=1
&fQuery=saddam&fSearchType=1&fStartDay=21&fStartMonth=3&fStart
Year=2003&fEndDay=3&fEndMonth=5&fEndYear=2003&fAuthor=&fSit
es%5B%5D=7 
 
http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fPage=0&fSectionId=2522&fSearch=1
&fQuery=iraq&fSearchType=1&fStartDay=21&fStartMonth=3&fStartYear
=2003&fEndDay=3&fEndMonth=5&fEndYear=2003&fAuthor=&fSites%5
B%5D=7 
 
http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fPage=0&fSectionId=2522&fSearch=1
&fQuery=bush&fSearchType=1&fStartDay=21&fStartMonth=3&fStartYea
r=2003&fEndDay=3&fEndMonth=5&fEndYear=2003&fAuthor=&fSites%
5B%5D=7 
Die Burger http://152.111.1.251/cgi-bin/dieburger.cgi?cs=iso-8859-
1&ul=http%3A%2F%2F152.111.1.251%2Fargief%2F 
berigte%2Fdieburger%2F%25&s=date&ad=off&ps=50&dx=1&dd=&dm=0
&dy=2006&dt=range&db=21%2F 
03%2F2003&de=03%2F05%2F2003&q=irak+%7C+bush+%7C+saddam 
White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/ 
Pentagon http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/archive.aspx 
 
Newspaper Internet location Keywords No. of reports 
Sunday Times 
Rapport 
The Star 
Die Burger 
Special report: War in Iraq 
Argiewe (Archives) 
Advanced search 
Argiewe (Archives) 
- 
Irak, Bush, Saddam 
Iraq, Bush, Saddam 
Irak, Bush, Saddam 
43 
56 
85 
183 
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With the publication cycle of the newspapers in mind, reports in the daily newspapers 
were analysed in the period 21 March 2003 (the day after the war began) to 2 May 2003 
(the day after Bush announced the end of major combat operations). The dates were 
adjusted for the Sunday newspapers to include the first publication dates after these 
marker events, namely 23 March to 4 May 2003.  
 
For the purpose of this study the term "news report" precluded financial news (e.g. stock 
market fluctuations ascribable to the war), sports news referring to the war, letters to the 
editor and personal musings along the lines of "I look at the stars and know somewhere 
in Iraq a child is dying", as well as single paragraph briefs. However, Bonny 
Schoonakker’s personal experiences in Iraq were included because he was the only 
South African newspaper reporter in the country during the studied period. 
 
4.6.2.3 Variables 
The method of measuring adapted for this study attempts to track the flow and slant of 
news on Operation Iraqi Freedom using the following variables (Table 5): 
 
• the name of the newspaper  
• date of the report 
• headline 
• author – own, compiled or agency 
• sources of information 
• slant 
• story element 
 
 
Table 5. An example of a datasheet used for analysis  
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The publication, date and headline are obvious and easy to categorise, but the author, 
sources of information, slant and story element are more involved.  
 
The authors of the reports were noted and categorised as "own", "compilation", "news 
agency" and "unknown" based on the story by-lines: 
 
• own (O): a newspaper’s employees, but also to contributing experts such as 
Lizette Rabe, head of the Journalism Department of the University of 
Stellenbosch (2003), Chris Landsberg, director of the Centre for Policy Studies 
(2003). Syndicated reporters such as Robert Fisk, who worked for the 
Independent Group, were regarded as one of The Star’s  "own" reporters. 
• compilation (C): reports written by an identified individual reporter, but compiled 
from various sources, for instance where a report by Die Burger’s Deon 
Lamprecht directly quoted Reuters and The Washington Post. 
• news agency (A): reports attributed to Reuters, Sapa (South African Press 
Association), Sapa-AFP (Agence France Presse) and Sapa-AP (Associated Press). 
• unknown (?): reports without a by-line.  
 
The sources of the reports were varied. The transcripts came from the US officials who 
delivered the speeches, namely Bush, Fleischer, Rumsfeld and Clarke. The sources of 
the news reports included US, UK and Iraqi officials, experts, civilians, spokespeople 
from various organisations, soldiers and interestingly, other media. 
 
The last two variables, namely slant and story elements, are closely related and are 
determined through a careful qualitative reading of the news reports and transcripts and 
therefore depend on a subjective judgement.  
 
The story elements are categorised according to Propp's fairytale analysis. The most 
common story according to this analysis is about a villain who causes harm to a victim, 
prompting the hero to go on a quest. The hero receives a magic agent from a donor, 
which he uses to achieve victory over the villain in order to right a wrong and ultimately 
to win the hand of the princess (1968:135-143) (Table 6, next page).  
 
While these elements were all present in the speeches of the US government officials, 
Bush, Fleischer, Rumsfeld and Clarke adapted their stories to suit different audiences. 
For example, when Bush addressed the Lima Army Tank Plant where Abrams tanks 
were constructed, he emphasised the role of these tanks as the magic agent in the war, 
and not the military personnel who built them (Bush, 2003i):  
 
[I]t is this facility that has provided the American military with the most 
effective armoured vehicle in the history of warfare – the mighty Abrams 
tank.  
 
Bush often referred to himself as the one to fight the evil villain (e.g. Bush, 2003a, b & 
c), yet he touted the Marines as the heroes when he addressed the Marine Corps’s Camp 
Lejeune (Bush, 2003j):  "Marine units were ordered … And that mission was 
accomplished".  
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Such variations necessitate the creation of more categories, such as "Hero – Military" 
and "Magic agent – Arms" (Table 7). Other extensions include "Hero – Saddam" and 
"Villain – Bush/USA", which were added when the analysis of news agency and 
newspaper reports indicated the necessity thereof. It was also decided to combine 
Bush/USA and Saddam/Iraq in the "villain" category as these terms were often used as 
synonyms, especially when condemned. 
 
 
Table 6. Abbreviated list of functions of Propp's most common story elements (1968) 
Villain his role is to disrupt the peace of a happy family, to cause some form of 
misfortune, damage or harm (p.27) by: 
• kidnapping (p.150) 
• plundering in various forms (p.150) 
• maiming, mutilation (p.150) 
• murder (p.150) 
• imprisonment, detention (p.150) 
• threat of cannibalism among relatives (p.150) 
• fights the hero and is defeated (p.152) 
Victim 
 
 
 
 
 
• has to be rescued  
• often rewards the hero and/or punishes the villain 
• kidnapped  
• maimed 
• killed  
• imprisoned 
• tormented (p.150) 
Hero • suffers from actions of  the villain (p.149) 
• is aware that something is missing (p.150) 
• agrees to fight for the sake of another (p.150) 
• performs pious deeds (p.151) 
• may be supplied with a magic agent (p.151) 
• is victorious (p.152) 
• hero flies though the air (p.153) 
• marries the princess (p.154) 
Quest • the hero is called upon to help 
• the misfortunes in various forms is announced  
• the hero is dispatched (p.150) 
Magical Agent • transforms hero by giving him supernatural powers objects 
possessing a magical property (pp.43-44)  
• the agent is prepared (p.152) 
• agent offers it services, places itself at someone's disposal (p.152) 
Donor provides hero with magic agent that will that eventually end misfortune 
(pp.39, 151) 
Victory • the hero is victorious in an open battle 
• shows superiority in a contest 
• kills or expels the villain (p.152) 
• flies through the air (p.153) 
Princess the princess brings luck and a "happy ever after" when she marries the hero 
(p.154) 
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Table 7. Extended range of story elements based on the analysis of Propp (1968) 
Element Extended range 
Hero Hero - Bush 
Hero - Military 
Hero - USA 
Hero - Saddam 
Hero - Iraq 
Villain Villain - Saddam/Iraq  
Villain - Bush/USA 
Victim Victim - Iraq 
Victim - USA 
Victim - World 
Magic agent Magic agent - military 
Magic agent - arms 
Quest Quest - WMD 
Quest - Liberation 
Donor Donor – US Govt 
Donor - Bush 
Victory Victory 
 
 
Determining the slant of the reports and transcripts relied heavily on the story elements 
that could be observed. For example, many reports focused on American political and 
military power: its position as the world’s only superpower, its large fighting force, its 
superior arms, etc. Without any negative comments added, these qualities constituted a 
"hero", which is indicative of a positive slant. However, where the same attributes were 
referred to but criticised, the slant was indicated as negative. 
 
It is clear that for categorisation, the story elements necessarily have to be evaluated in 
the context they were used. Therefore, the quantitative analyses of these documents 
were fully based on a qualitative assessment and interpretation of the reports. As such, 
this study can neither be regarded as purely qualitative or quantitative, but must be seen 
as a fusion of the two methods of research. To exclude either method would have been 
vastly detrimental to the scope of the research. 
 
This study uses these eight most common story elements as a yardstick to measure the 
extent of gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
 
For the full coding schedule and datasheet, see Appendix I. 
 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter the study's objectives and research questions were stated and the key 
concepts explained as they are interpreted for the purpose of this study. Issues of 
measurement were addressed, namely the coding instruments that are used as well as 
how sampling is done, with an explanation of the key variables used in the analyses. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
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In Chapter 5 the history of the war correspondent and war reporting since the earliest 
days is examined. Next, the evolution of the relationship between war correspondents 
and the US government and military is tracked from the Crimean War up until the war 
in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter 5 
War reporting as news genre 
 
 
Now in these modern times a class of men have been begotten and attend our camps and 
armies and gather minute information of our strength, plans and purposes, and publishes 
them so as to reach the enemy in time to serve his purposes. Such publications do not add a 
man to our strength, in no ways benefit us, but are invaluable to the enemy. 
William Tecumseh Sherman (1863),  
Civil War Union General  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
War reporting is one of the oldest news genres. It was a dynamic force in the historical 
development of newspapers, and ultimately, the mass media as a whole. The singular 
relationship between the military and the media as seen throughout Gulf War II has its 
roots in the earliest days of journalism, and played a decisive role in the gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing of news about the war. When the course of this relationship 
over time is studied, it is clear that the fundamental obstacles have largely remained the 
same: while it is crucial to the survival of the military in times of war to keep 
information about their capabilities, strategies and positions secret, it is at the same time 
crucial to the survival of the media to publish exactly that information. Only recently 
did the US military start to realise the value of the commercial news media, and that 
information can be used as a strategic weapon through the news media: "Media shapes 
world opinion. World opinion can greatly influence military actions" (Martin, 2003:9). 
 
To understand how the US government came to the point where it now regards the 
media as an important weapon in its arsenal, it is necessary to study the genesis and 
development of the relationship between the US military and the media through the 
ages. It is important to note that any form of military or governmental censorship, 
diversion of reporters to or away from newsworthy incidents, misinformation, 
disinformation, restriction of access, intimidation of reporters, or the flooding of the 
news with information promoting a specific point of view is regarded by the author as a 
fundamental form of gatekeeping, agenda-setting and framing. Therefore, the following 
historical evolutionary timeline served to demonstrate the prevalence and 
metamorphosis of these theoretical constructs in the practical interactions between the 
military and the media.  
 
The inclusion of incidents of media management – especially in accounts of the wars 
since World War II – is in itself recognition of the incidence of gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing in that context, and will not necessarily be explained as such.      
 
5.2 Early history of the press and war reporting 
The conception of the newspaper as we know it today took place in 59 BC when Julius 
Caesar ordered that reports on the major social and political events of the day must be 
made publicly available (De Beer, 2004: 164, Pauw, 1980:4). The Acta Diurna was 
surprisingly similar to modern newspapers, as it reported on senatorial decisions, the 
reigning consuls' official duties, trials, executions and the Roman elite, as well as the 
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results of gladiator contests – but also, importantly, of the Roman wars. For three 
hundred years, copies of these documents were distributed to the rest of the Roman 
Empire in Europe and the Middle East (Sussman, 2001:11), making it the prototype of 
modern international newspapers (Pauw, 1980: 5).  
 
One of the first recorded "news magnates" was an enterprising Roman named Chrestes, 
who collected local and international news stories, which included anything from the 
merchandise on ships that have landed to witches that were burnt at the stake, and then 
sold these hand-written pages, known as the Chresti compilationem, at local markets 
(De Beer, 2004:164). Also during this time Titus Pomonius Atticus employed slaves to 
copy manuscripts which he then sold to literate Romans (Saul, 2004). 
 
Unfortunately, the decay and disappearance of the Roman Empire during the fifth 
century halted this promising development of news recording, and for several centuries 
afterwards there was no impetus for the regular publication of news in Western Europe 
(Unwin, Unwin & Tucker, 2004). There are no records of any written news reports that 
originated during this time (Pauw, 1980:6), which makes sense, as the ordinary people 
of Europe were virtually illiterate; they had no access to any scripted material, except 
for the odd Church pamphlet which was written in Latin and therefore completely 
incomprehensible to them (Manchester, n.d.). For a long time the only form of news 
distribution in Western Europe was word of mouth: through gossipmongers, town 
criers, and travellers (Stephens, 1999), as well as troubadours who travelled from town 
to town, performing their songs and poems about recent events in the world outside – 
news, in other words – in exchange for money (Jacoby, 1998). 
 
By the 13th century, news was again published in England, and a 1275 royal decree 
stated:  
 
It is commanded, that from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish 
any false News or Tales, whereby discord or (occasion) of discord or 
Slander may grow between the King and his People, or the Great Men of the 
realm; and he that doth so, shall be taken and kept in Prison, until he hath 
brought him to Court (which was the first author of the Tale) (Pauw, 
1980:6).  
 
Gradually, more European merchants started to publish written news accounts, 
containing information about war, but also of politics and commerce, as well as human-
interest stories: tales of hardship, massacres, murders and executions, piracy, plagues, 
religion, witch-craft, miracles and royal conspiracies (Sussman, 2001:18). By the end of 
the fifteenth century, highly sensationalised accounts started to appear in these hand-
written news sheets, like a report on the cruelty of Vlad Tsepes Drakul, also known as 
Count Dracula, towards the Germans in Transylvania (World Association of 
Newspapers, 2004a). However, these news pamphlets were still quite rare, as paper was 
scarce and very expensive, and the manual reproduction of the information was a long 
and laborious undertaking (Donovan, 2003). 
 
Then, sometime between 1450 and 1455 in Mainz, Germany, the goldsmith Johann 
Gutenberg unveiled the first workable printing press with standardised, movable type 
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(Jacoby, 1998). Although the Chinese used a form of printing as early as 200 AD, the 
type could not be moved or replaced (Ayers, 1944). The Koreans invented a viable 
copper type in 1392, but due to a governmental ban on commercial printing, the 
technique was never implemented (Jacoby, 1998). Gutenberg's printing press consisted 
of a converted wine press and equal-sized stamps displaying the letters of the alphabet 
which were arranged into pages of literature, of which many copies could be made. 
After using these reverse-cast high relief lead alloy stamps for the successful printing of 
several books, Gutenberg started printing a 42-line Bible (Wright, 2004a). When 12 
copies of this Bible was shown to the book trade guilds in Paris, the merchant was 
chased out of town, as the guild believed that such a number of identical copies could 
only be the work of the devil (Jacoby, 1998).  
 
In 1476 William Caxton took the first printing press to England and before the end of 
the century, printing presses were operating in every major European city (Wright, 
2004a). To cater for the tastes of the newly literate but less scholarly types, many 
popular ballads illustrated with suitable pictures were printed. These plebeian works 
moved Erasmus to lament in Adages in 1508:  
 
To what corner of the world do they not fly, these swarms of new books? It 
may be that one here and there contributes something worth knowing, but 
the very multitude of them is hurtful to scholarship, because it creates a glut, 
and even in good things satiety is most harmful . . . [printers] fill the world 
with books, not just trifling things (such as I write, perhaps), but stupid, 
ignorant, slanderous, scandalous, raving, irreligious and seditious books, 
and the number of them is such that even the valuable publications lose their 
value (Kitsch, 2003). 
 
Not all "new information" was as frivolous, however, one example being the printed 
accounts of  Christopher Columbus's voyages of discovery in 1493, that were published 
in Barcelona, Rome, Paris, Antwerp, Basel, and Florence, and carried the tales of his 
travels and the new world he had encountered in his own words (Stephens, 1999).  
 
Even in these embryonic stages of the development of news publication, reports on wars 
and battles played a central role (Unwin et al., 2004). For example, The Trew 
Encountre, published in September 1513, was a four-leafed pamphlet giving an eye-
witness account of the Battle of Flodden Field and included a list of the English 
warriors. In 1563 the Venetian government published a hand-scripted newsletter, the 
Notizie Scritte, to report on its war with the Turks (World Association of Newspapers, 
2004a). With the government in charge of the content, there is no doubt that these war 
reports were selected and framed to serve a very specific agenda. It was read out loud in 
public places where the audience had to pay one "gazetta", a small Venetian coin, for 
the privilege of hearing the government's take on the war. Also, in 1588 Michael 
Entzinger of Cologne, Germany, reported on the defeat of the Spanish Armada in his 24 
page news book (World Association of Newspapers, 2004b). The front page of the news 
book carried a woodcut illustrating the Armada sailing off the coast of England. 
Although this news book was published several months after Spain's defeat, it remains 
one of the earliest printed and illustrated news reports of a major historical battle. 
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Gradually, more and more newsletters appeared on a regular basis (World Association 
of Newspapers, 2004a). The newsletter commonly regarded as the first true newspaper 
is the Strasbourg Relation aller fürnemmen und gedenckwürdingen, first printed in 1609 
by Johann Carolus, who had the idea to collect hand-written news and print this in 
weekly instalments (Totosy de Zepetnek, n.d.). This was rivalled closely by Heinrich 
Julius, duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel's Avisa Relation oder Zeitung which was 
founded also in 1609 (Unwin et al., 2004). Although the Nieuwe Tijdingen was 
reportedly published as early as 1605 by Abraham Verhoeven of Antwerp, the earliest 
surviving copy is dated 1621. During this time France introduced its Gazette in 1631, 
and England founded the London Gazette, which is still published as a court journal, in 
1665 (World Association of Newspapers, 2004a). The oldest continuously published 
weekly paper is the Post-och inrikes tidningar of Sweden, which was founded in 1645, 
while the oldest surviving daily newspaper is the Austrian Wiener Zeitung, which began 
publication in 1703 (Unwin et al., 2004).  
 
These early European newspapers mainly covered news from their own continent, with 
very little attention to what was going on in America and Asia (World Association of 
Newspapers, 2004a), although the Dutch, being geographically and commercially in a 
strategic position, initialised international journalism through their "corantos", or 
"current news". The weekly or twice-weekly Courante uyt Italien, Duytsland, & C., 
started publication in 1618 (Unwin et al., 2004). Generally, however, European 
newspapers did not cover national news: French papers typically reported on the British 
royal scandals, while their English counterparts covered France's military blunders 
(World Association of Newspapers, 2004a). Only during the late 1600s did the focus 
shift to include more domestic issues.  
 
The newspaper industry in Western Europe boomed and in 1690, a doctoral student at 
the University of Leipzig, Tobias Peucer, investigated this new phenomenon called 
"news" (De Beer, 2004:165). In his dissertation De Relationibus Novellis ("On news 
reporting") Peucer considered, amongst other things, what today would be referred to as 
the definition of the word "news", the origin and history of the phenomenon, as well as 
news values and the different types of newspapers. According to Peucer, the purpose of 
news reporting was to communicate recent events that are either useful or in some form 
attractive or of interest to the reader who is searching for an answer to the age-old 
question "Ecquid novi" – anything new? (De Beer, Van Ryneveld & Schreiner, 2000:9).  
 
The booming newspaper industry was aided by a number of new inventions, such as 
Alois Sedenfelder's lithograph (1798), Friedrich Koenig's steam powered cylinder press 
(1812), and the telegraph (1844), with photographs used in newspapers for the first time 
in 1880 (World Association of Newspapers, 2004b). The first tabloid, The Daily Mirror, 
appeared in 1903 and introduced a new concept in journalism, namely the "exclusive 
interview", the first of which was with Lord Mint, the new viceroy of India, two years 
later. By 1994, the first independent on-line daily "newspaper" appeared on the internet.  
 
5.3 Modern mass media and the US military 
Since the implementation of satellite technology in the 1960s as part of the space race, 
there has been an unstoppable growth in the science of electronics, introducing 
communication devices such as fax machines, video recorders, the internet, digital 
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camcorders and mobile phones (Taylor, 2003). The invention of electronic 
communication technology, which includes radio, television and the internet, had an 
evolutionary effect on the dissemination of news from the war front, including that of 
the printed media, and played a definitive role in the changed face of war reporting – 
especially in the relationship between the military and the media during Gulf War II.  
 
5.3.1 Early days 
In American society, hostility between the press and the military precedes the founding 
of the nation (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995:34). During the American Revolution, 
colonial news media were regularly subjected to harassment and censorship by the 
military, mostly because of a disparity between the opinions they expressed, and the 
sentiments of the military. These newspapers however did not have war correspondents, 
but relied on letters from soldiers on the war front and official documents. This situation 
prevailed during the War of 1812, when news was still collected at random, and 
inadequate funds, military interference and poor technology hindered the timely 
publication of reports. Being "old news", the reports were of no value to the enemy, and 
security reviews and military censorship were therefore not required. That war produced 
what may be regarded as America's first war correspondent: James M. Bradford, editor 
and publisher of the Orleans Gazette, who enlisted with General Andrew Jackson in 
New Orleans, and subsequently described his military adventures in letters to his 
newspaper (Military Channel, 2006). 
 
By the start of the Mexican War in 1846, improved technology – first the Pony Express1 
and then the telegraph – allowed civilian correspondents to report from the battlefield 
(Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995:35). George W. Kendall, founder of the New Orleans 
newspaper Picayune, set up a system of couriers and steamboats which enabled him to 
consistently deliver dispatches from the war front ahead of military messengers, thereby 
scooping his competitors (The Times-Picayune, 2003). Kendall himself accompanied 
Major Benjamin McCulloch's Texas Rangers on their long and dangerous scouting 
missions as probably the first reporter "embedded" with the US military, his reports 
bringing him instant fame (Cutrer, 2003). Also during this war, camp newspapers were 
first published by military printers, which could be considered as the US military's 
public affairs effort: these newspapers were used by the civilian press as a prime source 
of information on the conflict (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995:35). 
 
5.3.2 Crimean War (28 March 1853 - 1 April 1856) 
Although the American military was not involved in the Crimean War, during this war 
William Howard Russell of The Times of London had set an international standard for 
modern war reporting, and his example would be followed by correspondents reporting 
all subsequent US conflicts (Mooney, 2004:14). Also, the traditional animosity between 
the military and the media in general – not only in America – can be traced to the war 
coverage of Russell. 
 
                                                 
1 The Pony Express was the first fast mail service across the North American continent, and operated 
between the Missouri River and the Pacific coast. By using horses, important messages were rushed 
across the vast plains, deserts, and mountains of the western United States. This journey took ten days to 
complete (Encarta World English Dictionary, 1999).  
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During this war the implementation of the newly invented telegraph, the predecessor of 
all new electronic media technology, coincided with the appearance of the first true war 
correspondents (Dyas, 2004a), making it the first "media war". Because of the 
advantages that it offered the military, a telegraph line was established between 
Balaclava (in Bulgaria) and Varna (in the Ukraine) in 18552.  
 
Although Russell realised the potential of the telegraph for reporting news, he rarely 
had the opportunity to use it, as its use was dictated by Lord Raglan, the Commander-
in-Chief, who had total disregard for Russell (Dyas, 2004b). Raglan therefore acted as a 
prime gatekeeper by regulating the flow of news from the war front. The tense 
relationship between the two men prefigured the strained relationship between the 
media and the military in subsequent wars, including Gulf War II (Malkin, n.d.).  
 
Because of Raglan's animosity, Russell's reports were dispatched to London by means of 
a combination of ordinary land mail, boats and occasionally, when the commander felt 
like it, the telegraph (Dyas, 2004a, Dyas, 2004b), a situation which vastly differed from 
the war correspondents who during Gulf War II had the ability to instantaneously 
dispatch their reports from practically any location to the outskirts of the earth.  
 
William Russell was frustrated by limited access from the moment he set foot on the 
Crimean peninsula in 1854, as military officers scorned him and Lord Raglan refused to 
talk to him, a position shared by "unilateral" colleagues during Gulf War II (Malkin, 
n.d.). Lord Raglan not only denied Russell the facilities usually offered to reporters, but 
even the means to draw rations (Russell, 1966:13). Despite this, Russell continued to 
report on the logistical and strategic failures of an inept leadership, how the soldiers had 
to make-do without essentials such as adequate arms and ammunition, tents in raging 
rainstorms, warm and waterproof clothing in winter, even food, but especially the lack 
of proper medical facilities (Russell, 1966:67, 151, 152, 179).  
 
As the military banned him from the battlefield, he interviewed soldiers returning from 
combat, but grew frustrated by their contradictory reports (McLane, 2004:79). After an 
appeal by his newspaper, Russell was allowed to observe the battles from higher ground. 
This gave him a bird's-eye view of the action and enabled him to see the poor leadership 
displayed by the British commanders, a matter he reported on relentlessly. This, 
however, caused the military to question the loyalty to the Crown of both Russell and 
The Times, which forced the very patriotic paper to agree to self-censorship and to report 
only on completed military operations.  
 
Russell's exposés of the conditions that British soldiers had to endure, as well as reports 
on both military and political incompetence, was directly responsible for the downfall of 
the Earl of Aberdeen's government in 1855 (10 Downing Street, n.d.; Baldwin, 1982; 
British History, n.d.).  
                                                 
2 The first attempt to use wireless telegraphy in a conflict situation was during the Anglo-Boer War of 
1899-1902 (Baker, 1995). Paul Kruger's Boer Republic ordered six wireless telegraphy sets from the 
German company Siemens and Halske in August 1899. The wireless telegraphs, which transmitted 
signals (not voices) within a range of 15 km, were intended for communication between the fortifications 
around Pretoria, but were confiscated by customs in Cape Town.  
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After Lord Raglan's death in June 1855 his successor, Sir William Codrington, issued 
history's first censorship order on 25 February 1856, prohibiting the press from 
publishing reports on military morale, criticism of the commanders,  or on military 
movements (Malkin, n.d.). 
 
The Crimean War was also the first to be systematically photographed and produced the 
famed war photographer Roger Fenton, who arrived in Crimea in March 1855 (Dyas, 
2004a). Fenton was commissioned by Thomas Agnew & Sons of Manchester to 
compile a photographic record of the war.  For this, Fenton travelled with two 
assistants, five cameras, 700 glass plates and a mobile darkroom. Because the existing 
photographic technology prohibited him from taking action shots, he photographed 
landscapes, scenes in the military camps, and portraits of important people.  
 
Compared to what a single reporter embedded with the military during Gulf War II was 
able to do with the minimum of equipment, this state of affairs is almost 
incomprehensible to the modern war correspondent. 
 
5.3.3 American Civil War (12 April 1861 – 9 April 1865) 
The professionalism William Howard Russell had brought to reporting during the 
Crimean War was applied by other reporters soon afterwards, with the outbreak of the 
American Civil War (Mooney, 2004:14). This was the first American conflict to be 
covered by large numbers of correspondents (Terry, 1996:5-6). Some 500 male 
journalists, known as the "Bohemian Brigade", reported mostly for foreign newspapers 
and papers from the Northern states, as the Southern press generally based their reports 
on letters and telegrams from soldiers (Mooney, 2004; Shepard, 2004:17-18). Russell 
himself also spent a brief period in America covering the war, but had to return to 
England due to problems with his editor (Mooney, 2004).  
 
The war affected virtually every American family in some way, causing an almost 
insatiable thirst for news from the battlefield (Mooney, 2004:15) – much as Gulf War II 
did in 2003. Both Confederate and Union newspapers obliged, not least because of the 
boost in circulation this implied. General William Tecumseh Sherman, who epitomised 
the military's disdain for the media, described the media reports to news-hungry 
civilians in a letter dated 13 July 1864 as "scattering [information] piecemeal to satisfy 
the greedy curiosity of a gaping public" (Sherman, 1864, as cited in Ewing, 1987).  
 
Due to advances in telegraph technology and railroads, correspondents were able to 
transfer their stories to the newspaper offices within hours after an event took place 
(Snyder, 2003:7-8). This gave rise to a new problem, namely the notion amongst many 
correspondents that accuracy and operational security were less important than the 
speed at which reports could be filed – again a reflection of what critics of the 
Embedded Media Program in Iraq said had happened there.  
 
The first-hand accounts of the horrors of war shaped the public's view of the conflict, 
which in turn infuriated commanders on both sides of the conflict (Shepard, 2004:17-
18). Of reporters General Sherman said  
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I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp 
rumours and print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which, in truth they 
are. If I killed them all there would be news from Hell before breakfast 
(Newseum, n.d.). 
 
For the first time, there was a concerted effort by the American government to censor 
news reports (Terry, 1996:6). President Lincoln gave the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of War permission to exert censorship as they saw fit. This included military 
control over telegraph lines, which meant that reporters were unable to file reports 
without military approval. Acting directly as a gatekeeper, agendasetter and framer of 
the news, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton used this opportunity for disinformation 
purposes, altering the number of casualties to create a more favourable image of their 
success in the war (Neuman, 1996a: 39). 
 
By the time the war ended, the military had begun to understand the power of the press 
on public opinion, as well as its impact on troop morale (Snyder, 2003:8). The 
professional war correspondent literally came to age and with this, the traditionally 
hostile relationship between the military and the media became an institution.   
 
5.3.4 Spanish American War (25 April 1898 – 10 December 1898) 
Dubbed "a splendid little war" by American Ambassador John Hay in a letter to 
Theodore Roosevelt (Bethell, 1998), the Spanish American War is infamous for the role 
the media allegedly played in its inception (Blow, n.d.). With the outbreak of the second 
Cuban Revolution in 1895, reporters streamed to the region, but like the unilateral 
reporters "embedded" in the Palestine Hotel during Gulf War II, few of them ever 
ventured closer to combat "than Key West or the bar of the Hotel Inglaterra in Havana" 
(Giessel, 1998). From there they created reports based on information supplied by the 
Revolution's propaganda offices, spiked it with their own imaginings, and fed readers at 
home a steady diet of stories about phantom battles, imagined Cuban victories, Spanish 
cannibalism and torture, and beautiful and savage Amazons fighting with the 
revolutionaries against the hated Spaniard (Giessel, 1998).  
 
An exchange frequently quoted by journalism scholars purportedly took place during 
this time (Campbell, 2005). Accompanying correspondent Richard Harding Davis, the 
artist Frederic Remington was sent to the Caribbean in January 1897, to do illustrations 
for a series of articles on the Revolution to be published in the New York Journal. 
According to the oft-repeated story, Remington soon became weary of the lack of 
excitement in Cuba and sent a telegram to the Journal's owner, William Randolph 
Hearst, reading: "Everything is quiet. There is no trouble. There will be no war. I wish 
to return." The publisher's infamous alleged reply: "Please remain. You furnish the 
pictures and I'll furnish the war", has become classical "proof" of the powerful effect the 
media have on world politics. An in-depth study by American journalism historian W. 
Joseph Campbell (2000) concluded that there is no credible evidence to support this 
story. 
 
Nevertheless, together with Joseph Pulitzer's World, Hearst's Journal was foremost in 
the search for sensation (Bethell, 1998). Hearst was the new owner of the floundering 
Journal, and was set on overtaking Pulitzer and his World in popularity (Bethell, 1998; 
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Giessel, 1998). In their battle for circulation, the two newspapers spared no expense, 
and both published a mixture of fact, fantasy and fiction in the guise of "news" in order 
to attract readers (Giessel, 1998). The Cuban Revolution offered the perfect opportunity 
for such sensationalism and scandal-mongering, and their frenzied reports whipped up 
American public opinion to the point of near-hysteria (Baker, 2001).  
 
When the American battleship the USS Maine exploded under mysterious 
circumstances in the Havana harbour on 15 February 1898, these newspapers, 
collectively known as the "yellow press", fanned the flames of anti-Spanish sentiment 
(Moritz, 2004). Marching to the war-drums banged by Hearst, Pulitzer and others, the 
public pushed Congress, and consequently also peace-loving President William 
McKinley, towards war with Spain (Baker, 2001). Ironically, this happened just as the 
new Spanish government reconsidered Cuban oppression and moved towards 
negotiations with America to prevent war (Moritz, 2004). 
 
Hearst clearly enjoyed the feeling of political power his paper had given him:  
 
Under republican government, newspapers form and express public 
opinion. They suggest and control legislation. They declare wars. They 
punish criminals, especially the powerful. They reward with approving 
publicity the good deeds of citizens everywhere. The newspapers control the 
nation ... (Bethell, 1998).  
 
"How do you like the Journal's war?" Hearst's newspaper asked a month into the war. 
 
On the battlefield, the relationship between soldiers and reporters was unlike anything 
seen before or since the Spanish American war, as the correspondents enjoyed 
tremendous prestige and therefore were generally allowed to do almost exactly what 
they pleased (Giessel, 1998). Still, some of the generals, such as General William R. 
Shafter, commander of the American expeditionary force to Cuba, saw the media as 
nothing more than a nuisance (Felman, 1992). When the legendary Richard Harding 
Davis asked to go ashore with the first wave of troops at Daiquiri, Shafter exclaimed: "I 
don't give a damn who you are. I'll treat you all alike!" The reporters never forgave him 
for this and gave him very poor press. 
 
War correspondents such as Davis, Stephen Crane and James Creelman proved to be 
quite valuable to the military, although their presence and opinions were not always 
fully appreciated (PBS, 1999). Crane for example warned Lieutenant Colonel Theodore 
Roosevelt that he kept hearing a dove cooing, which he thought could be a signal from 
the Spanish scouts. Roosevelt ignored him, and led his men into an ambush. During 
another battle Creelman tried to retrieve the Spanish flag from a hill. He got carried 
away, pulled his pistol and started shooting as he ran up the hill. Unfortunately, he was 
shot in the back, and as he lay on the ground, thinking that he was dying, William 
Randolph Hearst himself leant over him, saying: "Well, I'm sorry you're shot, but wasn't 
it a splendid fight? We beat all the other newspapers" (PBS, 1999). 
 
Richard Harding Davis accompanied the 1st US Volunteer Cavalry, better known as the 
"Rough Riders", and became close friends with Theodore Roosevelt, the second in 
 81
command of the unit (Cresswell, 1998). During the battle at Las Guasimas, Davis 
became directly involved in the fight, an event Roosevelt (1899) described in his book 
The Rough Riders: 
 
It was Richard Harding Davis who gave us our first opportunity to shoot 
back with effect. He was behaving precisely like my officers, being on the 
extreme front of the line, and taking every opportunity to study with his 
glasses the ground where we thought the Spaniards were … Davis suddenly 
said: "There they are, Colonel; look over there; I can see their hats near 
that glade”, pointing across the valley to our right. In a minute I, too, made 
out the hats, and then pointed them out to three or four of our best shots, 
giving them my estimate of the range.  
 
Davis did not shrink away from joining the fight either. In a letter to his brother Charles, 
he wrote how he "borrowed a carbine and joined Capron's troop … we ran forward 
cheering across the open and then dropped in the grass and fired. I guess I fired about 
twenty rounds and then formed into a strategy board and went off down the trail to 
scout" (Davis, 1864-1916). Roosevelt had subsequently offered him a commission in 
the unit, which Davis declined, but he did accept one of only three honorary 
memberships ever given by the Rough Riders (Cresswell, 1998). 
 
5.3.5 World War I (1 August 1914 – 11 November 1918) 
Because of the British military's deep-grained antagonism towards the press following 
their experience with William Howard Russell during the Crimean War, British 
Secretary for War  Horatio Kitchener unconditionally banned all reporters from the 
battlefield during World War I (McLane: 2004:79; Morgan, n.d.). Correspondents who 
attempted to report from the war front were arrested on sight (Morgan, n.d.).This 
initially prompted American journalists to cover the war from the German side, as they 
had better access that way. After some time a mere six correspondents were embedded 
with the army on the Western front, but because of their absolute loyalty to their units, 
they produced "the worst reporting of just about any war and were all knighted for their 
services" (Knightley, 2003a). For example, pressures from home offices for sensational 
reports on enemy atrocities resulted in contrived reports of German soldiers tossing 
Belgian babies into the air and catching them on their bayonets, and the boiling down of 
German corpses to obtain glycerine to be used in ammunition (Shah, 2005). 
 
Upon entering the war, the US military employed a primitive form of embedding, 
allowing unlimited war zone access to uniformed reporters accompanying the fighting 
forces, but with obligatory censorship imposed on them (McLane, 2004:79). Because of 
their patriotism and gratitude for having the opportunity to accompany the soldiers, few 
journalists complained about this arrangement.  
 
However, the congenial relationship between the US military and the media only lasted 
until Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 
(Pritchard, 2003). The first Act prohibited the publication of information that might in 
any way be regarded as useful to the enemy, and the second banned criticism of the 
government and the military, as well as adverse remarks about the flag, military 
uniforms, and other symbols of national value. This was the beginning of the most 
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restrictive period in the relationship between the military and the media in American 
history. Reporters had to be certified as either accredited or visiting correspondents, 
pledge to report only the truth, put up a $10 000 bond which could be lost if the 
journalist reported anything that could embarrass the government, and sign a contract to 
submit all correspondence to the press office. 
 
The US government and War Department (which later became the Department of 
Defense) realised the potential of managed information dissemination (Defense Science 
Board, 2001:19). For this purpose, President Woodrow Wilson appointed journalist 
George Creel to head his newly formed Committee on Public Information (CPI), which 
had about 150 000 employees in the US and abroad, including public relations heavy-
weights Ivy Lee and Edward L. Bernays (Aldridge, 2003). The purpose of the CPI, also 
known as the Creel Commission, was to cultivate the conviction internationally and in 
the US that the American cause was virtuous, and that its foreign policy goals were 
selfless (Defense Science Board, 2001:19). At home, the commission promoted unity 
and loyalty, and internationally they encouraged appreciation and support for their war 
effort. This was done through the establishment of "country bureaus" to co-ordinate its 
activities, as well as numerous foreign offices.  
 
The CPI used all media available at the time to convey their message. They recruited 
artists to produce patriotic posters which were displayed all over the country, and 
millions of pamphlets and leaflets were printed and dropped from planes all over the 
world (Aldridge, 2003). Equally large numbers of booklets printed in the red, white, and 
blue of the American flag expanded on the British image of the Germans as 
bloodthirsty, cruel and barbaric Huns – an idea that was carried through to the movies 
they produced – and were distributed across the globe. The CPI also organised some 7.5 
million short public speeches delivered by 75 000 men, who got up during movie or 
theatre intermissions to deliver the government's message. So successful was the CPI's 
techniques of mobilising the public that Germany's leading World War I strategist 
General Erich von Ludendorff said it was the Allies' most significant accomplishment 
and that it was the direct cause of the disintegration of German soldiers' morale 
(Defense Science Board, 2001:19). Consequently, Hitler copied these strategies during 
World War II (Aldridge, 2003). The CPI laid the foundation on which marketing 
strategies for subsequent wars, including Gulf War II, would be built (Rose, 2000). 
 
After World War I, Guglielmo Marconi was instrumental in the introduction of short-
wave radio in 1924 (Headrickm, n.d.). Short-wave transmitters were about a twentieth 
cheaper than equally powerful long-wave transmitters, used only about 20% of the 
electrical power, and most importantly, it was also much faster than long-wave-radio. 
For a long time, neither broadcasters nor advertisers were very fond of news 
programmes, typically devoting only 15 to 30 minutes a day to it (Kierstead, 2007).  
 
5.3.6 World War II (1 September 1939 – 2 September 1945) 
From the American perspective, World War II was almost synonymous with Daily 
News's roving reporter Ernie Pyle (Gelfand, 2005). However, it is important to 
remember the role of the radio, which realised its full potential as news medium during 
this war. Politicians rapidly grasped the mass appeal of the new medium, and began 
using it as a tool to win over the public opinion.  
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In Germany, the Nazi government employed the centralised broadcasting system, the 
Volksempfänger (People's Receivers), for propaganda purposes from late 1933, making 
it the duty of every German to listen to the radio (Briel, n.d.). Early in the war the 
German programmes of the BBC and Radio Moscow were still transmitted to Germany, 
but from 1939 it became a capital crime in Germany to listen to foreign broadcasts.  
 
World-wide, however, the radio brought the sounds of the Battle of Britain, Pearl 
Harbour, and D-Day into the homes of the ordinary people through reports on incidents 
such as these (US News, 2004). Wearing short-wave transmitters in backpacks, radio 
reporters were able to report live from the war front, but such reports were rare as 
broadcasters did not want to risk a reporter being killed while live on air (Sullivan, 
2003). Also, live broadcasts from the battle field were frowned upon by censors. During 
the war in Iraq these same issues were put on the table, but apparently the advantages of 
having access to the battlefield by far outweighed the potentially negative reactions 
from the public should something have happened to a reporter – especially a television 
reporter – while he was live on air.  
 
Overall, the US government managed the dissemination of information through the 
Office of Co-ordinator of Information (COI), which President Roosevelt established in 
July 1941, shortly before Pearl Harbour (Defense Science Board, 2001:19). The 
director, Colonel William Donovan, created two major divisions, namely Research and 
Analysis, and Foreign Information Service (FIS). FIS (also referred to as the 
Psychological Warfare Division) propagated the American view by means of 11 
commercial short-wave radio stations broadcasting more than 300 programmes a week 
in Europe and Asia.  
 
American society during World War II was characterised by strong patriotism and pro-
government sentiment, a mood that was reflected by the media and which gave rise to 
the view – at least from the military side – that it was the golden age of military-media 
relations in America (Porch, 2002:88). Censorship rules were more relaxed than during 
World War I (McLane, 2004:79), but President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Offices of War 
Information and Censorship still enforced severe restrictions on the publication of any 
military information, ranging from the identity and movement of military units and 
material, casualties, and locations of archives and art treasures, to weather forecasts and 
temperatures in major cities (Pritchard, 2003). The publication of photographs of dead 
American soldiers was absolutely forbidden (Jackson, 2003). Such images were only 
published 21 months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and Germany's 
declaration of war against the United States, when the authorities decided that the 
images of the fallen soldiers would help mobilise public support.  
 
As was the case during Gulf War II, the military used accreditation to control media 
access to the battlefield, and correspondents were expected to first obtain a press pass 
from the War Department and a passport from the State Department (Pritchard, 2003). 
At the war front, typically about 50 correspondents were consigned to a press camp that 
formed part of the regular military forces and moved with the army through Western 
Europe. The army seldom tried to suppress bad news, but rather kept the media 
"reasonably satisfied" by releasing enough information (McLane:79, 2004). Reports on 
maritime operations in the Pacific theatre were however heavily censored, especially 
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early in the war, and unfavourable news was often held back until it could be countered 
by positive reports (Pritchard, 2003). This situation improved after correspondents, 
editors and publishers objected strongly enough at the Office of War Information.  
 
The press willingly accepted the War Department's press codes in exchange for 
accreditation and relatively free access to the war front (HRW, 1991; Porch, 2002:88). 
Wearing the uniforms of officers, but without rank insignia (Pritchard, 2003), 
correspondents accompanied military units on patrols, sailed with them on destroyers, 
flew in bombing raids, and accompanied assault teams to the invasions of North Africa, 
Sicily, Guadalcanal, the Philippines, and Iwo Jima (HRW, 1991; Porch, 2002:89). 
When the forces landed on the beaches of Normandy on D-Day, 24 war correspondents 
landed with them to report on the events. The BBC's correspondents were heavily 
criticised for providing a running commentary of an aerial dog-fight during the Battle of 
Britain, as if the life-and-death situation was "a cricket match or a horse race" (Bowen, 
n.d.). Contrary to the often over-enthusiastic and long-winded reports that were 
broadcast from Gulf War II, BBC's news controller A.P. Ryan warned correspondents 
before the D-Day landings at Omaha Beach in Normandy in 1944: 
 
Never "jazz up" a plain story. You are not dramatists ... You are broadcast 
reporters sent out to observe and tell us what you have seen ... If a 
correspondent is in the front row on an historic occasion - as some of you 
will be with luck - then he should let his story run ... [but] it is a very good 
broadcast indeed that stands more than five minutes (Bowen, n.d.). 
 
 
The friendly relationship with the military did not mean that the media was uncritical or 
that they were prepared to act as government propagandists (Rather, 2001). 
Correspondents often questioned censorship decisions, and if they were able to 
convince their "handlers" that reported information would not endanger military 
security, such decisions were frequently retracted. 
  
While the military generally treated reporters as part of "their team" (Porch, 2002:88), 
not everybody bonded with the war correspondents. A Washington censor, when asked 
in 1943 how the media should be kept informed about the progress of the war effort, 
replied: "Tell the bastards nothing till the war's over and then tell them who won" 
(Knightley, 2003b). 
 
5.3.7 Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) 
When North Korea launched an attack on US controlled South Korea in 1950, the US 
military was caught completely off-guard, and attempts by reporters who wanted to 
witness the North Koreans entering Seoul were the last of their concerns (McLane, 
2004: 79). This resulted in no military restrictions on either access to the war front, or 
on the content of dispatches (Pritchard, 2003). Without military guidance, 
correspondents reported according to their own set of guidelines and also voluntarily 
censored themselves. At this point General Douglas MacArthur praised the press for its 
good coverage without "a single security breach" (McLane, 2004:79-80).  
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It was the first war where reports were televised, but television was still in its infancy 
and because few people owned television sets, the audience was still relatively small 
(Taylor, 2003; Humphreys, n.d.). Satellite technology was not yet available, therefore 
footage had to be airlifted to broadcasters, causing a delay of several days and even 
weeks before the newsreels were screened in cinemas, before the start of the main film 
(Taylor, 2003). Consequently newspapers and radio broadcasts remained the preferred 
sources of news (Humphreys, n.d.).  
 
A growing number of reports on the desperation and disorganisation of the US forces 
who suffered one setback after the other inevitably caused the American public opinion 
to turn against the war (Greenway, 1999; Pritchard, 2003). The military was unable to 
provide the media with guidelines on admissible coverage and therefore grew 
increasingly frustrated by reports on US defeats after China entered the war (McLane, 
2004:79-80). General MacArthur called those who reported on the military woes 
"traitors", and in December 1950 he imposed strict censorship rules which were upheld 
until the end of the war (Jackson, 2003). Thus, a system similar to that existing in World 
War II was instituted, with censors reviewing each story (Pritchard, 2003). These 
included a ban on any form of criticism of military misfortunes, food shortages, inferior 
equipment, corruption in the South Korean government, and especially MacArthur's 
leadership (Porch, 2002:90; Pritchard, 2003). He also prohibited the publication of 
reports that either he or his censors thought would harm the morale of the troops or 
cause embarrassment to the US, its allies, or the United Nations. The military hence 
assumed the role of gatekeeper, agendasetter and framer in determining exactly what 
would be reported and how it would be reported. 
  
War correspondents were no longer permitted to talk to negotiators and had to rely on 
what was told to them at a daily briefing by the United Nations command (Greenway, 
1999). Reporters were expected to submit their reports to a field censor who in turn 
submitted it to senior officers in Tokyo for yet another review (Mordan, 1999). Despite 
these obstacles, most correspondents still believed that the military and the media were 
on the same side and few of them questioned whether or not the US should at all be 
involved in a war in Korea (Greenway, 1999).  
 
Attempts to co-ordinate the dissemination of information during this war include the 
establishment of Psychological Operations Co-ordinating Committee in March 1950, 
the Psychological Strategy Board in April 1951, and Operations Co-ordinating Board –  
which lasted eight years – in September 1953 (Defense Science Board, 2001:19). 
 
5.3.8 Vietnam War (1959 – 30 April 1975) 
World War II was viewed by the military as "the golden age of military-media 
relations", and in the same way the media regarded the war in Vietnam as the golden 
age of war reporting (McLane, 2004:80).  
 
The US did not attack Vietnam with one swift strike, but gradually "slipped" into the 
country over a period of several years, often acting clandestinely, until 1962 when it 
publicly committed several thousand military "advisers" to the country (Arnett, 2005 – 
see Appendix II for full interview). This number grew to half a million regular ground 
troops in 1965, when the main conflict began. In 1969, this number started to go down 
 86
until the last troops were pulled out in 1973, leaving only a small number of advisers. 
The war officially ended on 30 April 1975, when the last of the American officials were 
airlifted to safety from the roof of the embassy in Saigon.  
 
This war was the first conflict to be covered extensively by television (Hall, 1995) and 
for the first time ever Americans reported that they received most of their news through 
television and not newspapers or magazines (Howell, 1984).  
 
The media started reporting in earnest in 1962, when reporters for the AP, UPI, the New 
York Times and the Washington Post, Time and Newsweek magazines, as well as NBC 
and CBS TV took up residence in Saigon (Arnett, 2005): 
 
These dozen or so young reporters dominated the coverage of the story for 
the first two years … Vietnamese urban society was open and hedonistic, a 
heritage of 100 years of French colonialism. The South Vietnamese city 
dwellers, many business-oriented, were generally supportive of American 
military initiatives and welcoming to foreigners. … For the reporters 
working in Saigon, the exciting environment gave them an enjoyable private 
life in addition to the challenging professional requirements. Many married 
local women and stayed for years. 
 
War correspondents had unrestricted access and could go anywhere at any time, 
welcomed by soldiers who recognised the reporters' willingness to tell their stories to 
the people back home, while suffering the same hardship they had to endure (Pyle, 
2000): 
 
We drove down roads until the emptiness told us not to go any further. We 
trudged and sweated with the infantry and Marines, made harrowing 
helicopter assaults into landing zones, cowered behind paddy dikes as 
bullets cracked overhead. We waited long hours at isolated helicopter pads, 
saw B-52 strikes blossom like giant brown flowers, learned the culinary 
tricks of a C-ration diet, interviewed generals, lieutenants, sergeants and 
privates in their natural habitat, where the truth at least was bullet-proof. 
 
Although lighter equipment enabled television crews to report from anywhere in the 
war zone (US News, 2004), these reports initially did not contain much footage of 
actual battles, but typically showed reporters standing in front of arriving or departing 
helicopters, or with American patrols marching through rice paddies, or with small 
villages in the background (Hayward, 2004).  
 
The press was allowed to freely dispatch stories, photographs, and film from the 
battlefield, unimpeded by security inspection (Pritchard, 2003). Only two rules applied: 
that no troop movements should be disclosed prior to an operation, and that the identity 
of dead or wounded soldiers should not be disclosed in any way before their next of kin 
had been notified (HRW, 1991). These restrictions were accepted as reasonable and 
American news organisations respected them. Moreover, in the early years of the war, 
before the introduction of satellite communication systems which radically increased the 
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speed of broadcasting, it took at least twenty hours to dispatch televised footage from 
Vietnam to New York (Howell, 1984). The news was old and of little use to the enemy. 
 
There are many reasons for the absence of censorship. One was that the US was a guest 
of South Vietnam and it was therefore not their right to impose restrictions on news 
coverage (Riechers, 2003). Also, the US government for a long time did not want to 
admit that there was war in South Vietnam, a fact that would be confirmed by 
censorship of the media. Another factor which is often forgotten, is that prior to the war 
in Vietnam, hundreds of US reporters had done at least two years compulsory military 
service, as had all American males during that time in history (Arnett, 2005). "This 
shared experience engendered an easy familiarity between the media and the soldiers at 
the basic level". 
 
However, as the discrepancy grew between the military's official rendition of events and 
what the reporters observed on the ground, this relationship soured dramatically. The 
daily military briefings in Saigon where American and Vietnamese officers provided 
news releases and verbal accounts of land and air battles to some 400 accredited 
correspondents became a farce (Galloway, 2003; Pyle, 2000). The irreverent name 
"Five O'Clock Follies" was "partly a reflection of the combativeness of the Vietnam 
press corps" (Arnett, 2005): 
 
By the time Saigon's daily five o'clock briefings were instituted in 1965 
relations were already bad between the media and US government officials. 
A year-long series of Saigon coup d'etats by competing South Vietnamese 
military officers, along with the rising capabilities of the Vietcong 
guerrillas, had meant a constant flow of bad news back to the public in the 
United States, resulting in a bunker mentality by the American officials in 
Saigon whose job it was to positively influence the reporting. From the 
beginning in Saigon there was a confrontational cast to the daily briefings. 
 
These briefings were widely ridiculed by the media, and the officials were accused of 
being either uninformative, or downright deceptive (Porch, 2002:91). The New York 
Times' Gloria Emerson (2003) recalled: 
 
The Five O'Clock Follies? Oh, it was ludicrous. It was painful to see. Some 
briefer, a colonel, would get up there and you'd watch his trial by fire as 
reporters would taunt him. He was hardly responsible for the mess, but they 
gave such duplicitous information and figures, and after a while it was just 
part of the heavy sadness of it all. It was impossible even to laugh at them 
and their loony tunes. 
 
It was clear that the military tried to stay "on the message" as conveyed by the US 
Administration, which maintained that the South Vietnamese military was an effective 
fighting force, that the US humanitarian aid improved the living conditions of the 
Vietnamese peasants, and that the US military was making progress (McLane, 
2004:80).  
 
Peter Arnett (2005) recalled: 
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At the beginning the Kennedy Administration was anxious to portray success 
in its policy against the then secretive Vietcong guerrillas. But the reporters 
were discovering that the "counterinsurgency” campaign was seriously 
flawed because of corruption and the ineptness of the South Vietnamese 
army. Reflecting the exasperation of the authorities, at a press conference in 
Saigon late in 1962 the then commander of US Forces in the Pacific, 
Admiral Harry D. Felt, demanded that I "get on the team” when I insisted in 
asking challenging questions. This "get on the team” philosophy flowed 
from the military's World War Two experience where everyone, including 
the reporters, was anxious to "get on the team”.  This phrase became a 
frequent challenge to reporters from the military as the war widened and 
worsened. 
 
Vast improvements in electronic communication technology led to an increase in the 
number, size, and quality of colour television sets, and by the middle of the war, there 
were about 10 million television sets in America (US News, 2004). This brought the 
realities of the war right into American living-rooms, and as the war dragged on, public 
sentiment increasingly turned against the war effort (Hall, 1995). Nevertheless, 
President Lyndon Johnson tried three times to impose censorship rules on the media in 
Vietnam, but he did not succeed, as there were just too many foreign journalists who 
could not be commanded by the US – "the genie was already out of the bottle" (Jackson, 
2003). 
 
Coverage was not censored by the US military or government, yet reporters and 
photographers were frequently frustrated by the censorship imposed by their own 
editors and publishers who were often "frustrating and capricious gatekeepers" 
(Jackson, 2003). Furthermore, when correspondents realised what kinds of stories 
would be censored at home because of their editor's or publisher's patriotic agenda, 
political interests or understanding of the public's preferences, they stopped filing such 
stories or images and essentially censored themselves (Jackson, 2003). For example, 
because of self-censorship, not government restrictions, no bodies of fallen American 
soldiers were shown on US television until the Tet offensive in 1968, and even then 
images were carefully selected not to upset the public.  
 
This was the turning point in the war and media coverage of this battle is widely 
attributed with the American nation's loss of confidence in the war, as well as the final 
breakdown of relations between the media and the military.  
 
On 30 January 1968, in the middle of the Tet New Year holiday, the North Vietnamese 
launched a synchronised surprise attack on 36 of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals, 
70 smaller towns, as well as on the American base at Khe Sanh and the American 
embassy in the Saigon city centre (Hayward, 2004). Televised images of the offensive 
showed Americans at home that despite official briefings which claimed US success on 
the battlefield, the enemy was much more formidable than they had been lead to believe 
(Riechers, 2003). CBS anchor Walter Cronkite, who was regarded as "the most trusted 
man in America", visited Vietnam soon after the offensive and in an unprecedented 
move, delivered a personal commentary on television in which he urged the American 
leaders to cease fighting and to negotiate for peace. Such was the regard for Cronkite 
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that the politically astute Lyndon Johnson reportedly remarked: "If I've lost Cronkite, 
I've lost the country" (Riechers, 2003).  
 
After the Tet offensive relations between the military and the media broke down 
completely (Porch, 2002:91). Most of the officers blamed their defeat on the media 
(Pritchard, 2003). They decided that the press was an adversary not to be trusted, that 
reporters were politically liberal, sceptical of authority, and invariably disrespectful to 
military values and operations, resulting in the military maxim that "real men don't talk 
to the press" (Porch, 2002:91).  
 
While it is understandable why this view was held by the military, the blame must be 
shared by government spokesmen who framed the enemy as weak before the Tet 
offensive, while television coverage of the battle made it obvious that they were much 
stronger than suggested by the spokesmen (Moïse, 1998). When the same spokesmen 
truthfully reported heavy North Vietnamese losses during the battle, nobody believed 
them. A request by US commander General William Westmoreland for an additional 
200 000 soldiers further discredited the victorious frame. Media images of the Air Force 
bombing South Vietnamese cities, or a South Vietnamese General shooting a 
handcuffed prisoner through the head, also broke down the frame of the US and its 
allies as the noble heroes and contributed to the public's increasing resistance to the war 
(Moïse, 1998, Riechers, 2003).  
 
The war in Vietnam had a lasting effect on both the American military and the media: 
the media still regard the unrestricted access and lack of censorship as the standard 
against which all war coverage should be measured, while the military still regard the 
media as their enemy, which should be kept on a short leash (McLane, 2004:80). 
 
Between 1966 and 1973 four national level psychological operations committees 
managed public opinion, but afterwards this type of formalised governmental 
interference ceased (Defense Science Board, 2001:19-20). The Department of Defense 
immediately saw the weakness, but the government ignored calls for the co-ordinated 
management of information dissemination. For the next 25 years, ad hoc committees 
were responsible for providing pro-US messages to the rest of the world.  
 
5.3.9 Grenada (25 October 1983 – 15 December 1983) 
The October 1983 invasion of Grenada, known as Operation Urgent Fury, brought the 
animosity between the US military and the media to a head (Venable, 2002:67). The 
senior officers serving in Grenada served as junior officers in Vietnam, and brought 
with them the resentment they felt for the press (Felman, 1992:23). The ground rules 
between the Pentagon and the media agreed upon in the 1980s, which included and 
acknowledgement of the public's right to "timely and accurate information", rules on 
media accreditation, battlefield support, security reviews and the standard of reports, fell 
by the wayside when the military invaded Grenada (Porch, 2002:94).  
 
During the first two days of the invasion the US government barred the news media 
from the Caribbean island (Venable, 2002:67). Reporters who got wind of the military 
activity tried to reach the island on their own, and in a move that unequivocally 
demonstrated the US military's aversion of the media, the operational commander, Vice-
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Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, not only established an exclusion zone around the island, 
but also ordered patrol boats to fire at unauthorised craft bringing journalists on the 
island (Lian, 2003). Several reporters who managed to make it to the island were 
arrested "for their own safety" (Felman, 1992:23), and detained incommunicado on the 
USS Guam for several days (HRW, 1991). 
 
Surprisingly, the American public had no sympathy for the press, as they concluded that 
the media wanted to get into Grenada not to report on the operations, but to sabotage it 
(Van Hook, 1986). Of the approximately 500 letters and telephone calls received by 
NBC, more than 80 percent supported the press restrictions. 
 
The military's total lack of assistance to the media – to get on the island, as well as their 
refusal to allow them on their amphibious and airborne assaults – caused a media outcry 
(Felman, 1992:23). Only then, on the third day of operations, did the military allow a 
single press pool of 15 reporters, accompanied by military escorts, on the island (HRW, 
1991; Venable, 2002:67). The rest of the 600 correspondents remained in "comfortable 
exile" in their hotels in Barbados, waiting with mounting frustration to cover the 
unfolding story (Porch, 2002:94). This "pooling-system" continued until more than a 
week after the invasion, despite the fact that by that time the fighting was already over 
(HRW, 1991). 
 
The poor treatment of the media can be ascribed to the military's decision not to 
integrate them in their operational planning, but to assign them to their corps of public 
affairs officers, who themselves were not informed about the military operations in 
Grenada (Porch, 2002:94). It is alleged that the reason for the media black-out was to 
promote the perception created by the Reagan government that Grenada was teeming 
with Cuban soldiers ready to roll out the Communist ideology in the region (Tegally, 
2002).  
 
The media's vociferous objections to the way they were treated during the invasion 
forced the military to re-evaluate their press policies (Pritchard, 2003; Venable, 
2002:67). The next year General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, appointed a panel of experts from both the military and the media headed by 
retired Army Major General Winant Sidle (Venable, 2002:67). The panel had to answer 
the question "how do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the 
lives of our military and protects the security of the operation while keeping the 
American public informed through the media?" Included on the so-called "Sidle Panel" 
were the heads of organisations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association, the Radio-Television News Directors 
Association, and the National Association of Broadcasters (Pritchard, 2003).  
 
The panel's answer, contained in eight recommendations, laid the foundation of the 
media-military relations as seen during Gulf War II. The purpose of these 
recommendations was to guarantee news coverage of US military operations "to the 
maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. 
forces" (Pritchard, 2003). The Sidle Report recommended media pools in battle zones 
when access was otherwise not possible. It also recommended that reporters who were 
allowed access would voluntarily comply with security ground rules established by the 
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Department of Defense, the violation of which would lead to the immediate cessation of 
further access to the military operations. Pools, according to Robert Fisk (2006) "meant 
that you were taken with the military and lived with them".    
 
5.3.10 Panama (20 December 1989 – 3 January 1990) 
The first real opportunity to test the recommendations of the Sidle Panel came in 
December 1989, when the US invaded Panama to remove General Manuel Noriega in 
an operation known as Just Cause (McLane, 2004:81). It was a fiasco (Pocock, 1991).  
 
Because Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney still held the media responsible for turning 
public opinion against the war in Vietnam and "did not look on the press as an asset", he 
delayed calling out the press pool (Porch, 2002:94). The pool arrived too late to cover 
the initial invasion, but independent reporters who arrived by commercial flights were 
confined to the Howard Air Force Base to protect the interests of the pool reporters 
(Combelles-Siegel, 1996). When the pool eventually arrived, they received a series of 
lectures by personnel of the US Embassy who had no knowledge of the military 
operations. Then, on the first day when all the major battles took place, the 19 reporters 
were "herded like sheep" away from the battle ground to selected locations where the 
fighting had already stopped (Pocock, 1991).  
 
Because of the poorly equipped media centre, pool reporters were unable to file reports 
in a timely manner (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). The Pentagon's fax machine was 
defective, and it took a full day to fax reports to Washington, while photographic 
material reached the US capital only four days after the initial invasion. Paradoxically, 
although the pool system was supposed to offer the pool reporters the unique 
opportunity to observe military operations up close, it only served to constrain them 
while they had to watch hundreds of independent reporters filing their stories first 
(McLane, 2004:81). This made the media outlets realise that if they wanted to cover 
military operations, they needed to become self-sufficient in terms of access, transport, 
and communication technology. Despite these handicaps, this was the first war that 
CNN presented as a media event, which greatly frustrated the military. 
 
After Operation Just Cause both the Pentagon and the media blamed the US Southern 
Command for the failed press pool exercise (Ben-Zedeff, 2003). They cited four major 
failures: the pool was too big; the military did not plan for its deployment; the reporters 
had to rely on the military for transport; and reports took too long to reach the home-
offices in the US. However, the main reason for the failure was the fact that the Panama 
invasion was an open war, which meant that anybody who wanted to could cover it in 
any way they chose, while the pool reporters were restricted by their agreement with the 
military.  
 
These failures prompted the Pentagon to perform a critical introspection (Pritchard, 
2003). Commissioned by Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams, former 
Associated Press Pentagon reporter Fred S. Hoffman analysed the events in Panama and 
concluded that "excessive concern for secrecy prevented the Defense Department's 
media pool from reporting the critical opening battles" and that the pool produced 
reports and photographs of "essentially secondary value" (HRW, 1991). His emphasis 
on the need for the military to assist the press pool in its war coverage, as well as 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell's instruction to his commanders to 
include public affairs planners in the preparations for military operations, dramatically 
improved the military's attitudes towards the media (Pritchard, 2003). 
 
5.3.11 Gulf War I (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991) 
The American reprisal against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided a testing ground for 
the Hoffman Report's recommendations (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). The war consisted 
primarily of two parts, namely Operation Desert Shield, which was the build-up 
operation in Saudi Arabia, and Operation Desert Storm, the coalition war against Iraq 
(Ben-Zedeff, 2003).  
 
While planning the operation to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, the Pentagon made a concerted 
effort to accommodate the media in order to ensure satisfactory coverage of the 
developing conflict (Oehl, 2004). They also established an ad hoc committee known as 
"3PD" (Psyop, Propaganda and Public Diplomacy) which co-ordinated official messages 
from the various military agencies (Defense Science Board, 2001:20). The committee 
considered the themes and objectives of their messages, the situation with the media, 
Iraqi information or disinformation, vulnerabilities, target audiences, and the timing of 
messages.   
 
During Operation Desert Shield everything initially seemed to go according to plan: US 
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney activated the 17 member pool of reporters and 
technicians two days after the first American soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia (Mordan, 
1999; Porch, 2002:95). However, they only managed to arrive on 13 August, as King 
Fahd of Saudi Arabia at first rejected the US's application for visas for the reporters and 
granted the visas only when CNN started broadcasting from Baghdad after the US 
accepted responsibility for the pool members (Ben-Zedeff, 2003; Porch, 2003:95).3 
 
The next day Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams published 
his instructions to the media at the same time as US Central Command (Centcom) 
announced their ground rules (Ben-Zedeff, 2003). The press accepted the regulations, 
but were not happy about it, and added the phrase "Cleared by the Pentagon" to their 
reports to express their dissatisfaction.  
 
For the next three weeks the pool system functioned fairly satisfactory to both the 
military and those included in the press pool (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). The military 
provided the press with exclusive access to locations and situations, ensuring positive 
coverage from the media despite some apparent flaws in the military deployments. It 
was not long before approximately 1 600 non-pool reporters started to enter Saudi 
Arabia illegally in defiance of King Fahd's ban by flying to Bahrain and then crossing 
the border into the country (Porch, 2002:95). These "unilaterals" managed to cover the 
conflict from the sidelines while constantly fearing prosecution by either the Saudi 
police or the American military.  
 
                                                 
3 Contrary to the general perception, CNN initially did not use satellite technology, but rather used 
telephone lines so that viewers heard their voices reporting while watching still images of their faces 
(Sullivan, 2003). 
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Improved broadcasting equipment enabled correspondents to report live from the 
battlefield (Belknap, 2002). The computer and satellite technology eventually used to 
transmit audio and video material revolutionised the speed of coverage (US News, 
2004), but was also cumbersome and potentially dangerous: to broadcast live, television 
convoys had to stop to set up equipment, and the 1 000 kg satellite dishes, packed into 
16 crates, alone took two people several hours to assemble (Pennington, 2003). Portable 
video phones also became available during this war, but the technology was relatively 
crude and unreliable (US News, 2004). These satellite connected devices weighed as 
much as 40kg and needed an electrical outlet or a generator as power source, which 
complicated live coverage of the war and therefore in a way determined the news 
agenda (BBC News, 2003a). 
 
In the early stages of the war nearly all Western journalists left the country because of 
the danger posed by bombers and cruise missiles, as the war was fought almost entirely 
from the air (Higham, 2003). Despite the risk, CNN managed to stay in Baghdad thanks 
to the efforts of producer Robert Wiener in the run-up to the war (Arnett, 2005).  
 
Wiener lobbied the Iraqi officials involved with the media, and persuaded 
them to co-operate and allow CNN to stay during the war. One reason was 
that CNN was the only international television organisation in existence at 
that time.  The Iraqis could watch CNN in the foreign ministry and the 
information ministry… They became familiar with CNN's operations and 
realised the potential. Peter Jennings of ABC came in to interview Saddam 
as did Dan Rather of CBS, but the Iraqis had no immediate access to watch 
the broadcasts. …  The authorities could clearly see that CNN would be a 
very important opportunity for them to counter American commentary. 
 
Officially, the US military had a negative view of Arnett's continued reporting:  
 
The view of military spokesmen was that any coverage from the enemy side 
would hurt the US because it would give the Iraqis an opportunity to 
communicate to the world through a credible news organisation. The CNN 
view was that as long as that viewpoint was clearly established that it came 
from the Iraqis, there could be no great harm in it. After the war however 
senior military officers expressed their appreciation of the coverage 
“because it allowed them a close-up view of their targets, particularly in 
Baghdad” (Arnett, 2005). 
 
When the military operations changed from defensive to offensive, with Operation 
Desert Shield going over into Operation Desert Storm, the relationship between the 
military and the media broke down again (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). Some senior 
officers such as General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Commander of US Central 
Command, still harboured an inherent mistrust of the media since the Vietnam war – the 
prevailing military credo seemed to have been "Duty, honour, country, and hate the 
media" (Oehl 2004). It must however be noted that when the Information Operations 
planners suggested the use of deception through the media, Schwarzkopf (interviewed 
by Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995:156) refused: 
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One of the principal proposals was that we would plant false stories in the 
newspapers. Then the enemy, reading these newspapers, would be led to 
believe them. But a decision made in Washington, which I supported, was 
that’s not the way we do things in the United States of America. We don’t lie 
to the press. We do not put false stories in the newspaper to manipulate the 
enemy. We’re not going to do that. 
 
Because of the lingering mistrust, the press was denied full access to the war front, and 
in turn they denied the military due credit for successful operations (Holm, 2002:60). 
This mutual wariness, coupled with technological advances that enabled the almost 
immediate transmission of news reports, set the stage for another showdown between 
the military and the media (Oehl 2004).  
 
The military was overwhelmed by large numbers of reporters who all wanted to report 
from the battlefield, and who needed to be both accommodated and controlled but 
without endangering or burdening the military units on the battlefield (Crumm, 1996; 
Mordan, 1999). The only realistic solution to this problem was to either restrict all 
media access to official military sources, or to once again use the pool system. The 
military chose the latter, organising new ad hoc press pools that allowed for small 
groups of accredited reporters who agreed to obey security regulations to be escorted to 
military positions and addressed by unit commanders (Porch, 2002:95).  
 
The new "non-competitive" ground rules ensured that non-pool reporters had equal 
access to the reports, photographs and notes gathered by the pool reporters (Porch, 
2002:95). This arrangement was unacceptable to the media, as only between 10 percent 
of the approximately 1 600 correspondents and technicians were allowed to travel with 
military units to the war front (Mordan, 1999). Those lucky enough to be included in 
these pools had no choice in their destination but had to be satisfied with the slots 
assigned to them (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). If they wanted to report anything at all, the 
reporters excluded from the pools were forced to cover a mass of uninformative military 
briefings, which caused further irritation (Mordan, 1999).  
 
This arrangement also strained relationships within the press corps, as media 
organisations depend on competition, definitely not co-operation, for survival (Porch, 
2002:96). According to Robert Fisk (2006) "journalists fought like tigers to be on duty 
with pools". Consequently, larger news organisations schemed to push smaller 
competitors out of the pool, non-news publications such as fashion magazines competed 
for pool positions, and some reporters became "pet journalists" to a commander or unit 
by reporting favourable on their "master" in return for battlefield access (Porch, 
2002:96).  
 
A further strain to the relationship between the military and the media was the military's 
promise to take care of the dispatch of pool reports to news organisations (Porch, 
2002:96). A decision to courier pool reports by ground vehicles – despite the 
availability of satellites, fax machines, and laptop computers – caused much frustration, 
as it resulted in delays which made the reports dated, and therefore worthless (Fisk, 
2006; Mordan, 1999). In one case a reporter's story took two weeks to reach Dhahran, 
from where it would be sent to the US (Combelles-Siegel, 1996). A photographer's film 
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took 36 days, while some television footage never reached the US. The Department of 
Defense admitted that during the ground war almost 70 percent of the pool reports took 
approximately two days to reach Dhahran, thus arriving as old news after the offensive 
was over. Also, because of the number of correspondents, restrictions by host nations, 
and extremely dangerous conditions, Centcom instructed public affairs officers to 
review all dispatches before release to ensure that they complied with the security 
guidelines (Venable, 2002:69). The media argued that this strictly controlled set-up 
impacted on their coverage of the conflict and could therefore be regarded as indirect 
censorship (McLane, 2004:81).   
 
Despite the reporters' protestations, outright censorship was rarely an issue during Gulf 
War I (Venable, 2002:69). Of the 1 351 pool reports filed during Operation Desert 
Storm, only five were sent to be reviewed by the Department of Defense, and of these, 
four were cleared for publication. The editor of the publication whose reporter wrote the 
fifth story agreed that it violated the security regulations and that it should therefore be 
changed. Because there was no alternative, the media mostly went along with the pool 
system and its restrictions, but insisted to further discuss their accommodation and 
support by the military with the Department of Defense (Bruner, 1997). 
 
Most of the reporters, those who were not in the pools assigned to combat units at the 
front line, were not subject to the military's security restrictions, and they could do what 
they wanted (Mordan, 1999). One such example was Robert Fisk (2006): "… I travelled 
on my own and I saw things for myself, so I had no censorship and I didn't have any 
soldier delaying my copy. I was in the paper every day." Also, the new portable satellite 
technology further enabled these reporters to bypass the military's regulations (Crumm, 
1996). While Vietnam was the first televised war, the Persian Gulf War was the first to 
be broadcast live, a capability that was fully exploited by CNN whose non-pool 
reporters broadcast continuously from Baghdad (McLane, 2004:81). A drawback of the 
newly gained ability through satellite technology to give live coverage blurred the lines 
between reporting news and making news (Mordan, 1999). Real-time reports often 
focused on reporters involved in non-events, such as them struggling to put on gas 
masks, due to a lack of real newsworthy events.   
 
On the war front, the different service groups were found to treat their pool reporters 
very differently (Oehl, 2004). General Schwarzkopf only granted interviews to reporters 
he liked and the largest tank battles since World War II went uncovered because of the 
Army commanders' reluctance to accommodate the media. The Navy gave the 
commanders of every ship the choice whether or not to allow the press onboard. The 
USS Iowa for example played an important role in the offensive operations through 
Naval gunfire, but the commander refused to allow the media on his ship, denying his 
crew and ship coverage of their actions.  
 
The Air Force, on the other hand, continuously provided the media with footage of 
precision-guided bombs striking their targets, and the Marine Corps seemingly couldn't 
get enough reporters to tell their story (Oehl, 2004). Their units carefully looked after 
the media, and in turn received coverage like none of the other services (Holm, 
2002:60). Unfortunately, this accommodating attitude backfired when some of the 
reporters later alleged that the Marines used the coverage of the amphibious forces off 
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the coast to distract Iraq from the military's true objectives (Porch, 2002:96). This was 
not denied by the military, which argued that they could not allow the media to reveal 
their plans, especially not the "left hook" manoeuvre through Iraq's southern desert into 
Kuwait. 
 
A major complaint about the coverage of the war was that especially the televised 
images did not expose the ugly side of war, where civilians died and communities were 
devastated (Ben-Zedeff, 2003). While Gulf War I was no less bloody than any other 
war, the perception was created that it was a clean technological war in which 
computers operated "smart" munitions, with hardly any casualties. In lieu of real on-the-
ground coverage from the war front, commentary of retired generals was broadcast, 
leading Robert Goldberg of The Wall Street Journal to write:  
 
For all the air time, there was, and is, surprisingly little information. The 
Pentagon is keeping a tight lid on the US side, and over the weekend, both 
Israel and Iraq imposed censorship. Combat pictures are in even shorter 
supply than facts. Mostly, this is news by press release (HRW, 1991).  
 
This sterile image was created as much through the military's news management efforts, 
as by the news networks' realisation that America was watching their footage real-time 
(Ben-Zedeff, 2003).  
 
Critics from the other side of the political spectrum claimed that CNN and other 
international media gave Saddam the opportunity to directly and instantaneously 
disseminate propaganda messages to the American people (Crumm, 1996). A classical 
example cited by such critics was the bombing of the Abu Gharib baby milk plant. 
However, Peter Arnett (2005), who reported the story for CNN, described the events as 
follows: 
 
On Day Six of the first Gulf War the Iraqi authorities took me and a camera 
crew to an industrial site west of Baghdad near the Abu Gharib prison. The 
small signpost at the entrance bore a crudely lettered sign “Baby Milk 
Plant” in English and Arabic. The structure beyond was barely 
recognisable as a building. The sheet aluminium walls and roof had been 
ripped off and scattered across the yard. The steel roof girders were twisted 
and blackened. The machinery underneath was a tangled molten pile. 
 
Officials at the scene claimed that this baby milk plant had produced twenty 
tons of milk formula each day, and had been destroyed in US bombing raids 
the previous Sunday and Monday. The officials asserted that President 
George H. Bush had reneged on his promises not to hit civilian targets, and 
this was proof of American indifference to the Iraqi people.  
 
After I reported the story that evening, the White House responded publicly 
with anger, asserting that the plant was a cover for producing biological 
weapons and that Peter Arnett was playing into the hands of the Iraqi 
Government. This statement from the White House spokesman was repeated 
by Republican Party senators and the conservative media. There was 
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enormous pressure on CNN to pull me out of Baghdad, but the company 
stood firm. I stayed. 
 
History has clearly shown that the plant was simply producing baby 
formula. But the charges against me tend to stick. I believe that US officials 
put enormous pressure on me and CNN because they feared that credible 
reporting would reflect negatively on their war effort. 
 
In a later report by the CIA it was confirmed that it was indeed a baby milk factory as 
Saddam insisted, and not a key biological weapons plant as the US had believed when 
they bombed it (CIA, 2004).  
 
After the war, news organisations again strongly expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
way that they were treated by the military, due in part to the persistent suspicion from 
commanders (Venable, 2002:69). And once again, media and military leaders sat down 
to work out guidelines that would satisfy all, resulting in the DOD principles for news 
media coverage of DOD operations, which was published in 1992 (Pritchard, 2003). 
This document simply repeated previous guidelines, although it did emphasise the need 
for military commanders to get personally involved in the planning of media access in 
the future.  
 
Three important issues came to the fore, namely that in future conflicts transparent and 
independent reporting would be the norm, that press pools would be an exception rather 
than the rule, and that compliance with the Pentagon's security guidelines would be a 
condition of access to the military forces (Venable, 2002:69). These principles formed 
the bedrock of the relationship between the military and the media in subsequent wars. 
  
5.3.12 Somalia (4 December 1992 - 31 March 1994) 
Almost as soon as the new guidelines for military-media co-operation were signed into 
policy, they were put to the test (Venable, 2002:69). In the early 1990s UN 
humanitarian aid missions delivering food and supplies to starving Somalis were 
severely disrupted by the deteriorating security situation in the country (Hendrickson, 
1995). Planes bringing relief aid were looted as soon as they landed, convoys carrying 
food and medicine were robbed, and aid workers were attacked, prompting the UN to 
request member nations to send their military forces to protect the aid operations (PBS, 
2005). Media images of emaciated infants dying in refugee camps increasingly 
prompted the American public to put pressure on their government to do something 
about the situation (Martin, 1995). In the last few weeks as president, George Bush 
Senior responded to the UN's request and on 4 December 1992, he announced that the 
US would deploy 25 000 troops to Somalia to lead Operation Provide Relief, a 
multinational humanitarian relief effort.  
 
The media played a significant role during this operation, as well as the subsequent 
Operation Restore Hope and Operation Continued Hope (Martin, 1995). In a bizarre 
incident that has been described as a "DoD sponsored media circus" American Marines 
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and Navy Seals landed on the moon- and Klieg4-lit beaches of Mogadishu on 9 
December 1992 (Hendrickson, 1995). While the perception still exists that the media 
acted irresponsibly by being present at the famed landing, the truth is that the military 
told them exactly where and when the troops would land (Strobel, 1998).  
 
In the pre-dawn hours the American soldiers stepped from the waves onto a beach "that 
looked more like a movie set than a real beach" (Belknap, 2002:9). This was part of a 
military plan to use the media to send a signal to the Somali militias about the power of 
US forces, as well as to let the American public know about the heroic actions of their 
soldiers (Porch, 2002:100; Strobel, 1998). The media presence created a dangerous 
situation for the soldiers in an unexpected way. While it appeared as though some of the 
marines were practising their acting skills for the television cameras (Belknap, 2002:9), 
others wore night vision goggles that magnify even the smallest amount of light, 
blinding them when the Klieg lights were turned on (Strobel, 1998). 
 
In an interview with the author, journalist Paul Watson whose photographs of a US 
soldier's body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu earned him a Pulitzer 
Prize, described the landing as follows:  
 
I was on the beach the night the US troops landed and I thought it was a 
circus. I'll never forget the SEAL digging into the beach only to be 
surrounded by reporters, in the glare of TV lights, and being asked 
questions like what his name was, and where he was from – no small 
humiliation for a Special Forces commando trained for covert missions. Of 
course it was a show put on for media consumption. We were alerted to the 
likely landing time well in advance. And since there was a huge contingent 
of unarmed journalists who moved around Mogadishu every day, and the 
US forces' arrival had been discussed with and approved by the main militia 
leaders, there was no need for a dramatic landing in the middle of the night 
(Watson, 2005 – see Appendix II for interview). 
 
Throughout the Somalia intervention the military did not exercise much control over the 
media (Paul & Kim, 2004). Because the operation started off as a humanitarian 
intervention, the press enjoyed more freedom than in a combat situation, and as the 
media settled in Somalia before the military, there was no need for the implementation 
of any form of pool system. The military did however provide unprecedented support to 
the media in the form of transportation, briefings and assistance with the filing of 
reports, as well as meals and medical assistance (Belknap, 2002:9; Hendrickson, 1995).  
 
At times, however, the relationship between the media and the military was still 
strained, especially when the media refused to submit to military authority (Porch, 
2002:100). Reporters and photographers moved virtually unrestricted throughout the 
Somali capital, often in areas deemed too dangerous by the military, interviewing both 
sides of the conflict with equal ease (Stockwell, 1995). The media were more mobile 
than the military and had access to people and places that the military did not, resulting 
                                                 
4 A Klieg light is a powerful electric lamp used in filming, named after its inventors, Anton T. Kliegl 
(1872-1927) and John H. Kliegl (1869-1959) (Compact Oxford Dictionary, 2007).  
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in having more information about the people and events in Somalia than the military 
(Strobel, 1998). An example of this was the military's search for clan leader Mohamed 
Farrah Aidid: while they didn't know where he was, any member of the media was able 
to interview him. Between March 1993 and March 1994 about 600 correspondents from 
60 countries covered the hostilities in Mogadishu without any security review of their 
stories (Stockwell, 1995).  
 
This media access to the Somali war zone directly influenced military operations. For 
example, after international media coverage of an inept raid by the US military on a UN 
compound in Mogadishu in August 1993, the military changed their approach 
(Stockwell, 1995). Three days later, when they wanted to search a compound that they 
suspected of housing a militia mortar firing position, the soldiers politely knocked at the 
gate and asked the owner's permission to search the property.  
 
Reporters were often frustrated by the military's stance at press briefings:  
 
When the foreign press corps got down to around a dozen people, the media 
was very adversarial. The afternoon briefings frequently erupted in shouting 
matches over the latest killing of civilians by US-led forces, for instance. 
[Chief UNOSOM II military spokesman, as well as spokesman for US 
Forces Somalia and Task Force Ranger, Major David] Stockwell was 
friendly behind the scenes, but reporters were angry at the lies and since we 
moved on our own, taking risks just to get back and forth from the daily 
briefings, I think most took personal offence to being treated as if we were 
blind and deaf to the reality we lived with outside the walls of the U.S. 
compound every day and night (Watson, 2005). 
   
The media's unrestricted access was frowned upon by the military, especially when the 
escalating violence between the US military and the Somali militias resulted in 
increasingly negative press (Paul & Kim, 2004). Watson, for example, was denounced 
by the military "on various levels" (Watson, 2005). They blamed their very presence in 
Somalia, as well as the increasing expansion of their responsibilities known as "mission 
creep", on the media, as well as, ironically, the public's withdrawal of support after 
reports about American casualties in Somalia (Porch, 2002:100). 
 
By October 1993, the media was no longer interested in publishing images of starving 
Somali children (Martin, 1995). On 3 October, when US Task Force Ranger was sent on 
a disastrous mission into Mogadishu in search of Mohamed Farrah Aidid, there were 
few reporters left in the city, none of them American (Bowden, n.d.; Richburg, 1993, 
Watson, 2005). According to Watson (2005) Reuters evacuated its office after 
journalists were killed when they tried to cover  
 
what was effectively a massacre of Somali clan and religious leaders by US 
Apache helicopters, which destroyed the house they were meeting in. When 
reporters and photographers showed up, an enraged mob killed them. Of 
course, the story became murdered reporters instead of massacred Somalis 
(Watson, 2005).  
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Shortly thereafter AP recalled its reporters after the US warned that they had "credible 
evidence" that Americans were in danger of being kidnapped. By September 1993 only 
Watson, three British reporters and a Greek correspondent representing AFP were left in 
the part of Mogadishu where the "Baffle of 3 October" took place (Watson, 2005).  
 
During this incident, which was later portrayed in the Hollywood film Black Hawk 
Down, 18 American servicemen were killed and another 77 wounded (Martin, 1995). At 
the time, not much was published about the incident itself, as news reports were 
dominated by images of an enraged crowd of Somali's dragging the body of a 
serviceman through the streets of Mogadishu (Stockwell, 1995). This memorable image 
was photographed by Toronto Star reporter Paul Watson, who won a Pulitzer Prize for 
the photographs. Answering a question about the Somali's reaction to his presence on 
the scene that day, Watson (2005 – See Appendix II for interview) said: 
 
I worked with good fixers in Mogadishu, and had covered the place for a 
long time before October 1993, so I and my car were pretty well recognized. 
That helped, but did not guarantee safety. I had two bodyguards armed with 
assault rifles (I usually only travelled with one) and the fixer was armed that 
day too. But the whole crew didn't want to be on the streets and that it was 
suicidal. After telling the crowd who I was, they agreed to let me 
photograph and I got out of the car. I took a few frames before others 
arrived and the crowd got angry. My guards pulled me back into the car, but 
I realized the full-body pictures I'd taken were probably unusable because 
the corpse's green army underwear was slightly askew, exposing a bit of his 
genitals. I jumped out of the car, took a few more frames of half the body 
only, and those were moved by AP, which later told me they wouldn't have 
touched the full-body pictures. I definitely felt endangered, but was 
determined to get photographic proof to report desecration of American 
bodies. I'd reported it before, in September, and the Pentagon denied it. 
 
Although many US soldiers were killed in Somalia, the military prohibited the 
publication of images of the wounded and the dead (Stockwell, 1995). In fact, the US 
public had not seen images of their fallen soldiers since Vietnam. Therefore, despite 
reports by people like Watson (2005) who wrote about the desecration of the bodies of 
American soldiers, the photographs came as a complete shock to the unprepared 
American audience who immediately demanded the withdrawal of US soldiers from 
Somalia (Martin, 1995). On 7 October 1993 Clinton addressed the American nation:  
 
A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and their 
families lay dying by the tens of thousands – dying the slow, agonizing death 
of starvation, of starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the 
anarchy that then prevailed in that country. This past weekend we all 
reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the 
bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot – 
all of them soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end 
the starvation of the Somali people themselves. These tragic events raise 
hard questions about our effort in Somalia. Why are we still there? … And 
when will our people come home? (Clinton, 1993). 
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Within a week after the Mogadishu incident, the US government announced that all its 
forces would be recalled from Somalia by 31 March 1994 (Martin, 1995). Other 
countries soon followed their example, effectively ending Operation Restore Hope.  
 
It is popularly accepted, also by senior government officials such as Colin Powell, that 
media images of starving babies got the US military into Somalia, and media images of 
a dead American soldier being dragged though the streets of Mogadishu by the very 
people they were supposed to help, got them out of the country (Conetta, 2004; 
Stockwell, 1995). Others, like Steven Livingston (1998), contested this view of the 
events in Somalia.  
 
The purported effect that the media had on government decisions was named "the CNN 
effect", which refers to "the collective impact of all real-time news coverage" (Belknap, 
2002:1), or the impact that the accelerated free flow of information and shortened news 
cycles of media such as CNN have on public opinion and consequently on the 
government's foreign policy (Nye, 1999). Due to its immediacy, modern broadcast 
media force politicians to quickly make foreign policy decisions about the conflicts or 
humanitarian crises on the media agenda. This view is based on the widely accepted 
notion that CNN's footage of starving children motivated US President George Bush 
Senior to send his troops into Somalia, and that images of triumphant Somali's dragging 
the corpse of an American Ranger through the streets of Mogadishu compelled 
President Bill Clinton to recall US soldiers from Somalia (Mermin, 1997:385; 
Schraeder & Endless; 1998:29).  
 
More than a decade after the "birth" of the CNN effect, there is still little agreement 
amongst scholars about the concept, how it should be defined, and the ways it should be 
researched (Gilboa, 2005:37). For this reason, and because the effect of media coverage 
on policy is not the focus of this study, the different arguments pertaining to this 
phenomenon will not be further explored.  
 
5.3.13 Haiti (30 September 1991- 18 September 1994) 
On 30 September 1991 Haiti's elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown 
in a military coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras (Robyn, 2004). The US 
administration – first under Bush Senior and then under Clinton – did not accept the 
military junta or the newly installed president as legitimate government of Haiti and 
tried to force the illegitimate leaders out to re-instate Aristide through economic 
sanctions, threats and eventually by initiating a full-scale invasion of the island. On 18 
September 1994 the military rulers agreed to hand over the government only hours 
before the US was to invade the country (Robyn, 2004). 
 
Prior to the US intervention in Haiti, the National Security chaired an ad hoc committee 
to manage the dissemination of information on the island by co-ordinating the themes, 
objectives, media, audiences, and timing of messages (Defense Science Board, 
2001:20). The Foreign Information Subgroup, later renamed to "Broadcasting to Haiti", 
for example conducted unilateral US radio and TV broadcasts, air-dropped radios to the 
Haitians, and broadcast President Aristide's radio and TV messages. The effort was a 
success and resulted in a proposal by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy for the 
creation of a standing International Information Committee for future crises. However, 
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when the US entered Haiti, the Foreign Information Subgroup disbanded without 
establishing such a committee.  
 
The relationship between the military and the media during Operation Restore 
Democracy can be described as cordial: well in advance of the operation, the military 
planned for the incorporation of the media, working out ground rules which the media 
willingly accepted (Belknap, 2002:9). A unique approach to military-media co-
operation during this operation was the inclusion of the media in operational units 
before the commencement of the invasion (Venable, 2002:69). This practice, now 
known as "embedding", means that news reporters were accepted as part of the fighting 
unit and were therefore allowed to accompany the units on their missions. 
 
The embedding of reporters in fighting units came after media objected to the pooling 
system (Porch, 2002:97). The strategy of assigning a reporter to a unit with whom he or 
she lived and travelled throughout an operation, was first used in World War II and 
Vietnam, and allowed the military to exercise control over the media (Paul & Kim, 
2004). The established set of ground rules ensured a more positive relationship between 
the military and the media in Haiti: the correspondents respected most of the military's 
operational security concerns, and in turn were allowed to report the conflict as they 
observed it (Paul & Kim, 2004).  
 
The military shared top-secret plans with reporters before the invasion and according to 
an agreement, the media exercised a self-imposed embargo on the broadcast of video 
footage during the first hour of the invasion (Belknap, 2002:9). As both the press and 
the marines were harshly criticised – and ridiculed – after the spectacle in Mogadishu 
(see Chapter 6.3.12), the media agreed not to use lights during the operation. Still, 
General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that a 
nocturnal airborne assault on Port-au-Prince was called off only hours before US 
paratroopers would have landed, for fear that "the sky would have been illuminated with 
a thousand white lights, making floating ducks of our soldiers" (Shalikashvili, 1995).  
 
This was refuted by Venable (2002:70), who maintained that the "forced entry into 
Haiti" was not called off because of fears of irresponsible actions by the media, but 
because former US President Jimmy Carter and Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras 
reached an agreement before the attack could take place. Throughout the operations in 
Haiti there were no breaches in the fragile trust between the military and the media, 
despite the media's knowledge of planned operations (Venable, 2002:70). This proved 
that amicable co-operation between the US military and the news media covering their 
actions was possible (Venable, 2002:70). 
 
5.3.14 Bosnia (20 December 1995 – 20 December 1996)  
The origin of the conflict in Bosnia is particularly complex (Metz, 2001:2). It has its 
roots in the artificial formation of Yugoslavia after World War I, when a collection of 
divergent ethnic groups were thrown together to form one country. Yugoslavia was held 
together by President Josip Broz Tito, but when he died in 1980, the country started 
falling apart as ethnic and other tensions built up. Between 1990 and 1992, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia all became independent, leaving only Serbia and 
Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia (Metz, 2001:3).  
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In contrast to the other states which mostly had one dominant ethnic group, Bosnia is 
split between ethnic Serbs (40 percent), Bosnian Muslims (38 percent) and ethnic 
Croats (22 percent) (Metz, 2001:4).When the Bosnian government held a referendum on 
independence in 1992, the Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia, tried to divide the 
country along ethnic lines through armed resistance, driving other ethnic groups off the 
land they owned (Metz, 2001:4). The 38 percent Bosnian Muslims and the 22 percent 
ethnic Croats agreed to create the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994, but 
war between the Muslim Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska 
continued until the Dayton Accord was reached in December 1995 (Metz, 2001:5).   
 
The US became involved in the war when the UN Security Council awarded NATO – 
led by the US – the directive to implement the military phase of the Dayton Accord: to 
maintain peace, keep the armed forces of the Federation and the Republika Srpska apart, 
transfer land between the two warring parties and to move military arms and units into 
approved locations (Metz, 2001:5).  
 
The Bosnian War can best be described as "a struggle for perception", with the media 
being manipulated by political leaders on both sides to encourage and exploit latent 
ethnic tension (Collins, 1999). The Serbs directed their perception management 
campaigns at the people of their country, while the Bosniacs (Bosnians of Albanian 
descent) successfully targeted the international media, resulting in the publication of a 
number of definitive media images which framed the Bosniacs as the helpless victims of 
the evil Serbs.  
 
One of the most memorable of these was that of "thin man" Fikret Alic, photographed 
by an ITV news team at Trnopolje (Figure 23). These images presented an opportunity 
that was quickly jumped upon by US public relations firm Ruder Finn, hired by the 
Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Albanian opposition in Kosovo, 
to win the support of the Jewish community (Merlino, 1993: 127-129). The frame used 
in media reports immediately afterwards changed by the use of emotionally charged 
phrases such as "ethnic cleansing" and "concentration camps", which "evoked images of 
Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The emotional charge was so 
powerful that nobody could go against it", according to James Harff, former director of 
Ruder Finn, in an interview given to French public TV channel France 2. 
 
Later analysis of the television footage, as well as investigations by various researchers, 
indicated that the men were in a refugee centre at a school, not a concentration camp, 
and that they were free to come and go as they pleased (Deichmann, 1997). The news 
crew itself was inside a small compound, which housed a tool shed, and was enclosed 
by barbed wire: the men were on the outside. The "starved" Fikret Alic was found to be 
the survivor of a 10-year affliction of tuberculosis. 
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Figure 23. "The shock of recognition is 
acute. Skeletal figures behind barbed 
wire. Murdered babies in a bus. Two 
and a half million people driven from 
their homes in an orgy of 'ethnic 
cleansing'. Detention camps, maybe 
even concentration camps. Surely these 
pictures and stories come from another 
time – the Dark Ages, the Thirty Years' 
War, Hitler's heyday” (McAllister, 
1992). This is a prime example of 
framing: the photographer was inside a 
fenced enclosure, and not the subjects 
of this photograph, as is suggested. 
 
 
To further complicate the situation, the military also courted the media. Moving away 
from the traditional view that "the media represents a necessary evil for commanders to 
deal with" (Wentz, 1998), US peacekeeping forces this time recognised the potential 
that favourable media coverage offered in gaining an advantage militarily. Before the 
deployment of American forces in Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavour in December 
1995, Major General William Nash already had plans in place for the strategic use of 
the media (Lovejoy, 2002:56). His three main objectives were to cultivate American 
support for the operations, to persuade the various political interest groups in Bosnia to 
adhere to the Dayton peace agreement, and to boost the soldiers' morale.  
 
The prototype of media embedding that was seen during the operations in Haiti was 
further developed and the term "embedding" was for the first time used to describe the 
assignment of a reporter to a military unit for an extended period of time (Paul & Kim, 
2004). Thus 33 reporters from 24 American and nine British, German and French media 
organisations were embedded in 15 units of Task Force Eagle for approximately a 
month at a time (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997). In total, more than 1 700 media 
representatives covered the operations in the part of Bosnia where the American 
military operated.  
 
By giving correspondents full access to the soldiers and allowing them to report on 
anything they heard – unless specifically told that it was off the record – the military 
hoped to foster a relationship between the reporters and their units that would lead to a 
better understanding of the mission, and more depth in the reported news (Lovejoy, 
2002:51-52). 
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This openness resulted in a number of embarrassing reports on the US military, one of 
which was a story in December 1995 by Wall Street Journal correspondent Tom Ricks 
on a meeting he attended with battalion commander Colonel Gregory Fontenot 
(Lovejoy, 2002:51-52). During this meeting, Fontenot remarked that he doubted that the 
US military would stay in Bosnia for only 12 months, which was the expressed opinion 
of the President. He also warned his African American troops against Croatian racism. 
Within hours after this report was published, Fontenot was heavily criticised by senior 
officials in the Clinton government, and was later officially reprimanded.  
 
The consequent outcry in military circles produced what is commonly known as the 
"Ricks Rule" (Porch, 2002:98).  According to these new Pentagon rules, embedded 
reporters – that is, reporters staying with units for longer than 24 hours – were no longer 
allowed to quote soldiers by name, all conversations with soldiers were to be regarded 
as "off the record" unless agreed otherwise, and a soldier had the right to retract 
anything he had said at any time if he realised after a conversation "that he gave 
erroneous information" (Eagle Base Joint Information Bureau, 1996). According to the 
Pentagon this policy was proposed to safeguard the media's access to the battlefield, as 
military units increasingly resisted the idea of embedded reporters in their midst.  
 
The military also experienced some problems because their processing of information 
often could not keep up with that of the media (Wentz, 1998). Over time the military 
realised the potential power of global media networks, including the internet, and 
utilised them as key strategic tools. 
 
Despite some initial problems, the embedding of journalists in military units was judged 
to be a success by both the embedded media and the military, and specifically the 1st 
Armoured Division's commander, Major General William Nash (Belknap, 2002:11). 
Consequently, embedding was continued until the end of Operation Joint Endeavour 
(Ferrell, 2004).   
 
5.3.15 Kosovo (24 March 1999 – 9 June 1999) 
During the Kosovo conflict, the media reports on Serb massacres of civilians, such as 
the controversial attacks on the village of Raçak, helped to turn Western sympathies 
against Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and in favour of a US led NATO 
intervention in Kosovo (Tait, n.d).  
 
On 19 March 1999 President Clinton (1999) told the media at a news conference: 
 
We should remember what happened in the village of Raçak back in 
January, innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a 
gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire – not because of 
anything they had done, but because of who they were. 
 
Five days later, on 24 March 1999, the US-led NATO forces launched an air attack on 
Kosovo using sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, as well as a force of 400 aircraft 
which included American B-52 bombers, F-16 fighter-bombers, F-117 stealth fighters, 
Canadian F-18s, and other aircraft from 11 countries (BBC News, 1999). 
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On 30 April 1999, President Clinton ordered the creation of the International Public 
Information (IPI) system in a secret Presidential Decision Direction (PDD-68) 
(Federation of American Scientists, 1999). According to the IPI charter, international 
military information would be used to "influence the emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups 
and individuals." The IPI Core Group, lead by the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs at the State Department, consisted of officials from the US 
Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce and Treasury, as well as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
 
Contrary to the relatively successful co-operation between the US military and the 
media in Bosnia, Operation Allied Force exposed an enduring rift which was increased 
by tighter than ever restrictions on the media, which regarded the regulations imposed 
by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark as a gag order 
(Belknap, 2002:11; Holm, 2002; Ferrell, 2004). As in Bosnia, reporters were embedded 
with the military, but this time they had significantly less access to the war front (Paul 
& Kim, 2004).  
 
Notwithstanding these frustrations, the Western media still seemed to uncritically accept 
the peacekeeping forces' actions. Fisk (2006) recalled an incident where the 1st Battalion 
of the British Parachute Regiment shot a Serbian policeman in Pristina:  
 
I found at once the same old situation applied: that journalists would go 
along with what the British wanted. I remember that an officer came down 
and said “A Serb policeman had been shot. He'd endangered the lives of 
British paratroopers”. This was the First Battalion, the Parachute 
Regiment, who were known in Northern Ireland for being pretty brutal. I 
was covering Northern Ireland, so I knew this regiment pretty well from far 
away. The situation was that a sergeant said “No more questions!” and the 
cameras immediately went down and all the journalists started leaving 
immediately. And I said “Why no questions? What have you got to hide? 
Why no questions? Had he been armed? How many shots were fired?” And 
the cameras just went up again and the officer was forced to continue 
talking. But there was a classic example: the journalists were prepared to 
lower their cameras when told “no more questions”. Our job is to ask 
questions - not accept tamely when we are not allowed to (See Appendix II 
for interview). 
 
Despite his critical approach, neither the British nor the American military showed any 
overt hostility towards Fisk (2006): "I don't think they even knew who the reporters 
were who were reporting from the other side of the line, so to speak". In fact, he 
experienced more animosity from his media colleagues:  
 
A few of the embedded correspondents were quite rude to me. They had 
already taken the side of NATO, you see. I remember one of them coming in 
and castigating me for writing about Serb civilians, as if I had not also been 
writing about Kosovo Albanian civilians, which indeed I had at great 
length. 
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News coverage was also complicated by the fact that the operation in Kosovo was 
almost exclusively an air campaign, which by nature produces very few opportunities 
for media embedding (Paul & Kim, 2004). Once again the press was forced to rely fully 
on the military for information (Porch, 2002:99). Even when a reporter was allowed to 
fly along on a bombing raid, the effects of such a campaign remained largely invisible 
from the air (Paul & Kim, 2004). This created the perception of a sterile war fought by 
faceless and nameless warriors, which failed to capture the American public's interest in 
and support for of the war effort (Holm, 2002). 
 
The uninformative daily briefings where the military showed the media what they 
wanted them to see, i.e. videos of precision strikes, frustrated reporters and motivated 
them to go out on their own to find the true facts (Belknap, 2002:11; Porch, 2002:99). 
Despite apparent restrictions "we could travel more freely than you would imagine", 
having been authorised by both the government and the military to work as journalists 
and issued with military press cards to help them get through checkpoints (Fisk, 2006). 
 
The lack of information from US military sources therefore compelled the Western 
media to "cross the lines to get the other side's version", giving Slobodan Milosevic the 
opportunity to promote his point of view (Belknap, 2002:11; Porch, 2002:101). 
However, according to Fisk (2006) Milosovic's main concern was not as much 
propaganda, as it was security: 
 
The key thing if you wanted to report from the Serb side was not that they 
would force you to write what they wanted you to write, but what they 
wanted to be sure of, was that you were not a spy working for NATO. Once 
they were sure that you were not sending military information to NATO, 
they gave you a lot a freedom and left you alone to do as you wished.  
 
This resulted in very graphic coverage of the effects of allied attacks on civilians, 
described by the US military as "collateral damage", such as the mistaken air raid on a 
refugee convoy near Djakovica in April 1999 (Paul & Kim, 2004). When contradictory 
responses from the Supreme Allied Commander and spokesmen for NATO and the 
Pentagon undermined any sense of credibility, the media chose to report the Russian 
and Serbian accounts of the tragedy (Porch, 2002:101). These reports raised questions 
about the morality of NATO's campaign and nearly ended the operations because of the 
withdrawal of public support (Paul & Kim, 2004). 
 
US Navy Admiral James Ellis, who was in charge of NATO's Southern Command in 
Kosovo, acknowledged that the Serb media campaign was much more successful than 
that of NATO:  
 
[T]he enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents by the thousands, 
but no one saw it. We accidentally killed innocents, sometimes by the 
dozens, and the world watched on the evening news (Ellis quoted in 
Pounder, 2000:58). 
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Angered by what he regarded as Milosevic's disinformation campaign, General Wesley 
Clark demanded a NATO air strike on the Serbian television station (Belknap, 
2002:11).   
 
At 02:06 on the morning of 23 April NATO bombers launched a planned attack the 
headquarters and studios of Radio Televisija Srbije (RTS), the Serbian state television 
and radio broadcaster in central Belgrade (Amnesty International, 2000: 46). At that 
time of night, the building was still occupied by approximately 120 civilian production 
staff and technicians, of whom 16 were killed and a further 16 were injured. The raid 
resulted in a three-hour blackout of broadcasting, but by daybreak, the RTS newscasts 
had resumed. Responding to the attack, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea maintained that 
"Radio Television Serbia, despite the appearance, is an instrument of war. It has nothing 
to do with journalism as you or I would recognise that" (Sadler, Vinci, McIntyre & 
Plante, 1999). The attack was denounced by Amnesty International as "a direct attack 
on a civilian object, killing 16 civilians. Such attack breached article 52(I) of Protocol I 
and therefore constitutes a war crime" (Amnesty International, 2000:28). 
 
The sinister aspect of this incident was that CNN had invited Serbian Information 
Minister Vucic to the studios for an interview at exactly the time the missiles struck the 
studios.  
 
As I remember, CNN's get-out clause was that it was on a different date. In 
fact it wasn't. The missile hit the building in the early hours of the morning. 
And in America, of course, it was still the previous day. So they said he 
wasn't asked to go to the studio on this day. It was the previous day he was 
asked, but in fact, that previous day in Yugo time was the day the missile hit. 
So they tried to get out of it by manipulating the date issue and in fact it was 
all about the international time-line. It wasn't anything to do with a different 
date at all, it was exactly the same time (Fisk, 2006). 
 
After the air campaign ended in June 1999, reporters were allowed limited access to 
military units, but the perception that the military was not prepared to co-operate with 
the media could not be dispelled (Ferrell, 2004). The Kosovo experience showed the 
impossibility of restricting the media in this technological age, as even the direct denial 
of access to information by the US military did not deter the media, but rather resulted 
in unfavourable coverage as they sourced information elsewhere (Paul & Kim, 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea regarded his media campaign in Kosovo as 
a huge success, which he attributed to his ability to frame the conflict as a story, 
complete with mandatory heroes and villains (Berlin Online, 2000).  
 
5.3.16 Afghanistan (7 October 2001-present) 
The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 in retaliation against the 11 September 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. 
Central to the attacks on America was the realisation by the US government that parts of 
the global population actively despised them, and that they urgently needed to work on 
international perceptions of the country and its policies (Gough, 2003:29). 
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Previously, most efforts by government agencies such as the Department of Defense, 
Department of State, the White House, and other agencies to co-ordinate their image 
building messages to international leaders and communities took place on an ad hoc 
basis (Ford, 2004:10). Strategic communication became a priority only after the 
September 11 attacks (Defense Science Board, 2004a:20). Due to a variety of factors, 
including the gargantuan and utterly disparate nature of the US government strategic 
communications network, these efforts were not very successful (Lamb, 2006:7). It 
resulted in considerable friction between different communication agencies, especially 
between the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, which had very 
different approaches to strategic communication.  
 
In an effort to co-ordinate their messages to the international community, the White 
House and the Department of Defense immediately turned to The Rendon Group, a 
private Public Relations company already contracted by the government to promote its 
image abroad (Foer, 2002:29). The firm previously worked extensively with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Kuwaiti royal family and the Iraqi National Congress, 
the opposition group who sought to oust President Saddam Hussein (Dao & Schmitt, 
2002). 
 
Rendon's first step was to employ the 24-hour news cycle to align international 
sentiments with the American cause, and to aid in the creation of the Coalition 
Information Centers (CIC) in Washington, London and Islamabad (Conetta, 2004:5). It 
was the responsibility of the CICs to immediately react to inaccurate news stories from 
hostile sources, to anticipate and proactively deal with potentially damaging news 
reports, and to vigorously promote news items that cast a positive light on US policies 
and actions (Ford, 2004:10). The messages were coordinated in such a way as to 
dominate the news cycle in all the different time zones (Foer, 2002:29).  
 
At the same time, the Department of State instituted a public diplomacy co-ordination 
group in its Operations Centre, which was linked to the White House, Department of 
Defense, and American embassies across the globe, as well as to relevant US military 
commands (Defense Science Board, 2004a:21). To further advance the American image 
abroad Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed Charlotte Beers, a highly successful 
advertising executive and specialist in public relations, as Undersecretary of State for 
Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy in October 2001 (Conetta, 2004:5; Gough, 2003: 
29). Although Beers was regarded as "the most powerful woman in advertising", her 
appointment was greeted with criticism. The Economist (2002) portrayed her as 
somewhat frivolous for the position by reporting that  
 
she ate dog food to woo product men at Mars; she wowed managers at 
Sears by casually dismantling and reassembling a power drill during her 
pitch. That was in peacetime. But this is war.  
 
She was especially criticized for "trying to adapt flashy Madison Avenue techniques to 
the subtle art of diplomacy" (Omar, 2003:3). 
 
Also in October 2001, the Department of Defense established the controversial and very 
secretive Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) (Lamb, 2006:7), which hired The Rendon 
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Group at about $100 000 a month to assist them in their international communication 
efforts (Dao & Schmitt, 2002). Referring to the OSI, the New York Times on 19 
February 2002 broke the news that  
 
the Pentagon is developing plans to provide news items, possibly even false 
ones, to foreign media organizations as part of a new effort to influence 
public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly 
countries (Dao & Schmitt, 2002).  
 
According to this report (Dao & Schmitt, 2002), critics of the OSI argued that  
 
mingling the more surreptitious activities with the work of traditional 
public affairs would undermine the Pentagon's credibility with the media, 
the public and governments around the world.  
 
They also feared that  
 
disinformation planted in foreign media organizations, like Reuters or 
Agence France Presse, could end up being published or broadcast by 
American news organizations (Dao & Schmitt, 2002).  
 
A week later, on 26 February 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced 
the closure of the OSI (Rumsfeld, 2002a). He said that  
 
notwithstanding the fact that much of the thrust of the criticism and the 
cartoons and the editorial comment has been off the mark, the office has 
clearly been so damaged that it's … pretty clear to me that it could not 
function effectively. So it's being closed down.  
 
By this he implied that the OSI was shut down because it had been sullied by false 
media reports. At a press briefing in November that year Rumsfeld (2002b) said of the 
OSI incident: 
 
You may recall that. And "oh my goodness gracious isn't that terrible, 
Henny Penny the sky is going to fall.” I went down that next day and said 
fine, if you want to savage this thing fine I'll give you the corpse. There's the 
name. You can have the name, but I'm gonna keep doing every single thing 
that needs to be done … That was intended to be done by that office is being 
done by that office, NOT by that office in other ways. 
 
According to the Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting web site, not one of the major 
American television news programmes, newspapers, news agencies or news magazines 
have reported on these contentious remarks (FAIR, 2002). 
 
On 30 July 2002 Press Secretary Ari Fleischer confirmed the White House's intention to 
set up a permanent Office for Global Communications (OGC) that would work closely 
with the Department of State's Office of Public Diplomacy (Fleischer, 2002). The 
principal reason for the establishment of the OGC was the belief that  
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better co-ordination of international communications will help America to 
explain what we do and why we do it around the world. It's important to 
share the truth about America and American values with other nations in 
the world (Fleischer, 2002).  
 
The mission of the OCG was to  
 
co-ordinate the formulation among appropriate agencies of messages that 
reflect the strategic communications framework and priorities of the United 
States, and [to] facilitate the development of a strategy among the 
appropriate agencies to effectively communicate such messages (Bush, 
2003k).  
 
Tucker A. Eskew (2003), director of the OGC, said the aim of the office was  
 
to coordinate across agency lines and integrate [Bush's] themes into the 
communications of our government – the communications we engage in 
around the world in speaking about international issues, and speaking 
about our own domestic policy to the rest of the world. 
 
The OGC was based on the formula of the CICs that had been set up in Washington, 
London and Islamabad, and would "go to international hot spots, areas of high 
international media interest" (Eskew, 2003). In short, the focus of the OCG was  
 
the short-term goal of winning the evening news cycle rather than making 
any long-term effort to change attitudes and opinions. Its messages are 
more informative, more journalistic, than persuasive (Gough, 2003:30). 
 
It is clear that the military's involvement in the media's coverage of the war was starting 
to take a whole new shape. Their issue was no longer only with the reporters on the 
battlefield, but increasingly involved a multi-pronged approach, the extent of which can 
only be guessed. 
 
On the battlefields of Afghanistan, however, media access to military units was 
extremely limited throughout the conflict, resulting in a very little coverage of the 
American operations (CPJ, 2001; Powell, 2004). Unprecedented restrictions on media 
access to the American forces were enforced especially during the first three months of 
operations (Hickey, 2002). Reporters had no reasonable access to bases on land and sea 
from where operations against the Taliban were launched, and were not allowed near 
the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk that served as command base for Special Forces 
operations. While 30 pool reporters from 26 news organisations were aboard American 
Navy vessels at the time of the first air strikes, they were not allowed to interview pilots 
returning from their bomb runs (Clarke, 2002a; Hickey, 2002). The reporters 
complained about being isolated and therefore unable to file timely reports (Cloud, 
2001). The Pentagon also failed to provide a central facility in the region to which 
reporters could turn to for information (Hickey, 2002). 
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There were various reasons for this policy towards the media. The military action 
mostly consisted of small-scale operations primarily conducted by US special forces 
together with so-called Afghan "friendly forces" (Savidge, 2006 – see Appendix II for 
interview):  
 
The US military has always been reluctant if not downright opposed to 
allowing the media along on such missions. It might compromise the 
operation to have members of the media inserted awkwardly into a small 
team of professionals that have been together in some cases for years. It 
could be dangerous since such missions are risky. And there simply may not 
be space to add people. Finally the US would not want to give away how 
such units operate believing secrecy is part of their success. I think in 
addition to these logical issues there was still a hesitancy within the military 
command of allowing the media such close access ... these are long standing 
issues of how the media might overemphasize the negative of combat and as 
a result harm morale in the military and on the home front.  
 
Robert Fisk (2006) offered a different perspective: 
 
You have to realize something. In Afghanistan … journalists can't move 
around freely. Because of the dangers of moving freely around in the 
Kandahar region, for example, journalists can't go there without armed 
guards. 
 
I travelled on my own with Afghan friends who where also my translators, 
because I don't speak Pashtu. When we wanted to go to a particular village 
far out in the desert we would go to the local Afghan governor and ask if he 
could send some guards with us. This is not to protect us from kidnapping or 
Al Qaeda. It was to protect us from being robbed by bandits who had 
weapons.  
 
Although the Pentagon proposed the use of a press pool system as was suggested after 
the Grenada invasion, the official pool was never activated during the campaign in 
Afghanistan (Powell, 2004), despite a belief by pool members that "they won't start the 
war without us" (Thompson, 2002). Consequently, the media were conspicuously absent 
from military bases during the build-up of the US and allied forces along the Afghan 
border prior to the invasion (Taylor, 2002). For reports on the progress of military 
operations, the media mostly had to rely on briefings by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke, and other 
Pentagon staff in Washington (Taylor, 2002).  
 
This was a never ending aggravation. Here we were living under harsh 
conditions while our counterparts stayed at their Washington homes and 
continually scooped us. We had a saying ... Khandahar. So close and yet so 
clueless (Savidge, 2006).  
 
Independent reporters however entered the country via neighbouring Tajikistan well 
before the first strikes (Hickey, 2002). They were aided by the opposition Northern 
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Alliance, who were known to be friendly to the media, although they were suspicious of 
Arab reporters after two Arabs posing as journalists killed military commander Ahmed 
Shah Massood on 9 September in a suicide bomb attack (CPJ, 2001). To cover the 
American insurgence, reporters were prepared to pay as much as $300 for a helicopter 
ride, $3 000 to hire a car, and even to put their life on the line by travelling the 
treacherous mountain paths in truck convoys and donkeys. Several reporters slipped 
into the territory dressed in the traditional burkhas worn by local women (Hickey, 
2002). These clandestine measures were necessary as the Taliban suspected journalists, 
as all foreigners, of spying for the United States and Britain, resulting in the arrest of 
four reporters and their guides within the first two months of conflict (CPJ, 2001). The 
Taliban did on occasion escort a small number of foreign reporters to witness the 
destruction left in the wake of the American bombing raid. 
 
Al Jazeera was the only television broadcaster tolerated in Afghanistan by the Taliban 
during the first phase of the war, and therefore a crucial source of information about the 
war (CPJ, 2001). The station's critical coverage of the war, and its interviews with 
Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, irritated the US government to such an 
extent that on 3 October 2001 Secretary of State Colin Powell requested the Emir of 
Qatar, who partly finances Al Jazeera, to exercise more control over its reports (James, 
2001; Zednik, 2002). Al Jazeera's response was to promptly publish the demand.  
 
Less than six weeks later, on 13 November, an American bomber dropped two 500-
pound bombs on Al Jazeera's television bureau in Kabul (Zednik, 2002). Nobody was 
injured, as the news team was warned by their head office to evacuate the premises 
before the Northern Alliance entered the city (Gowing, 2005:188). In an interview with 
foreign correspondent, commentator of media ethics and BBC World presenter Nik 
Gowing (2002) US Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary for Public Affairs Rear Admiral 
Craig Quigley justified the attack by stating that the site "had been, and was at the time, 
a facility used by Al Qaeda" and that this "military significance" made it a "legitimate 
target". Gowing (2005:188) observed:  
 
Incredibly, they even claim that, with all their intelligence gathering 
capacity confirming the "Al Qaeda facility", they never knew the compound 
was Al Jazeera's broadcast office (even though it had been open for 20 
months).  
 
With the Pentagon doing nothing to ease media access to the battlefield, the Marine 
Corps took the initiative in November 2001 to embed reporters with Task Force 58 at 
Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan (Powell, 2004). Even so, the reporters' activities 
were severely restricted: no accompanying troops on operations, no reporting on what 
they saw, no observing from the side-lines, no photographs, no interviews with senior 
commanders, pilots, doctors, or the wounded (Morello, 2001:43). They were allowed to 
report on church services and promotion ceremonies, but were asked not to report on the 
speeches. Correspondents complained that their colleagues in Washington were able to 
break significant stories about the American campaign in Afghanistan by merely 
attending official Pentagon briefings (CPJ, 2001). Despite these complaints, they 
published more than 350 stories about the Marines at Camp Rhino and Kandahar, and, 
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importantly, proved to the Department of Defense that reporters can be embedded 
successfully with units during military operations (Powell, 2004).  
 
The Pentagon's decision to restrict media access to the battlefield at times cost them 
dearly. For example, journalists were not allowed to accompany the Army's 10th 
Mountain Division when it raided the remote village of Danditemur, believed to be a 
Taliban settlement (Powell, 2004). This gave the Taliban the propaganda advantage: 
after the media visited the village the next day, they reported on allegations that US 
troops had run down and killed a small child, and that they killed an octogenarian with 
the butts of their guns.  
 
Only after Kandahar, the last major stronghold of the Taliban, fell on 7 December, did 
the Pentagon move to ease restrictions on the media. More than two months after the 
first attacks, on 13 December, the Pentagon announced the establishment of three 
coalition press centres in Afghanistan at Mazar-e-Sharif, Bagram and Kandahar Airport, 
where public affairs officials would assist reporters with access to the coalition forces 
and help them to get interviews, photographs, and whatever else they needed to cover 
the war (Clarke, 2001a). While the information centres were established as promised, 
the reporters have already left the area, making these facilities redundant (Taylor, 2002). 
 
By mid-December 2001, hostile fire had killed more war correspondents than it did 
American troops (Hickey, 2002). 
 
Victoria Clarke also proposed the implementation of a C-130 cargo plane to serve as a 
shuttle service for the media. Two weeks later on 27 December, even before the 
implementation of the shuttle service, she declared the end of the pool system: 
"Consider it disbanded. Go crazy," she told the national media pool bureau chiefs at a 
Pentagon meeting (Clarke, 2001b).  
 
This did not mean that the battlefield opened up to the media, and complaints kept 
mounting: Marines locked up reporters in a warehouse to prevent them from covering 
"friendly fire" incidents; troops encouraged Afghan fighters to terrorise photographers 
and confiscate their digital photographs; military officials led reporters away from the 
action (Taylor, 2002). 
 
Operation Anaconda was a 12 day campaign in the desolated mountains around the 
Shah-e-Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan, launched on 2 March 2002 (Miracle, 
2003:42). A few days before Operation Anaconda was launched, military commanders 
and public affairs officers decided to embed a small pool of reporters with the troops 
entering the war zone (Pool, 2002). Among the eight-member pool (Miracle, 2003:42) 
was CNN reporter Martin Savidge, who was secretly invited by the US military to 
accompany them on the mission (Savidge, 2006): 
 
It began when an officer in Khandahar one day pulled me aside and said, 
"let's go look at the mountains”. If you have ever been to that part of 
Afghanistan you would know they are nothing worth looking at, so it was 
clearly just a ruse to get me outside to talk in private away from the other 
journalists. 
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Once alone he said, "There's going to be a mission” and if I wanted to be on 
it I could tell no one. Not fellow journalists not even my bosses. If I did I 
would be "out”. Of course I agreed. I said CNN would have to be told 
something I couldn't just very well vanish without a trace ...  he agreed and 
said my producer who would remain behind could notify them that I had 
gone on a mission, but only after we had departed. 
 
The reporters were prohibited from reporting any details about the operation until after 
they had returned from the mission, which caused "a bit of angst initially" (Marye, 
2004:29).  
 
The initial agreement was I would file no reports or have any contact with 
them or CNN until the mission was completed. Operation Anaconda was to 
last 48 to 72 hours … instead it went on for nearly 2-weeks. Eventually that 
part of the rules had to change (Savidge, 2006). 
 
Savidge and the other media representatives gave their full co-operation, and by not 
compromising operational security, they were able to report independently and 
comprehensively on the mission, which was the largest American ground operation 
since the first Gulf War (Isaacson & Jordan, 2003). 
 
I found the access to Operation Anaconda to be extraordinary ... in fact it 
was stunning. We were not only allowed to sit in on intelligence reporting 
and mission planning meetings but we were also allowed to film them. This 
was top down driven access, allowed because the agreement was not a 
single report would be made until the mission's completion … Of course the 
purpose of the government in allowing media access was to show and 
witness an anticipated outstanding America success to be transmitted to the 
American people and the world. I do not believe such access would have 
been given if the US military had any doubts about the outcome of the 
operation. No one knowingly invites spectators to their own disaster 
(Savidge, 2006). 
 
The Pentagon was very satisfied with their press policy (Clarke, 2002a). Clarke told the 
media that since the terror attack on the US, the Department of Defence had  
 
responded to more than 42 000 media inquiries, hosted more than 5 000 
media visits to military facilities, given more than 1 500 interviews, and 
conducted more than 225 press briefings (Clarke, 2002a).  
 
They had also provided unparalleled media access to top officials, with Donald 
Rumsfeld giving more than 100 press briefings and more than seventy press interviews 
and General Tommy Franks, Commander of Central Command in Afghanistan, 
participating in live briefings and teleconferences with the media (Clarke, 2002a). 
 
From the media's side, however, the picture is not as rosy, especially for the 
correspondents who operated from Afghanistan.  At a bureau chief meeting with Clarke 
on 14 March 2002, frustration was expressed about everything from the confused 
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distribution of pooled news, and "minimal and difficult" access, to the fact that the 
regular pooled system was never implemented, and technological glitches preventing 
correspondents from filing reports (Clarke, 2002b). An interesting result of the media's 
isolation was that they turned their cameras onto themselves (The Guardian, 2001). 
They photographed their colleagues on horseback, striking macho poses on the deck of 
an aircraft carrier, in various uncomfortable positions wearing unusual outfits such as 
military fatigues, protective goggles "carelessly thrust, Eurotrash-style, into the hair-
band position" (The Guardian, 2001). A number of reporters dispatched images of 
themselves wearing the flowing robes of the local population, with even male reporters 
sporting the female burkha.  
 
This all was made possible by satellite video phones, which had been around since Gulf 
War I, but really came of age in Afghanistan (Hunt, 2001; US News, 2004). 
Transmitting fuzzy, jerky images along with the audio reports, reporters clearly chose to 
sacrifice picture quality for immediacy of reporting (Boyer, 2001; Wendland, 2003). 
The $10 000 satellite video phone, popularised by CNN, looked like a briefcase and 
weighed only about 5 kg (Hunt, 2001). Where speed of reporting was not an issue, its 
camera could be replaced by a higher resolution digital camera, using the video phone 
to stream the visuals back to the network. This lighter, more mobile equipment freed 
war correspondents to report live from wherever they wanted – as long as they did not 
have to rely on the military to take them there.  
 
The war in Afghanistan prompted the Pentagon to rethink their views about warfare and 
to acknowledge the importance of public diplomacy, public affairs and psychological 
warfare to achieve military objectives (Haddock, Thompson & Rabon, 2002:32). Despite 
satisfaction about their relationship with the media, the US military failed dismally to 
occupy this strategic territory, prompting Richard Holbrooke to ask in a Washington 
Post column: "How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading 
communications society?" Holbrooke (2001:7) called for the recruitment of the "very 
best talent from outside the government … as it was in World War II". Urrutia-Varhall 
(2002:31) suggested that private sector experts should be enticed to join the reserves to 
teach military personnel "the secrets of the trade". 
 
Despite the shortcomings in their communication strategy, the military was sufficiently 
impressed by the outcome of the military-media synergy in Afghanistan to implement 
the novel – and very controversial – concept of large-scale media embedding during 
their next major conflict: Gulf War II. 
 
5.4  Discussion 
This part of the study showed that war news is not only one of the oldest forms of 
reporting, but that it also played a pivotal role in the development of the mass media, as 
the development of newspapers was to a large extent driven by the desire by especially 
merchants to gain knowledge about the state of war in the regions that were of 
commercial importance to them. 
 
A survey of the history of the relationship between the US military and the media in 
times of war reveals that since the earliest wars in America, this relationship indeed 
showed an oscillating pattern (Figure 24).  
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Figure 24. A simplified depiction of the oscillating relationship between the media and 
the US military during wars from the American Civil War up to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, developed by this researcher. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 24, the relationship between the US military and the media was 
strained during the American Civil War, but when the Spanish War began 33 years 
later, all the previous animosity between the military and the media was forgotten. In 
fact, war reporters were respected by the military and as such were allowed to do 
practically whatever they wanted.  
 
This positive relationship continued during the onset of World War I, when the military 
initially allowed a rudimentary form of embedding, with obligatory censorship as part 
of the deal, but soured as soon as the US implemented the most restrictive measures in 
history against the press. 
 
The relationship remained positive throughout World War II and into the Korean War 
five years later. However, negative press reports once again sullied the positive 
media/military relationship.  
 
With the onset of the Vietnam War, the pendulum swung back again, and the 
relationship between the two institutions was once again positive. As in Korea, reports 
that emphasised military mistakes and shortcomings caused the breakdown of the 
relationship. The mistrust remained during the invasion of Panama.  
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Because of the concerted effort by the US military to rectify the failures in its media 
policies during the Panama conflict, the relationship between the media and the military 
improved dramatically during the early stages of Gulf War I, only to break down again 
when the military changed its strategy from defensive to offensive. The military re-
employed the pool system, which was completely unacceptable to the media. 
 
Once again representatives of the media and the military sat down to iron out the 
problems, and when the US became involved in Somalia the relationship was positive 
once more. This cordial relationship lasted through the conflict in Haiti. 
 
From a situation where the media did not have much to do with the US military in 
Bosnia, the relationship improved when the military implemented a primitive form of 
embedding that allowed reporters to live and travel with military units. This positive 
situation was reversed in Kosovo, where correspondents were still allowed to embed 
with the media, but under restrictions that some equated with a gag order. 
Uninformative press briefings forced the media to find information elsewhere, which 
resulted in graphic coverage of the effects of the US led military campaign, which in 
turn antagonised the military. 
 
This animosity remained throughout the initial stages of the "war against terror" 
campaign in Afghanistan, but improved somewhat when the military allowed a handful 
of reporters to accompany them on a campaign in the mountains.  
 
5.5  Summary 
In this chapter a broad examination was done of the history and evolution of war 
reporting in general. To explain the foundations of the sometimes strained relationship 
between the US government and military and the media, as well as to understand the 
evolutionary development of the US's military/media policies, a brief overview was 
given of the policies and interactions between the US military and the media since the 
earliest conflicts that the US was involved in. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
 
In Chapter 6 the relationship between the media and the US government, and in 
particular the military, is further explored. Special attention is given to the US 
government's strategic communication network and the Department of Defense's media 
policies during the Operation Iraqi Freedom phase of Gulf War II. The experiences and 
working conditions of both embedded and unilateral reporters under the media policies 
will be examined. 
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Chapter 6 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(20 March 2003 – 1 May 2003) 
 
 
Think of them as an offensive weapon. Plan for their employment just as you would plan for 
any of your other supporting arms — your artillery, your close air support and your naval 
gunfire. They'll be there and there's nothing you can do about. It's a fact of life. 
 Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Broeckert (2003),  
US Marines Corps Public Affairs Officer. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Arguably, the most outstanding feature of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the United 
States of America's very successful media campaign. In an historically unprecedented 
move, the US Department of Defense (DoD), in conjunction with the White House, 
afforded hundreds of selected international reporters the opportunity to accompany 
American troops to the war front. In what was known as the Embedded Media Program, 
reporters were invited to "live, work and travel as part of the units with which they are 
embedded", according to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2003a).  
 
The rationale behind this programme was apparently very simple: in order to counter-
act Saddam's propaganda, "we need to tell the factual story - good or bad – before 
others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will 
continue to do" (Rumsfeld, 2003a). Hereby the US government, and specifically the 
Department of Defense, placed itself very strategically in terms of the gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing of the primary reports on the war that originated in the Gulf 
region.1    
 
Gulf War II started with Operation Iraqi Freedom – also referred to as Operation Iraqi 
Liberation by White House spokesman Ari Fleischer (2003a; 2003b) during press 
briefings – while the US was still heavily involved in Afghanistan. Within a day after 
the September 11 attacks on the US, both Bush and Rumsfeld mentioned the possibility 
of linking Iraq with the tragedy (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004:334-335). This focus on Iraq did not come out of the blue, but "has 
been among the earliest issues for the Bush foreign policy team" (Lieber, 2001). A 
month after Bush took office as president, he told the media that his  
 
                                                 
1 The author regards all forms of military or governmental censorship, diversion of reporters to or away 
from newsworthy incidents, misinformation, disinformation, restriction of access, intimidation of 
reporters, or the flooding of the news with information promoting a specific point of view as a 
fundamental form of gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing. Therefore, the inclusion of incidents that 
construe any form of media management by the military, and even by the media itself, is recognition of 
the incidence of gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing in that context, and will therefore not necessarily 
be indicated as such.   
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primary goal is to make it clear to Saddam that we expect him to be a 
peaceful neighbour in the region and we expect him not to develop weapons 
of mass destruction.  And if we find him doing so, there will be a 
consequence (Bush, 2001).  
 
During the incursion in Afghanistan, American influence operations targeting national 
and international audiences through the news media had grown exponentially because of 
the US government's policy to add "weapons of mass communication to weapons of 
war" (Hoffman, 2002:1).  
 
Remarkably, during the Iraq escapade the depth, range, and intricacy of these perception 
management efforts expanded even further.  
 
It took place on various levels, both overt and covert, with a variety of interconnected 
government and non-government agencies participating (Figure 24, p. 185). To unravel 
this crow's nest of public and secret associations and networks of influence is far beyond 
the scope of this study, but to give a glimpse of the extent of this phenomenon, one such 
line of influence will be briefly examined. 
 
There was no evidence that Iraq was in any way involved with 9/11 (Cheney, 2001), but 
powerful non-governmental think-tanks such as the Jewish Institute for National 
Security Affairs (Jinsa) immediately called on the US government to "confront the 
terrorists and their supporters". In a document titled This goes beyond Bin Laden, 
released on 13 September 2001, Jinsa (2001) asked the government to  
 
halt all US purchases of Iraqi oil under the UN Oil for Food Program and 
to provide all necessary support to the Iraq National Congress, including 
direct American military support, to effect a regime change in Iraq 
(emphasis by Jinsa). 
 
This request is significant, as influential advisors to the Bush government such as 
Richard Perle and Douglas Feith were associated with Jinsa (Jinsa, 2006a; Jinsa, 2006b).  
 
Richard Perle was Chairman of the Department of Defense's Defense Policy Board, an 
extremely powerful group advising Bush and the Pentagon on military policy (Jinsa, 
2006a). He was also chairman and CEO of the media company Hollinger Digital, 
director of The Jerusalem Post, and a prolific contributor to the New York Times, 
Washington Post, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, and the Jerusalem Post 
(Benador Associates, n.d.). He was often interviewed on ABC's Nightline and This 
Week, CBS's Face the Nation, NBC's Meet the Press and Today Show, and PBS's 
NewsHour, and produced The Gulf Crisis: The Road to War for PBS in 1992. In short, 
he had a very strong presence in the media. His view of strategic communication was 
that there is nothing wrong with mixing public diplomacy with psychological operations, 
as long as it was to the advantage of the American people (Perle, 2002b).  
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Figure 25. This is a simplified depiction of the complicated strategic communication network of 
the US Government around the time of Gulf War II, compiled by the author from information 
obtained from Defense Science Board (2004a&b), Broadcasting Board of Governors (n.d.), 
Department of State (2005), Joint Chiefs of Staff (2003) and Gardiner (2003). The White House 
functioned autonomously, but had direct jurisdiction over the strategic communication efforts of 
the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other government information agencies. 
The two Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) functioned independently of one another, but 
both had representatives of the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defense 
and the Department of State. The NSC consisted of representatives of the White House, 
Department of Defense, Department of State, and the CIA. The CIA functioned autonomously, 
but had a say in most of the departments. The Office of Information Activities (OIA) resorted 
under the Department of Defense, but its functions were mostly unclear/secret. The Secretary of 
State served on the board of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), although the BBG is 
considered to be an independent organisation. Various civilian public relations firms were co-
opted by especially the Department of Defense and the Department of State, but other 
departments used their services as well. 
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Douglas Feith, as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, was responsible for the 
"development and oversight of offensive IO (Information Operations), Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPS) and International Public Information (IPI)" (Armistead, 2002:20). 
During Feith's tenure in the Department of Defense, two particularly controversial 
offices were established (Conetta, 2004:5-6). The secret Office of Strategic Influence 
(OSI) was opened shortly after he was appointed, and was meant to manipulate foreign 
public opinion through disinformation and the covert placement of false or misleading 
reports by third party agents in international media. The OSI was closed down within six 
months, but its activities were usurped by other groups, such as the disbanded but still 
inscrutable Office of Special Plans (OSP) (Conetta, 2004:5), which was apparently 
"used to manufacture propaganda for internal and external use, and pseudo war 
planning" (Kwiatkowski, 2004). 
 
Like Perle and Feith, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which worked for many years 
to oust Saddam, was also closely associated with Jinsa (Jinsa, 2005). Funded by the US 
Department of State, the INC launched a major media campaign, and in a letter to the 
US Senate Appropriations Committee, dated 26 June 2002, they claimed to have planted 
108 articles discrediting Saddam in the international media to influence global opinion 
in favour of an American war against Iraq (Landay & Wells, 2004). Targeted media 
included The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time, the BBC and CNN, Agence 
France Presse, Associated Press, United Press International, Czech News Agency, 
Moscow News, The Independent (London), The Wall Street Journal and Vanity Fair. 
The existence of this document was confirmed by the INC's Washington office 
(McCollam, 2004). 
 
This example clearly shows that numerous interrelated individuals and institutions – not 
only the Department of Defense – had the will, the means and the opportunity to manage 
the news media prior to as well as during Gulf War II. Due to the secretive nature of 
many of the organisations that generated information that was used by the media, it is 
obvious that the origin of a lot of information pertaining to the war in Iraq would also be 
obscure.  
 
6.2 Department of Defense policy 
The non-secretive part of the Department of Defense's media strategy was 
overwhelmingly transparent and became a hallmark of Operation Iraqi Freedom. An 
earlier report by the Defense Science Board (2001:50) stated that "a coordinated 
capability to manage the dissemination of information to foreign audiences in support of 
US interests is necessary, feasible, and an urgent national priority".  
 
The Pentagon listened: months before the final decision to attack Iraq the Department of 
Defense already had contingency plans in place regarding the role the media would play 
in the event of a war (Department of Defense, 2001). It included the "aggressive use of 
information operations", with strategic communication teams assigned to Central 
Command to ensure that the message of American superiority in Iraq is broadcast to the 
international community (Ferrell, 2004:10). 
 
This entailed complete media coverage of the war by means of what is known as the 
Embedded Media Program. 
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6.2.1 Embedded Media Program 
The Embedded Media Program was an inspired public relations move by the 
Department of Defense's newly appointed Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the 
public relations expert Victoria Clarke (Hume, 2003). She previously held the position 
of general manager in the global public relations and marketing firm Hill and Knowlton, 
was president of the leading issue advocacy and corporate communications company 
Bozell Eskew Advertising, and was also vice-president for Public Affairs and Strategic 
Council for the National Cable Television Association (Department of Defense, 2003b). 
Although she had little knowledge of military culture, Clarke knew the world of public 
relations and the media, and she and her deputy, former army officer Bryan Whitman, 
realised that a war in Iraq would be big news, whether the military decided to 
accommodate the media or not (Shepard, 2004:11-12). The only way to counteract Iraqi 
propaganda, they believed, was to "take offensive action to achieve information 
dominance by means of robust media access".   
 
The Embedded Media Program therefore was a deliberate move by the Pentagon to 
dominate media coverage of the war, counter hostile propaganda and disinformation 
efforts, and at the same time to garner public support both in the US and the rest of the 
international community (Rumsfeld, 2003a).  
 
Although Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were initially against the idea of 
embedding, Rumsfeld agreed that it might work (Shepard, 2004:13). The huge success 
of very limited embedding in Afghanistan advanced the case for large-scale embedding 
in Iraq (Shepard, 2004:21). 
 
I do believe media inclusion during Operation Anaconda became a model 
for embedding of journalists in the war in Iraq. And from the stand-point of 
the US military they must have been pleased with the initial outcome from 
the Afghan experiment. From 6 journalists the number was expanded to well 
over 600 by the time the ground war began in Iraq. As I joked the media was 
no longer imbedded instead, there were so many journalists it was more as 
though soldiers were embedded with the media (Savidge, 2006). 
 
6.2.2 Ground rules 
In what was the most evident policy mechanism for controlling the media during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Pentagon compiled a set of strict ground rules which had 
to be signed by members of the media who wished to be embedded with the military 
(Villarreal, 2005:51). Violation of these rules would result in the immediate termination 
of the reporter's stay with the unit (Rumsfeld, 2003a).  
 
In brief, the ground rules contained in the Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on embedding 
media (Rumsfeld, 2003a) stated that:  
 
• All interviews with military personnel would be "on record", and interviews with 
pilots and air crews would only be allowed after the completion of missions. 
• Embeds were not allowed to be armed. 
• The unapproved use of lights for filming or photography during nocturnal 
operations was prohibited. 
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• Embargoes may be imposed to protect operational security. 
• The release of information that might jeopardize operations or endanger lives was 
proscribed. This included the numbers of for example troops, aircraft, artillery, 
and ships; the names and locations of units as well as visual material from which 
these could be identified; information camp security and force protection 
measures; and also rules of engagement, future operations, and techniques of 
intelligence collection.  
• To retain the surprise factor, embeds were required to take extra precautions at the 
beginning of own and friendly operations, and they were prohibited from 
broadcasting from airfields on land or sea until the safe return of the initial strike 
force.  
• Embeds were not allowed to describe the movements or methods of special 
operations units, including angles and speeds of air attacks, and tactical and 
evasive naval manoeuvres.  
• The effectiveness of e.g. enemy electronic warfare, camouflage, and targeting 
could not be reported.  
• Photographs and film of identifiable enemy prisoners of war, as well as custody 
operations and interviews with detainees were disallowed.  
• Embeds could not report on postponed or cancelled operations, and missing or 
downed aircraft while search and recovery operations were still in progress.  
• They were required to be sensitive about the identity of fallen, wounded, or ill 
military personnel until their next of kin had been informed or the information was 
released by the Pentagon, and to respect the privacy and welfare for personnel in 
medical treatment facilities.  
 
The proposed embedding of reporters received mixed reactions from military 
commanders (Shepard, 2004: 22). Some were reluctant to allow the media into their 
fold; others resignedly accepted the inevitability of the programme, while a number had 
a genuine desire to make it work. However, both the military and the media agreed with 
the ground rules and considered them fair, reasonable and logical, although there was a 
general feeling that it could have been simplified to a short list of do's and don'ts 
(Wright, 2004b:IV-16).  
 
6.2.3 Media boot camp 
A second move to indirectly control the media came in the form of the unofficial 
requirement for all embeds to attend specifically designed boot camps where they could 
become familiar with and incorporated into the fighting units (Villarreal, 2005:51).  
 
A week-long programme was presented at a range of locations, such as Quantico in 
Virginia, Fort Dix in New Jersey, and Kuwait (McLane, 2004:81-82).  More than fifty 
representatives of various news organisations attended the first camp at Quantico 
(DeFoore, 2002). To develop a relationship with the military and to prepare them for the 
rigours of battle, prospective embeds were familiarised with direct fire, instructed on 
chemical weapons protection, how to navigate minefields, and how to apply battlefield 
first aid (McLane, 2004: 81-82; Miracle, 2003:45). The reporters were taken on tactical 
marches, experienced staged capture by the enemy, and were taught military jargon. 
Like the soldiers they would be embedded with, they slept in barracks bunks, rose at 
05:00, and were equipped with military backpacks and Kevlar helmets. 
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Many reporters were sceptical about the boot camp, as they expected its aim was to 
condition them to obey orders from the military, as well as to get rid of candidates 
unsuitable for embedding (Branigin, 2003). The latter suspicion was true: according to 
Shepard (2004:280)  
 
they weeded out those who mistakenly thought covering a war would be a 
heck of an adventure. After barely surviving pretend war, some opted to not 
experience the real thing. 
  
The promise that embeds would automatically have the honorary rank of major during a 
war, with all the privileges this entailed, somewhat sweetened the deal for some 
(Knightley, 2003b), although this offer created new concerns regarding the danger 
reporters would potentially be exposed to (Cramer, 2003). Dressed in fatigues like the 
fighting forces, it was feared that they might be mistaken for soldiers and become a 
target for hostile troops (Ricchiardi, 2003). 
 
The army drill sergeants responsible for the training of the prospective war 
correspondents, on the other hand, had their own concerns and frustrations to cope with, 
namely the correspondents themselves. At one occasion a drill sergeant compared the 
supervision of reporters to "herding cats" (Ricchiardi, 2003).  
 
6.3 Reporters in Iraq 
6.3.1 Embedded reporters 
The Embedded Media Program in Iraq enabled the unprecedented number of 692 
journalists, photographers, videographers, producers and technicians of 224 media 
organisations to live and travel with units of all the different departments of the military 
(Wright, 2004b:S-1–S-6). Embeds were allowed to stay as long as they wanted and 
therefore their numbers fluctuated as they joined or left their allocated units. When the 
war started there were 408 embeds with the ground forces, when Baghdad fell there 
were 422, and a day after Bush declared victory, this number dropped to 108. Eventually 
64 percent of the media personnel who were embedded were American 
(national/regional), 27 percent international, and 9 percent local.  
 
Most embeds arrived at their allocated unit, ship, or air base a week to 10 days before 
Operation Iraqi Freedom began, which gave them the opportunity to become familiar 
with the environment – both geographical and military – and to establish a mutual 
relationship of trust with the soldiers (Wright, 2004b:S-5–S-6). The rest of the embeds 
signed up at the units' home bases, where they could witness deployment preparations 
and meet the soldiers' families. A number of reporters were embedded after the start of 
the war, but this generally caused problems and was therefore not considered to be a 
very effective move. 
 
Many questions were asked about the Embedded Media Program. Critics pointed out 
that there is a thin line between "embedding" and "in bed with" (Cramer, 2003). Fears 
were that the reporters' reliance on the military would result in a too familiar relationship 
between correspondents and their units, leading to overly positive reports on military 
operations (Owens, 2003). This concern was not unfounded. While the program 
presented the media with fairly unrestricted access to "the factual story – good or bad" 
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(Rumsfeld, 2003a), the architects of the policy knew very well that correspondents 
whose safety depended on their units would probably bond with the troops and that it 
would most likely result in more positive coverage. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Larry 
Cox (2003), chief of the press desk, said in a Columbia Journalism Review interview:  
 
We knew that some members of the press were going to experience that. 
That is an aspect of the situation that we felt was going to be important for 
the press to experience. 
 
A clear indication of the embedded correspondents' alliance with their units was their 
use of the pronoun "we" in their reports, which for some critics was indicative of the loss 
of objectivity (Owens, 2003). As the military had expected (Cox, 2003) the "enthusiastic 
embrace of the plural pronouns 'we,' 'our,' and 'us' to describe the progress of the units to 
which they're attached" was understandable, considering the embeds' "strong stake in the 
outcome of any hostile action they might encounter" (Shafer, 2003a).  
 
A favourite example of such a bond often quoted by critics and proponents alike 
(Owens, 2003; Kincaid, n.d.), is the story of Martin Savidge of CNN, embedded with the 
1st Marine Battalion, who reportedly offered his satellite phone to four troops, who 
chose to use it to phone the parents of a fallen comrade. Savidge (2006) denied that this 
ever occurred, or that he would have made a report of such an incident, but added that he 
and many other embedded reporters regularly made their satellite phones available to 
soldiers who needed to call home. In fact, most embedded correspondents acted as a 
direct link between the troops and their families, either through their satellite phones, or 
e-mail messages (Marlantes, 2003).   
 
Savidge (2006) admitted that it was very difficult to separate his loyalty towards his 
adoptive unit from his professional duty as a reporter: 
  
It is not possible to live and face danger with a unit and not develop a deep 
personal connection with those who are a part of it. Under those 
circumstances it is extremely difficult if not impossible to maintain the 
objectivity a journalist normally tries to have. I struggled with this every 
single day and I know I did not always succeed. That is part of the reason I 
believe that embedded journalism by a news organization must be done in 
conjunction with independent reporting whenever possible. I would try to 
carefully monitor my words and reports to guard against bias but it's damn 
difficult. 
 
Savidge (2006) denied that it was ever expected of him to serve as a "cheerleader" for 
the military:  
 
There was never any time I was told or pressured to report anything other 
than what I saw or experienced by members of the unit or commanders or 
officers. 
 
Nevertheless, when he reported on 22 March 2003 that the US forces hit Safwan Hill 
with napalm, the military denied it and said that it did not have "napalm" in its arsenal. 
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A documentary titled "Fallujah, the hidden massacre" aired by Italian Public Television 
however forced the Pentagon to admit that it indeed used white phosphorous, or so-
called "Shake and Bake" munitions, in their operations against Fallujah (Heard, 2005).  
 
The implication of this is that while Savidge – and other embeds, for sure – were not 
prevented from reporting what they saw, the military did not hesitate to contradict true 
reports with false information. By the time the validity of the reports could be verified, 
the newsworthiness of the event had passed. All that remained was the image that 
reporters such as Savidge at best did not know napalm (which is a generic term for all 
"fire bombs") from white phosphorous, or at worst that he was not a reliable reporter. 
This way, it can be concluded that the military actively served as gatekeepers and 
determined the frames and general agenda of the reports filed by "their" embeds.  
 
Detractors of the embedding policy also cautioned against the so-called "soda straw" 
view of the war, without any context of events being offered. This implied nothing else 
than very restricted framing of news. According to Jack Schafer of Slate (2003a)  
 
battlefield reporters are viewing the war through soda straws – the soda 
straws of their specific, narrow battlefield locations and the soda straws of 
their self-preservation.  
 
Correspondents were aware of this danger, and some worried that their narrow view of 
events would cause them to write slanted reports (Marlantes, 2003:1).  
 
The military realised that lack of context could distort media reports, and Rumsfeld 
(2003b) himself cautioned that  
 
what we're seeing are slices of the war in Iraq. We're seeing that 
particularized perspective that that reporter, or that commentator or that 
television camera happens to be able to see at that moment.  
 
Cox (2003) stressed that embedded coverage would have been insufficient had it been 
the only coverage of the war:  
 
But it's not. It's one element. The others balance it and broaden it and lead 
to the overall goal for both the military and the journalists, which is to 
provide an accurate picture of the war. 
 
Schoonakker (2006), himself a unilateral, conceded that embedded reporters had far 
greater access to the battlefield than he and the other independent reporters had and that 
they consequently saw much more of the war than the reporters in Baghdad who had to 
rely on the Ba'athist government for news. 
 
However, as to the accuracy of reports from embedded journalists, I don't 
think that is the salient point. The Western media that sent their reporters off 
for embedding with the coalition had already accepted the US 
administration's rationale for invading Iraq. The great failure of journalism 
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in the case of the invasion of Iraq was the lack of any critique as to why the 
US should invade in the first place. 
 
6.3.2 Unilateral reporters 
The "other" reporters Cox (2003) referred to were the "unilaterals", the 1 500 to 1 600 
journalists and news crews who covered the war independently from the military. 
Having a "slightly broader picture of the war to look at'" (Cox, 2003), it was expected 
that unilaterals, who operated in Iraq and neighbouring countries, would serve a crucial 
role in the conflict, namely as "a true audit of just how honest the embedding process 
is", and "what kind of access is being granted to the embedded correspondents and 
camera crews" (Lewis, 2003). Yet, due to the dangers unilaterals had to face trying to 
get into and surviving in Iraq, while evading capture by and dodging bullets of both the 
coalition and Iraqi forces, their coverage was also restricted and "in its own way a soda 
straw" (CPJ, 2003; Donvan, 2003).  
 
Peter Arnett (2005) noted a clear distinction between the type of stories filed by 
embedded and unilateral reporters, which is likely the reason for the military's hostility 
towards unilaterals:  
 
Non-embedded reporters cover the Iraqi side of the story. They will write 
about politics, tribal and ethnic issues, human interest stories about Iraqis 
impacted by the war and so forth. Main stream news organisations will 
embed their western reporters to cover the US military operations, and use 
local Iraqis or Arab staff to cover the Iraqi side. 
 
Even if reporters embedded with an advancing military unit wanted to stop and report on 
the results of his unit's actions, it is not practically possible – there was no time to talk to 
the injured or observe the humanitarian implications of such an attack (Turnley, 2003). 
Reporters travelling independently to catch the slack were therefore essential for 
balancing media reports. 
 
Like the embedded media, unilaterals who wanted to report on the activities of the 
coalition ground forces had to register with the Coalition Press Information Centre 
(CPIC)-Kuwait (Wright, 2004b:S-3). That seems to be where the similarity in treatment 
ended, as the military frowned upon the presence of independent reporters in Iraq. They 
repeatedly urged unilaterals to stay out of the country, and warned that the military could 
not guarantee their safety (CPJ, 2003).  
 
All reporters were required to carry numerous identifications, but "only one mattered: 
the brown 'embed' ID. Without this, entry is forbidden into Iraq except by invitation" 
(Wilson, 2003). Generally, embedded reporters were regarded as "official journalists", 
deserving of military interviews, while unilateral reporters "were often treated as pests 
with no right to the battlefield" (Shafer, 2003b). The Guardian reporter Jamie Wilson 
(2003) felt that in the eyes of the "the coalition military press machine", unilateral 
reporters were "one step down from being a member of the Republican Guard".  
 
The British and US military, as well as the Kuwaiti border guards, actively prevented 
unilateral reporters from entering Iraq to cover the war (Donvan, 2003). This was 
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especially true for unilaterals who wanted to follow in the wake of the military as they 
invaded and passed through the southern cities of Basra, Umm Qasr, Nasiriyah, and 
Safwan (Shafer, 2003b). Independent reporters who presented their unilateral 
accreditation badges at the checkpoint on the two highways into Iraq from Kuwait were 
told to turn back as they had no right to enter Iraq (Turnley, 2003). To complicate their 
entry into Iraq, a military exclusion zone of 120 km wide was enforced in the northern 
third of Kuwait where the American troops were based (CPJ, 2003). Reporters who 
wanted to approach the Iraqi border had to obtain permission from the Kuwaiti 
government, which approved hardly any of these requests.  
 
Hundreds of unilateral reporters were "embedded … in the million-dollar press centre" 
in Doha, Qatar, an "over-air-conditioned warehouse (a virtual sensory-deprivation 
chamber), with only microwavable mini-pizzas to eat" (Wolff, 2003a; Wolff, 2003b). 
Here they believed they would get fresh information on the progress of the war during 
daily press briefings (Rice, 2004) which, it turned out, was "ably engineered and 
precisely scripted to tell you as little as possible" (Wolff, 2003b): 
 
 
It takes about 48 hours to understand that information is probably more 
freely available at any other place in the world than it is here. At the end of 
the 48 hours you realize that you know significantly less than when you 
arrived, and that you're losing more sense of the larger picture by the hour. 
Eventually you'll know nothing. This may be the plan, of course (Wolff, 
2003a). 
 
The first missile attack on Baghdad came and went with hardly any information passed 
to the reporters waiting at the Centcom Information Centre (Ramshaw, 2003). When the 
war "officially" began questions to the press officers were almost invariably answered 
with "no comment", or "we don't want to endanger the troops" (Rice, 2004). Even as the 
reporters watched the bombing of Baghdad on the centre's six television monitors, the 
press officers had "no comment" on whether or not the war had officially begun.  
 
Gradually, it dawned on me that the military had herded us into the press 
centre so that we could be kept away from information (Rice, 2004). 
 
This pattern of information deprivation prevailed, prompting Michael Wolff of the New 
York Metro to ask Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, one of the command's chief 
spokesmen: "Why are we here? Why should we stay? What's the value of what we're 
learning at this million-dollar press centre?" (Wolff, 2003b). This question "drew [a] 
hearty applause" from Wolff's colleagues (Rice, 2004).  
 
The Centcom reporters were further irritated by "the crude efforts at manipulation": each 
briefing beginning with video clips showing "precision bombing" and US soldiers being 
greeted by waving children, as well as the increasingly derogatory labels applied to the 
opposing Iraqi forces (Massing, 2003). At first they were called "armed thugs", then 
"terroristic behaving paramilitaries" and "terrorist-like cells" and finally "death squads". 
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Despite consensus that the daily briefings were "ably engineered and precisely scripted 
to tell you as little as possible" (Wolff, 2003a), and the general dismay about "the level 
of distortion, obfuscation and misinformation served up to them" (Massing, 2003), the 
flow of "news" from the unilaterals at Centcom never stopped (Ramshaw, 2003):  
 
No matter how jaded these reporters were, when the lights went on, they 
knew their roles. They had producers and an audience. The show must go 
on. If everybody here seemed privately to accept that the process of 
reporting war was a crock, publicly they accepted the war as a coherent 
event that they had some mastery over—they had inside sources, they had 
the general's ear. They were war reporters. We'd reached the point where 
reporters were interviewing other reporters in the most media-scrutinized 
war ever fought (Wolff, 2003b). 
 
"All-news, all-the-time TV reporters" stood in the empty briefing room and "filled air-
time with poise and smooth authority" (Ramshaw, 2003). Massing (2003) noted that 
although the "briefers and spinners" were to blame for the situation, the reporters 
themselves were only too ready to accept whatever was they were fed (Massing, 2003). 
While they were openly contemptuous of the set-up at Doha, they did not report on it: 
 
 [t]here were no publishers making angry phone calls to the Pentagon or 
the White House – no letters, no outrage. In this, we all failed the American 
public (Rice, 2004). 
 
Unilateral reporters in Kuwait also complained about the military breaking promises to 
fly them into southern Iraq by helicopter to observe the aftermath of their attacks 
(Shafer, 2003b). Instead of being ferried about in helicopters, only a handful of the 
thousand-plus reporters were picked up at their five-star hotels in Kuwait City every day 
for the 90 minute drive into Iraq in an air-conditioned tour bus (Shafer, 2003b; Wilson, 
2003). They were not allowed to see the "collateral damage" of the coalition attacks, but 
were taken to a few towns deemed safe, where they could report on aid convoys, US 
forces supplying water and restoring the electricity supply – "think of it as the Disney 
Tour War" (Wilson, 2003). 
 
In some cases unilateral reporters managed to convince military units to take them along 
with them, "praying that the press handlers don't get wind and shut us down", but mostly 
they were forced to enter the country without permission (Wilson, 2003). Some chose 
unconventional ways to cross the border: it was rumoured that despite the Geneva 
Conventions forbidding it, a number of independent reporters concealed their vehicles in 
Red Cross guise in order to cover the invasion (Shafer, 2003b). Others were smuggled 
across the border, like Paul McEnroe of the Minneapolis Star Tribune who entered Iraq 
"embedded under a load of potatoes" (Wilcock, 2003). 
 
Once they managed to get into Iraq, unilaterals could freely pursue their stories (CPJ, 
2003). In many instances they saw a completely different war from the one embeds 
reported on, and not only because embeds experienced frontline action with the troops 
(Donvan, 2003). For example, early in the war embeds reported that Iraqis were waving 
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and cheering at the American troops, while unilaterals visiting the same towns a short 
while later found that the Iraqis were not happy at all.  
 
They were not happy with us, the Americans. They were not happy with the 
British. They were not happy that five people in town had been killed. They 
were not happy that their electricity was off. They were not happy that big 
guys wearing camouflage helmets were telling them where in their town they 
could go. They were not happy that I was there asking them questions 
(Donvan, 2003). 
 
Also, where embeds told how an Iraqi slapped a picture of Saddam with a shoe, 
unilaterals heard the rest of the story, that both that man and his mother were killed by 
the Baathists that same night: "So the story of this triumphant move and this welcoming 
of liberation, was not at all the story I was picking up" (Donvan, 2003). John Donvan, a 
correspondent for ABC News Nightline, had a hard time convincing ABC that he had an 
important story to tell, as they had seven embedded reporters feeding amazing scenes of 
jubilation back home. His story clashed directly with those reports, and he only got on 
air to share his experiences some 12 hours later. 
 
Unilateral reporters in many ways remained partly dependent on the US military for 
security and supplies (CPJ, 2003). Some US and coalition units were accommodating 
and allowed unilaterals to join their convoys through dangerous regions (Wilson, 2003). 
It was often higher officers who objected to the presence of the unilaterals and in some 
cases ordered that they should be escorted back to the border, the pretext being that it 
was too dangerous for them to be there (CPJ, 2003). To scare unilaterals away from the 
battlefield, the death of ITN reporter Terry Lloyd and the disappearance of his crew – 
later established to be dead as well – were used as a "vulgar justification of censorship 
and control" (Wilson, 2003). 
 
When the military refused to let unilateral journalists camp near their units, the reporters 
had to find a relatively safe place to spend the night, where they would not be attacked 
by pro-Saddam militia (Turnley, 2003). Carloads of unilateral journalists would "circle 
the wagons" at night by parking their cars together and as close as possible to the 
coalition's military camps.  
 
There were several cases of non-embedded reporters being harassed and abused by the 
military (CPJ, 2003). On 25 March 2003, American troops captured two Portuguese and 
two Israeli reporters near Baghdad and accused them of being spies (Scemama, 2003). 
The Portuguese reporter José Castro was assaulted, and all four men were denied food 
and water for 48 hours. In a separate incident, Christian Science Monitor reporter Phillip 
Smucker was held at gunpoint by the US military after discussing the position of a US 
unit during a CNN interview (CPJ, 2003). Although the unit's position had previously 
been discussed in the media, Smucker was escorted out of Iraq and threatened with 
detainment when he re-entered the country a few days later. 
 
Distressing accusations were made that especially the US military deliberately targeted 
the media (FAIR, 2003; Fisk, 2003; Reporters Without Borders, 2003; Schechter, 2005). 
These accusations were based on the fact that during the Operation Iraqi Freedom phase 
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of the war, 12 media employees were killed, eight of whom were not embedded with the 
military (AFP, 2005; Reporters Without Borders, 2006: 11,13). Of these eight, six were 
killed by the US military (CPJ, 2003). They were Terry Lloyd, Fred Nérac and Hussein 
Othman, all three from ITN, who died when their vehicle came under fire from US 
marines; Tareq Ayyoub, who died when a US missile struck the Al Jazeera bureau in 
Baghdad, and José Couso (Agence France Presse) and Taras Protsyuk (Reuters), who 
were killed when a US tank fired a shell into Baghdad's Palestine Hotel where foreign 
reporters stayed during the early stages of the war (CPJ, 2003). The number of reporters 
killed made it the deadliest war for journalists ever (Wiltenburg, 2003).  
 
Schoonakker (2006), on the other hand, did not feel that the military went out of their 
way to make life difficult for him. 
 
The Americans behaved like they had nothing to hide, and as soon as I 
could satisfy them that I was a journalist, they were always co-operative. 
Getting to that point could be tricky, though. They kept their firearms 
pointed at you, fingers on the trigger, while you tried to explain and 
demonstrate. One night I came within a split second of being shot at a 
roadblock, when my driver panicked and reached under the dashboard for 
his passport. The nervous solider (about 18, 19) thought my driver was 
reaching for a car bomb switch. The only reason he did not open fire was 
because I called him “dude”, as in “Hey, dude, take it easy”, when he lifted 
up his rifle to start shooting. I don't think the American authorities cared 
too much whether you were embedded or not. 
 
Contrary to the generally well-behaved embedded journalists, who often surprised unit 
commanders by knowing the ground rules better than they did themselves (Wright, 
2004b:IV-16), unilaterals were accused of recklessness and inaccurate reporting (Sperry, 
2003). Major General James N. Mattis (quoted by Sperry, 2003), Commanding General 
of the 1st Marine Division, accused unilaterals of routinely breaching security, and 
especially condemned their cutting into convoys and getting in between enemy and 
friendly units during fire-fights, in one instance resulting in the death and injuries of the 
unilateral reporters. This referred to the incident where US marines shot at and killed 
Terry Lloyd and two members of his crew, while the fourth was wounded.  
 
Unilateral reporters also had a different opinion of when the war ended. Because he 
knew what happened once the tanks passed through a town or village, Donvan (2003) 
felt that as a unilateral reporter he was much more aware that military operations not 
only continued, but that fighting actually increased after Saddam's statue fell in Al 
Firdos Square, while most embeds – and consequently the American public – were 
under the impression that the war ended then, "and everybody went home". Many 
ground commanders had the same objection, as most of the embeds left their units after 
the fall of Baghdad, when it became safer to move freely throughout Iraq and many 
news organisations established their own bureaus in Baghdad (Wright, 2004b:S-6). The 
commanders felt that by leaving the units, reporters missed many important incidents 
during the transition to the Stability and Support-Operations (SASO) phase of the war.   
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Afterwards, the media and the military agreed that the Embedded Media Program was 
successful (Wright, 2004b:S-9). The relationship between the two traditionally hostile 
institutions improved and many enduring reservations about one another was laid to rest. 
A protracted period of close interaction and shared hardship during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom resulted in relationships that might last for many years to come – "when young 
commanders become senior commanders and reporters become producers, editors, and 
bureau chiefs"  (Wright, 2004b:S-9). 
 
Schoonakker (2006) summarised the advantages and disadvantages of the Embedded 
Media Program as follows: 
 
Access to information is the prize but being led astray is the risk. It's like, if 
you want to dance to the music you will need a partner … Ever since 
Vietnam, the US military has learnt how to deal with the media far more 
intelligently (in terms of achieving their goals) than the media have learnt 
how to deal with the military. Journalism is a flawed and superficial 
business. Overall, the coverage of the Iraq war reminds me of something 
someone once said about bribing journalists: why pay them when you see 
what you can make them do for free? 
 
With such a concerted effort to "occupy the media territory" as one would a piece of 
foreign land, the crucial question remains: what was reported by the South African 
media in general and how was it reported? How effective was the US military as 
primary gatekeepers? Did the reports generated under the system of embedding serve 
the American agenda? Were the stories framed to show the USA, Bush and the military 
as the heroes rescuing the world, or what were the salient points?  
 
6.4 Discussion 
In the previous chapter it became clear that over time, relationship between the US 
military and the media in times of war revealed a clear oscillating pattern (Figure 24, 
p.117). Only during Operation Iraqi Freedom did this pattern change, when there was a 
positive relationship between one segment of the media and the US military, but a 
negative relationship between another segment of the media and the US military. 
Clearly, forces different to those present during other wars were in action during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
Referring to Figure 24 (p.117) it is clear that something drastic and quite new happened 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom: right from the onset, the new US media policies 
caused a split in the media opinion: some were very positive about the policies and 
decided to participate, others saw it as a way to control the press, and declined the 
opportunity to be embedded with the military. There were also media organisations that 
agreed with the new policies, but did not participate, or used both embedded and 
unilateral reporters.  Ultimately, when war coverage and the relationship between the 
media and the military were evaluated after the initial offensive stage of the war, there 
were two clear points of view:  
 
• embedded reporters generally regarded the relationship with the military in a 
positive light, and were in turn overwhelmingly praised by the military. 
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• unilateral reporters mostly regarded the relationship with the military as negative, 
and were strongly criticised by the military. 
 
The unusual pattern in the relationship between the media and the US military shows an 
indisputable correlation with whether or not the reporters acted within the scope of the 
military media policy. It is therefore clear that the military's novel policies during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom had a positive impact on the relationship with the segment of 
the media that complied with the rules, namely the embedded reporters, while the 
relationship with the rest of the reporters, the unilaterals, remained strained and in some 
cases even hostile.  
 
Based on the historical pattern depicted in Figure 24 (p.117) it is possible to make the 
assumption that the positive attitude of the military towards the embedded media is a 
reaction to positive coverage, while the military's negative attitude towards unilateral 
reporters is a reaction to unfavourable coverage. This would be an indication that on the 
level of the war correspondent, at least where these reporters are under the control of the 
military, the policy that was crafted to "tell the American story" as Rumsfeld (2003a) 
suggested, was an unqualified success.  
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter looked deeper into the US policies that resulted from the historically 
capricious relationship between the media and the US military, and how it developed 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The US government's strategic communication 
network and the Department of Defense's media policies were examined, as were the 
opinions and experiences of the media policies of both embedded and unilateral 
reporters. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
 
In Chapter 7 news reports pertaining to Operation Iraqi Freedom published by four 
leading South African newspapers, as well as transcripts of public addresses and news 
briefings by prominent US government officials are analysed in terms of gatekeeping, 
framing and agendasetting, using an adapted version of Propp's elements of a fairy tale 
as a standard. 
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Chapter 7 
Content analysis 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters aimed to show how war correspondence has evolved as a 
separate news genre, the flux in the relationship between the US military and the media 
in times of war through the years, and ultimately how the US media policies manifested 
during Gulf War II. The question, however, remains: where did war reports that were 
published in South Africa originate, what were the content of these reports, and whether 
and to what extent did the content and slant of these stories agree with the sources? 
 
In order to find an answer, all relevant news reports pertaining to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom published by four leading South African newspapers, namely the English and 
Afrikaans Sunday newspapers Sunday Times and Rapport, as well as the English and 
Afrikaans daily newspapers The Star and Die Burger are analysed. Also, all relevant 
transcripts of public addresses and news briefings by White House and Pentagon 
officials, namely President George W. Bush and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Public 
Affairs Victoria Clarke are analysed. These transcripts were included in the study to 
compare the content and slant of the war message at its source with war reports that 
were ultimately published by the South African newspapers. All reports and transcripts 
are analysed in terms of gatekeeping, framing and agendasetting. 
 
7.2 Analysis 
7.2.1 Gatekeeping 
In 1991, Shoemaker reviewed and combined various gatekeeping theories to form one 
comprehensive model (Shoemaker, 1991:74-76). The model accommodated the various 
nodes of gatekeeping, such as news agencies, newspapers and broadcasting 
corporations, where reports were selected and adjusted before being sent down the news 
channel to the next node. The model acknowledged the effect of correspondents' 
personalities and personal history, as well as that of their employers, on their news 
judgements. According to this model news messages are repeatedly subjected to similar 
decisions until it finally reaches the audience.  
 
Reports about Operation Iraqi Freedom published in the South African newspapers can 
generally be divided into three categories: they either came from news agencies, or were 
compiled by an own reporter from different combinations of agency reports, other 
media reports and own reports, or were completely written by the newspaper's own 
reporters  (Figure 26, next page).  
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Figure 26. The frequency of agency, compiled and own reports published by the four 
South African newspapers based on the relative percentages of the total number of 
reports analysed in each separate newspaper. 
 
 
Sunday Times used very few agency reports and compilations, but the dispatches of its 
"own" reporter in Iraq greatly influenced its coverage. More than half of the reports in 
Rapport came from news agencies, while approximately an even number of the rest 
came from "own" sources or were compilations. Just under half of the reports in The 
Star were obtained from news agencies. It used many "own" reports, which included 
syndicated material from its sister publications in the Independent Group. Die Burger, 
on the other hand, produced a significant number of "own" reports, which they 
augmented with reports written and compiled by their own reporters based entirely on 
various external sources, and relatively few agency stories. 
 
7.2.1.1 News agency reports 
The four newspapers relied to varying degrees on news agency reports, which were 
predominantly hard news stories (Figure 26). In the Sunday Times, only 4 of the 43 
analysed reports came from news agencies, and all four originated from Sapa-AFP 
(Figure 27, next page). About half of the 30 news agency reports published by Rapport 
were compilations of information supplied by more than one agency. The Star published 
almost an equal number of Reuters and Sapa-AP reports, but none from Sapa per se. By 
far the most of Die Burger's 45 agency reports also came from Reuters and Sapa-AFP. 
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Figure 27. The number of reports from the different news agencies that were published 
in each of the four South African newspapers. 
 
 
An analysis of the sources quoted in the news agency reports published by the four 
newspapers indicated that all the agencies showed a distinct preference for US sources 
(Table 8, next page). Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell, Franks and Brooks, as well as US 
officials, the US military, US marines, US analysts, the US government, US experts, the 
US ambassador, and US media are freely referred to by all five news agency groups.  
 
On the Iraqi side, Saddam was quoted once. The Star (2003d) reported on 21 March:  
 
After the strike, Saddam appeared on Iraqi TV, calling on his people to "go 
draw your swords" and condemning the US and Britain for "shameful 
crimes against Iraq and humanity. ... Iraq will be victorious and with Iraq, 
our nation and humanity will triumph and evil will be defeated," Saddam 
said. 
 
Iraqi officials were quoted just as often as pro-American Israeli and Kuwaiti officials, 
who were considerably less frequently quoted than Americans. Not once was an Iraqi 
General, a member of the Iraq Royal Guard, or an Iraqi analyst quoted.  
 
The frequency that US sources were quoted in reports published in South Africa 
compared to the frequency that Iraqi sources were quoted, is an indication that the 
American government succeeded in their quest to "occupy the media territory" (Rendon, 
quoted by Urrutia-Varhall, 2002), yet this fact does not give an indication of whether 
they succeeded in occupying this territory to their advantage, in other words, whether 
the coverage was supportive of the American view of the war.  
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Table 8. News sources that were cited by the different news agencies, in no specific 
order, as they were published in the four newspapers. 
 Sunday Times Rapport The Star Die Burger 
Reuters  Franks, Iraqi 
official 
Kuwaiti official, 
Centcom, 
Rumsfeld,  
UK military, Bush, 
Brooks, civilians, 
Blair, "reports",  
US commanders, 
Franks, Iraqi 
officials, US and 
UK officials.  
Middle East media, 
Rumsfeld, bankers, 
military analysts, 
Arab leaders, Putin, 
civilians, Brooks, 
US commanders 
Sapa-AFP Pentagon, 
Centcom,  
US government, 
US marines 
Clinton,  
US officials,  
US military,  
UK military, art 
experts 
Civilians, Franks, 
Pope,  Iraqi 
officials, Red 
Cross, BBC, Israeli 
military official, 
US embassy 
personnel, Chalabi 
Catholic press, 
Bush, Kuwaiti 
official, 
Washington Post, 
Russian minister, 
Blair, South Korean 
President, civilians, 
Web media, US 
experts, World 
Bank, Powel, 
Rumsfeld, Iraqi 
Sheik, civilians 
Sapa-AP  Centcom, civilian, 
Rumsfeld, marines 
Israeli official, US 
officials, Israeli's, 
Palestinians, US & 
UK commanders, 
Bush, Blair 
US analysts, Kofi 
Anan, Centcom, US 
ambassador, US 
officials  
Sapa  SA government, 
Pentagon 
 Middle East media  
Other 
agencies, 
combinations 
 US media, 
Centcom, 
Rumsfeld, Fox 
News, US officials, 
art experts, US 
military analysts, 
intelligence 
sources  
US officials, Bush, 
Centcom, marines, 
reporters,  US/UK 
military, Kuwaiti 
official, Saddam 
Iraqi official  
UK officer, 
civilian, 
environmental 
expert, BBC 
reporter 
 
 
7.2.1.2 Compilations  
The compilations printed by the newspapers were in essence an identified reporter's 
own take on agency news, which in turn consisted mostly of hard news. An example of 
this is a report by Die Burger's Sarel van der Walt (2003:2) in which he quoted Agence 
France Presse, CNN, the paper's Washington correspondent Deon Lamprecht, Reuters 
and British Defense Minister Geoff Hoon. Sunday Times used more compilations than 
agency reports, but both were largely outnumbered by its own reports. Both Rapport 
and The Star published relatively few compilations, but Die Burger extensively used 
this type of report in lieu of "own" reports. 
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7.2.1.3 Own reports 
Four broad categories of own reports were identified, namely news, interviews, opinion 
pieces and personal experiences (Figure 28).  
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Figure 28. The frequency of news, interviews, opinion pieces and personal experiences 
occurring in the "own" reports of each newspaper investigated, expressed as relative 
percentages of the total number of "own" reports in each separate newspaper. 
 
 
• News referred to "hard news": what happened, where it happened, how many 
were killed, what did Bush say?  
• Interviews included conversations between a reporter and a news subject, such as 
a minister, a human shield or military expert.  
• Opinion pieces were written especially by editors and expert commentators from 
universities, research institutes, humanitarian organisations, and the like.  
• Personal experiences involved reports written by a reporter while physically 
present in Iraq during the war, which applied only to Bonny Schoonakker of the 
Sunday Times.  
 
Only the Sunday Times could publish an "own" reporter's experiences, but it also 
printed a large number of opinion pieces. Rapport did not publish any interviews, but 
printed more opinion pieces than news stories. The Star mainly printed opinion pieces, 
while Die Burger used almost an equal number of news reports and opinion pieces.  
 
The case of Bonny Schoonakker as an "own" reporter in Iraq is interesting in terms of 
Shoemaker's model (1991). The first part of Shoemaker's model deals with the personal 
aspects that impact on decisions made by a reporter: his/her personality, personal 
history, circumstances, etc.  
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Here Schoonakker (2006) serves as an example: because of his personality and personal 
circumstances he applied when the Sunday Times indicated that they wanted to send 
somebody to Iraq. His employer was prepared to pay the equivalent of only about US 
$7 000 for his stay of 2 months –  about the same amount that would have been paid if 
he "went to Australia on a wine-tasting freebee" – which meant that he was not able to 
hire bodyguards or an armoured vehicle, as other correspondents had. This effectively 
prevented him from going where he had wanted to. Sunday Times also told him that as 
he had "volunteered" to go, he would have been held partially responsible should 
anything happen to him.   
 
These internal and external variables determined that he went to Iraq, stayed in 
Baghdad, and reported only on matters that would not physically endanger him. The 
impact of these gatekeeping choices was that "own" reports dominated the Sunday 
Times' coverage. Schoonakker contributed 15 of the 19 "own" reports on Operation 
Iraqi Freedom that were published by the paper. This demonstrated the effect of a 
single reporter in the field on the profile of the newspaper's news sources.  
 
These reports significantly impacted on the number of gates information had to pass 
through, but nevertheless, Sunday Times itself "gatekept" Schoonakker's contribution to 
such an extent that he told the researcher in an interview:  
 
I was dismayed by the manner in which some of my stories were presented. 
To this day, I cannot bear to look at those back copies. My complaints and 
criticisms in this regard were not taken seriously, and sometimes with 
irritation. Ultimately, this led to a situation in which it became impossible 
for me to continue working at the Sunday Times (Schoonakker, 2006).  
 
7.2.2 Agendasetting 
According to McCombs (2000) agendasetting is not about a premeditated story or 
political frame "concocted" and "relentlessly pursued" by the media, but rather about the 
result of an infinite number of gatekeeping decisions over time.  
 
He distinguished between two levels of agendasetting, namely the object agenda (first 
level) and the attribute agenda (second level). This refers to the characteristics of the 
object. 
 
When Gulf War II news reports were studied with McComb's model of first and second 
level agendasetting in mind, it is obvious that the first level of agendasetting was greatly 
determined by the US government and the Pentagon, which flooded the media with 
daily briefings from important officials, added to the wall-to-wall coverage by a bevy of 
reporters who more often than not filled the media space with useless text and images. 
The US government also decided who could go where and report on which aspects of 
the war. The narrative that they promoted was one where Saddam was a treacherous 
villain who stockpiled weapons of mass destruction intended to destroy the American 
society, and also, that he was a despot who did not hesitate to kill his own people, 
therefore the heroic United States, the leader of the world, strong and powerful with the 
indisputable right to force its values upon the rest of the world, had to intervene (Figure 
29, next page). 
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Figure 29.  The frequency of references made in 70 speeches and news briefings by the 
selected US government officials to different identified fairytale elements, expressed as 
a relative percentage of the total number of references (309).  
 
 
Sunday Times relied mostly on their own reporters and South African commentators for 
stories on the war, and of these almost half came from the pen of Bonny Schoonakker 
(Figure 26, p.136).  
 
While the war itself represented the first level of agendasetting, it was the characteristics 
attributed to Saddam and his government in Schoonakker's coverage that represented 
the second level of agendasetting. It is significant that when Schoonakker's reports were 
removed from the equation, Sunday Times' second level agenda swayed towards a very 
critical view of Bush and his government (Figure 30, next page). 
 
Rapport used few "own" reports and the largely supportive coverage of the American 
point of view would suggest that they were "closer" to the source of the information in 
the channel of news flow. However, such an assumption is belied by the fact that 
Rapport used material from the same agencies as Sunday Times, The Star and Die 
Burger did, and furthermore, that judging by the reports published by the newspapers, 
all the news agencies promoted an agenda that was very critical of the US (Figure 31, 
next page). The slant of the reports published by Rapport is obviously the result of an 
internal policy, as it could not logically be traced back through the news agencies to the 
original sources. 
 
 142
 
Figure 30. The frequency that the 17 story elements occurred in the Sunday Times 
calculated without and with reports by Schoonakker, expressed as a relative percentage 
of the total coverage by the newspaper. 
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Figure 31. The frequency of references to 17 identified story elements in stories by the 
four main news agency groups that were published in the newspapers examined, 
expressed as a relative percentage of all the references made by each agency. 
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The agendas set by The Star and Die Burger were very similar, with a tendency to 
portray the US as strong, but dead wrong (Figure 32).  
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Figure 32. The frequency of references to 17 identified story elements in stories by the 
four newspapers examined, expressed as a relative percentage of all the references 
made by in each newspaper. 
 
 
The Star hardly paid any attention to Saddam's misdemeanours but were overall 
extremely critical of the US and Bush. In a scathing editorial column called US double 
standards, The Star (2003e) writes: 
 
 The US has shown little respect for multilateralism. It has eschewed 
international obligations such as the Kyoto treaty and has shunned the 
International Criminal Court. ... But perhaps even more importantly, the 
war on Iraq is a violation of international law. ... To add insult to injury, 
the US also fired cruise missiles on areas in Iraq populated by civilians, 
including women and children. ... Americans are known for their double 
standards - do as we say and not as we do. ... The US has a poor record of 
observing rules that it wants others to conform to. 
 
Die Burger, while also very critical of American actions and decisions by for example 
referring to the US belief that "might is right" (Die Burger, 2003c:8), tended to offer a 
better balance between the salience of both Saddam's and Bush's negative attributes, but 
also emphasised the American hegemony and role as the world's only remaining super-
power. 
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The US government's policy of "occupying the media terrain" bore fruit in cases where 
the press relied mostly on reports generated under the influence of the US government 
press machine, but from the South African perspective their machinations in most cases 
failed miserably. While they might have managed to occupy the media terrain, they 
were not celebrated as the heroes, but rather as the treacherous villains in the tale.  
 
7.2.3 Framing 
A preliminary study of various media sources indicated that Gulf War II was presented 
to the world as a fairytale, or a story. The "picture" that was created in the public's head, 
to quote Lippmann (1922), was that of a hero being sent out on a quest to save a victim 
from an evil villain.  
 
The White House and Pentagon made it clear that they planned to get their side of the 
war story told. Various sources indicate that the US military had knowledge of the value 
of storytelling as a technique of public influence. Bennett (2001), Deputy Chief 
Information Officer of the US Department of the Navy, wrote:  
 
Conveying information in a story provides a rich context, remaining in the 
conscious memory longer and creating more memory traces than 
information not in context. Therefore a story is more likely to be acted 
upon than normal means of communications.  
 
According to the US Air Force's Air University web site (Air University, n.d.): 
 
Another way of creating change and sharing understanding is through the 
effective use of the time-honoured process of storytelling. Storytelling is a 
valuable tool in helping to build a common understanding of our current 
situation in anticipating possible futures and preparing to act on those 
possible futures. Stories tap into a common consciousness that is natural 
to all human communities. Repetition of universal story forms carries a 
subliminal message, a sub-text that can help convey a high level of 
complex meaning. Since common values enable consistent action, "Story in 
this guise creates a heuristic framework to allow decision-making in 
conditions of uncertainty." 
 
The use of the story frame in times of war has been done before: NATO spokesman 
Jamie Shea attributed the success of his media campaign in Kosovo to his giving the 
public a daily "soap opera" to watch, frequently reminding them who the hero and who 
the villain was (Berlin Online, 2000). The idea of winning over the public by framing 
news as a story is also advocated by US military scholars Casebeer & Russell (2005). 
 
It is therefore not unthinkable that the idea of framing the war as a "story" might have 
originated somewhere in the US government's complex strategic communication 
network (see Figure 25, p.121).    
 
Without access to official documents confirming it, it was impossible to prove that the 
US government had the intent of specifically using a story frame to sell the war to the 
American and the global public, but by examining transcripts of speeches and news 
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briefings by US government officials, it was possible to determine whether or not 
elements of Vladimir Propp's (1968) fairytale analysis were present, and if so, how 
frequently. This served as a control against which the analyses of the South African 
newspapers and news agency reports could be measured. 
 
7.2.3.1  US government frames 
The analysis of the US government's transcripts showed that most of the elements 
identified by Propp were present (see Table 7, p.70), but that especially one dominated: 
Villain – Saddam/Iraq (Figure 29, p.141).  
 
Obviously absent was the reference Villain – Bush/America. Other elements that 
featured strongly were the military as the hero, Iraqis as the victims and the quests to 
find the weapons of mass destruction and to liberate the Iraqi nation.  
 
The government communications were subsequently deconstructed to portray the 
contributions by each of the officials (Figure 33). The frequency that a particular story 
element occurred during media appearances by Bush, Fleischer, Rumsfeld and Clarke 
were expressed as a percentage of the total number of times that the fairytale elements 
were mentioned by a specific individual.  
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Figure 33. The frequency of references made to 17 identified story elements made in 
speeches and news briefings by White House officials Bush and Fleischer, and by 
Pentagon officials Rumsfeld and Clarke, expressed as a relative percentage of the total 
number of references made by each official. 
 
 
 
 146
The strongest story emerging from the Bush transcripts was that Iraqi and American 
victims had to be liberated from the villain Saddam. Rumsfeld told the same story: that 
the heroic US military/Americans had to save the Iraqi victims from Saddam and his 
villainous regime. Of the four officials, Rumsfeld put the strongest emphasis on the role 
of the magic agent, which, considering his position as Secretary of Defense, makes 
perfect sense. Clarke told the same story, but gave the most prominence to Saddam as 
the villain and also stressed the quest to find weapons of mass destruction. Interestingly, 
Fleischer strongly focused on Bush as the hero, Saddam as the villain, the American 
people as the victim, and the importance of finding the weapons of mass destruction. 
His message offered by far the strongest incentive for the American people to go to war.  
 
7.2.3.2  News agency frames 
These messages were only partially assimilated by the news agencies (Figure 31, 
p.142). All the reports published in the four South African newspapers that were clearly 
attributable to Reuters, Sapa-AFP, Sapa-AP or Sapa were analysed for the presence of 
the story elements evident in the government transcripts.  
 
It was found that only the most basic of these elements were retained, namely the hero, 
the villain and the victim, with the victim generally receiving very little attention.  
 
The result is an interesting triptych featuring Hero – USA, Villain – Saddam and 
overwhelmingly, Villain – Bush/USA. All the news agencies most strongly emphasised 
Villain – USA, but in the Sapa reports this aspect is the most evident of all. In fact, Sapa 
hardly reported on anything but the negative aspects of the American conduct.  
 
The score for Reuters, Sapa-AFP and Sapa-AP on this aspect was very similar, but 
without access to the original reports from Agence France Presse and Associated Press 
it is not possible to comment on the effect, if any, that Sapa and the newspapers 
themselves had on the contents of the Sapa-AFP and Sapa-AP reports. Reuters 
commented positively on the strength and leadership of the USA, while Sapa-AP 
frequently referred to the undesirable characteristics of Saddam.  Sapa-AFP mentioned 
the heroic properties of the USA almost as often as the villainous characteristics and 
deeds of Saddam and his government. 
 
7.2.3.3 Newspaper frames 
As in the news agency reports, the total analysis of the Sunday Times, Rapport, The Star 
and Die Burger also found significant emphasis on Hero – USA, Villain – Saddam/Iraq, 
and Villain – Bush/USA (Figure 32, p. 143). In the newspaper reports, Iraq as the 
victim, but also Saddam as the hero, emerged more strongly than in the news agency 
reports. Notable in this figure is the way Rapport's coverage differed from that of the 
other three newspapers in terms of its apparent support to Bush and the USA and its 
criticism of Saddam. Reports from both Sapa-AFP and Sapa-AP contained positive 
comments about Saddam, for instance that he was alive and well and urging Iraqis to 
fight to the last, promising them victory over the Americans (Sapa-AFP, 2003).  
 
The most striking feature of Figure 32 (p. 143) is the dominance of The Star's negative 
reporting on Bush and the USA, with a much smaller but still considerable number of 
reports dealing with the positive aspects of the United States, such as its power and 
 147
unquestioned dominance. Next to The Star, Die Burger offered the most criticism 
against Bush and the US, but at the same time also reported positively about the 
country's hegemonic international status. Conversely, Die Burger was much more 
critical of Saddam than The Star. Rapport's analysis indicated that it strongly agreed 
with Bush and the USA, which it framed as very much the heroes, and that it just as 
strongly condemned Saddam and his government as the villains. Rapport published the 
view that 
 
The American president will maintain world peace in the future ... We 
should embrace the new world order (Roodt, 2003 - translated). 
 
The Sunday Times proved to be the harshest critic of Saddam and his government, a 
position which is juxtaposed to Bush and the USA as the villain, with negative coverage 
of the Iraqis dominating. However, it is important to remember that Bonny 
Schoonakker, the newspaper's reporter in Iraq, contributed overwhelmingly to this 
emphasis on the negative aspects of the Iraqi government. In his "War Diaries", 
Schoonakker mercilessly criticised all aspects of the Iraqi leadership. Of the 15 articles 
he wrote, 13 dealt with the negative aspects of the life under Saddam and his 
government. The other two dealt with his frustration with not being able to watch a 
cricket match, and his final departure from the city – both reports are quite neutral in 
terms of the story frame. When Schoonakker's views were removed from the equation 
(Figure 30, p. 142), the Sunday Times produced an image somewhat similar to that of 
The Star (Figure 32, p.143), albeit without the emphasis on Hero – Bush.  
 
7.2.3.4  A comparison of newspapers 
In a multi-cultural society such as South Africa it is reasonable to wonder whether the 
frames presented by each newspaper might not in some way be connected to its 
historical and cultural background.  
 
Sunday Times was first published in 1906 Sir Abe Bailey (Times Media Limited, 1998; 
IMC, 2004). Before 1994 the English newspaper market was dominated by Anglo 
American Corporation, which controlled both Times Media Limited and Argus 
Newspapers – not because of its investment value, but because owner Harry 
Oppenheimer accumulated newspaper shares in the 1970s to prevent Louis Luyt from 
acquiring the newspapers on behalf of the National Party (Business Times, 1996). In 
1996, Anglo American's Omni Media Corporation sold TML, now known as Johnnic 
Publishing, to the National Empowerment Consortium, a coalition of black interest 
groups (IMC, 2004).   
 
Rapport was at the time of the study the only Afrikaans Sunday newspaper in South 
Africa and belongs to the Naspers group (Rapport, 2000). The newspaper was founded 
in 1970 when the Nasionale Pers-owned Sunday newspaper Die Beeld merged with the 
two Perskor Sunday newspapers Dagbreek and Landstem. Rapport was owned on a 
50/50 basis by Nasionale Pers and Perskor. In 1998 Caxton took over Perskor and with 
it, the company's 50 % share in Rapport. In 1999 Naspers bought out the Caxton share 
to become the sole owner of the newspaper, which together with Naspers's other Sunday 
publications, City Press, Sunday Sun and Sondag are published by RCP Media, a fully 
owned subsidiary of Media24.  
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The Star was first published on 6 January 1871 as The Eastern Star and was 
instrumental to the outbreak of the South African War of 1899 to 1902 due to its 
affiliation to Cecil John Rhodes and Barney Barnato, who were the majority 
shareholders in the press company that owned at least six newspapers across the 
country, including The Cape Times, The Cape Argus, and The Star (Staley, 1935; 
Marks, 2003; Smith, 1996:215). Tony O'Reilly, owner of Independent Newspapers and 
Media of Ireland, bought the Argus Newspapers in 1994 from the Anglo American 
Corporation subsidiary Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company (JCI), which 
was founded by Barney Barnato in 1889 (Brink, 2002). Because of this acquisition, the 
one of the biggest newspaper publishing companies on the African continent, now 
called Independent Newspapers, has its headquarters in Dublin, Ireland (Naughton, 
n.d.). Publishing 15 daily and weekly newspapers, Independent Newspapers in South 
Africa had a 60% share of English language newspaper readership and 64% of 
metropolitan newspaper readership at the time that Gulf War II took place (Caslon 
Analytics, 2003). 
 
The original mission of Die Burger, established in 1915, was to serve as the official 
mouthpiece of the National Party in the Cape Province, which was founded in the 
previous year (Naspers, 2006; South African History Online. n.d.). Today, Die Burger 
is completely independent of any political party (Scholtz, 2007: personal 
communication).  In 2000, Naspers consolidated all its printing concerns under the 
Media24 banner, which currently publishes more than 50 newspapers countrywide, 
which includes five daily and four Sunday newspapers, as well as 71 magazines 
(Media24 Magazines, 2007). The company dominates the South African book 
publishing market, and other divisions within Naspers also has ownership in pay-
television, internet, telecommunications and educational concerns both locally and 
globally (IMC, 2004). It is therefore surprising, considering the size of the media group, 
that the company preferred not to send any reporters to Iraq during Gulf War II, but 
rather relied on agency reports (Harber, 2003). Despite the obvious advantages of 
having an own reporter on the spot, who knew the audience's preferences, the 
organisation regarded the investment in terms of resources required to send a reporter to 
the war zone as too high (Jeffries, quoted by Harber, 2003). 
 
Judging from Figure 31 (p.142), there was very little correlation between the language 
groups the newspapers represented, and the positions they held during Gulf War II. In 
fact, the greatest similarity existed between the English and the Afrikaans dailies, 
namely The Star and Die Burger.  The greatest dissimilarity in the expressed views was 
apparent between the two Afrikaans newspapers, Die Burger and Rapport. In terms of 
Propp's model Die Burger told a very simple story about two bad leaders with bad 
governments who were at war with one another, but the less savoury of the two was 
more powerful than the other. Rapport's story according to Propp's model was even 
simpler: There once was a very powerful hero who went to war against an awful villain. 
The end. 
 
It was possible to strongly identify the presence of story elements in the public 
engagements by the selected US officials, and that a strong coherent "fairytale" emerged 
when their appearances were analysed separately as well as when they were considered 
as a single unit, namely the US government. Although the main story elements were 
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picked up by the different news agencies, the agencies presented a surprisingly uniform 
story of the US being very wrong, though very strong. The hegemony of the USA and 
the misdeeds of Saddam both received a lot of attention, but varied from one 
organisation to the next.  
 
This was also true for the total war coverage by the different newspapers. They too 
generally focused on the same three aspects that were present in the agency reports, 
namely Hero – USA, Villain – Bush/USA, and Villain – Saddam/Iraq. However, the 
way these three elements were framed differed vastly from one newspaper to the next, 
with no apparent correlation between the newspapers' cultural and ideological 
background and the ultimate coverage of the war.   
 
7.3 Discussion 
There are undoubtedly many ways to approach a study such as this.  
 
One way would be to base a study on an existing paradigm, for example the systems 
approach, which essentially promotes a view that every aspect of society attempts to 
reach a state of equilibrium (De Beer, 2003:9-11). Next, according to De Beer (2003:9) 
a particular theory, embedded in the paradigm, must be selected in order to "improv[e] 
our understanding of the process of mass communication", for example the functionalist 
approach to mass communication, as explained by Laswell (1948) and Wright (1960). 
Within this chosen paradigm and theory, a communication model would be a simplified 
reflection of reality (De Beer, 2003:10). Examples of models are gatekeeping, 
agendasetting and framing.  
 
However, this approach is applicable to purely qualitative studies, where "one brings to 
the research process a certain world and life view", and not to the scientific method 
which strives for objectivity (De Beer, 2003:10).  
 
Conversely, the study could have been approached from a purely quantitative 
perspective, such as the study on pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom coverage done by Park 
et al. (2004), who refer to Kracauer's (1993) definition of content analysis as "a 
qualitatively oriented methodology used to characterize and compare documents 
through standardized measurements and metrically defined units" (Kracauer, quoted by 
Park et al., 2004:5).  
 
Yet, as Park et al. rightfully note, this manner of content analysis can be criticised for its 
inability to reflect the "broader context within which media content is created" (2004:6). 
Moreover, counting sources or headlines or column-centimetres cannot portray the 
context or slant of news reports.  
 
This might have been rectified by counting idea elements, as was done by Archetti 
(2007). But again, counting words does not provide for the "feel" of a report: too often, 
reports seem "neutral" in terms of language use and stated facts, but do in fact reflect an 
uncritical support of a certain point of view. The "meaning" of the reports disappears. 
 
For example: In a report on US commander in Iraq General Tommy Franks's first public 
address since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Rapport (2003:2) quoted him saying 
 150
that the assault will be "characterised by shock, by surprise, by flexibility and by the 
employment of precise munitions on a scale never before seen, and by the application of 
overwhelming force". He was also quoted as saying that the campaign was especially 
designed to protect civilians. It is a fairly straight-forward report on an important US 
official's view of the war. 
 
The "feel" or "meaning" of the report is that the US military is very powerful and 
"good" in the sense that they would do anything to protect Iraqi civilians: the US 
military is the hero. Interestingly, the report failed to mention references made by 
Franks to civilians who were in fact killed and maimed by the US assault, despite the 
carefully crafted war plan (Associated Press, 2003b). Such a reference would have cast 
the US military in a more negative light.  
 
To allow for this "feel" or "meaning", the present study was done in line with the global 
news flow study led by Sreberny-Mohammadi in 1985, who recognised that validity, 
obtained through qualitative content analysis, "is often at the opposite pole" from 
reliability, obtained through quantitative content analysis (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 
1985:11). 
 
The present study sought to analyse news content objectively while still providing for 
context and meaning, which is normally lost in purely quantitative studies (Sreberny-
Mohammadi, 1985:11). Consequently, a combination of the two approaches was 
followed for the analysis of news reports on Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
With this in mind, reports published in The Star, Die Burger, Sunday Times and 
Rapport, as well as transcripts of public speeches and press briefings by Bush, 
Fleischer, Rumsfeld and Clarke were categorised according to the story frame on the 
basis of a qualitative evaluation of the content. This categorisation made it possible to 
enumerate the content of the reports for a quantitative analysis. Thus being quantified, 
variations in the content of the news reports could be observed. 
 
This combined approach to content analysis showed that for its coverage of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, Rapport, The Star and Die Burger relied heavily on news agency 
reports, which were augmented with opinion pieces and commentary by experts. A 
small number of interviews with local personalities were also included. Few of the 
Sunday Times reports came from news agencies, as the newspaper rather published 
Bonny Schoonakker's personal accounts of his experiences in Iraq.  
 
News agency reports were mostly based on American sources, such as government 
spokespeople, military commanders, soldiers, US analysts and several humanitarian 
organisations like the Red Cross. Few Iraqi sources were consulted and although a small 
number of the reports referred to Al Jazeera, they were by far the minority. If the 
newspapers' aim was to give a balanced view of the conflict, it would have been 
sensible to at least consult sources of a similar number and status from both sides of the 
conflict.  
 
The agendas of both Sunday Times and Rapport showed a strong anti-Saddam slant, but 
there was a huge discrepancy between their portrayals of the USA: Rapport revealed a 
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significant pro-USA orientation while Sunday Times disclosed a comparably strong 
anti-USA leaning. Judging by the number of news agency reports used by Rapport, this 
might seem as if the differences originated from the news agency reports. This is not 
true, however. The Star and Die Burger used reports from the same news agencies as 
Rapport, yet the two dailies both followed an anti-Bush/USA line. Rapport's orientation 
apparently did not stem from reports that trickled down past the news agencies' 
gatekeepers. 
 
Following the channel of news flow back through the agencies to sources in the White 
House and Pentagon, it became clear that the US government had touted itself as a hero 
that had to slay the villainous Saddam in order to liberate the Iraqis and to save the 
American people from Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Rapport largely held this 
same view despite the fact that news agency reports in general held a strong anti-
Bush/US view. It must therefore be inferred that Rapport used the agency material in a 
manner as to serve an internal agenda.  
 
If, according to McCombs (1999, 2000), the agenda is a product of gatekeeping 
decisions over time, this must mean that the gatekeepers within Rapport operate very 
differently from those of Sunday Times.  
 
The knee-jerk reaction would be to attribute it to the historical and cultural differences 
between the two newspapers, but when Rapport is compared to Die Burger, which is 
also an Afrikaans language newspaper and belongs to the same media group, there is a 
similar discrepancy.  
 
Like Rapport, Die Burger emphasised the role of the USA as the hero, mostly focussing 
on how powerful it is, but unlike Rapport, the strongest line of thought in Die Burger 
was one of disagreement with Bush and the American policies.  
 
The force behind Rapport's news agenda resides in one person, namely Z.B. du Toit, 
just like Die Burger's international news agenda is determined by Deputy Editor 
Leopold Scholtz. (Scholtz, 2007: personal communication). According to Scholtz, 
political expertise in these newspapers is "gossamer thin", resulting in the particularly 
strong effect of a single person on the gatekeeping process. 
 
This is obviously a deficiency in South African journalism that needs to be addressed by 
journalism schools which should make the training of expert political reporters a 
priority. 
 
Coverage by the two English newspapers The Star and Sunday Times were similar in 
that both promoted a critical view of Bush and his government – as did the Afrikaans 
Die Burger – while Sunday Times put emphasis on the Iraqi government's negative 
aspects. Coverage by Die Burger and The Star, the two daily newspapers, were very 
similar.  
 
By studying transcripts of public addresses and press briefings by Bush, Fleischer, 
Rumsfeld and Clarke, it was easy to recognise numerous elements identified by Propp 
(1968) in his analysis of a hundred Russian fairytales (Figure 29, p.141).  
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All four officials consistently hyped Saddam's villainous nature as the biggest issue, but 
while Bush, Rumsfeld and Clarke emphasised the plight of the Iraqi people as the real 
problem, Fleischer repeatedly stressed weapons of mass destruction and the danger 
thereof to the American people. Speculation about the reasons behind his somewhat 
divergent take on the reasons for going to war with Iraq is beyond the scope of this 
study, but it must be noted that logically, Fleischer's view offered the best justification 
for engaging another sovereign government in combat.   
 
The first and second level agendas as defined by McCombs (1999) were easily 
distinguishable by using a story frame based on Propp's fairytale analysis: The "objects" 
that were addressed by the newspapers, news agencies and US government officials 
were largely the same: the USA, its president, government, military and its people; Iraq, 
its president, government, military and citizens, and the reasons for going to war. The 
second level of agendasetting according to McCombs, the properties or characteristics 
of each of the above, were just as easily distinguishable, as is discussed previously.  
 
This study showed that despite numerous theoretical models that may prove or disprove 
gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing as elements of the process of news flow, news 
content in itself is an extremely dynamic force. Because of the infinite number of 
variables impacting on news flow and the selection and presentation of news, the 
eventual agendas that had emerged from content of the studied news reports could not 
be predicted on the basis of gatekeeping.  
 
The framing model that was used offered a surprisingly versatile tool to monitor not 
only framing, but also first and second level agendas. 
 
7.4 Summary 
In this chapter, an attempt was made to find an answer to the question of where reports 
on Gulf War II that were published by four leading South African newspapers 
originated, what the content of the reports was and whether and to what extent the South 
African reports mirrored the sources' point of view. For the latter purpose, transcripts of 
public speeches and press briefings of four prominent US government officials, namely 
Bush, Fleischer, Rumsfeld and Clarke, were analysed. The classical news models of 
gatekeeping, agendasetting and framing were used in the analyses, together with a story 
frame that served as a yardstick against which to measure the content of the reports. 
 
The analyses indicated that although much of the coverage came from US sources, the 
reports generally did not mirror the US point of view. Neither the frequency (daily or 
weekly) of the newspapers, nor its language (English or Afrikaans) showed any with the 
way the war was depicted by the different newspapers.  
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
In the final chapter, a few concluding remarks will be made, together with suggestions 
for further studies that may flow from the present one. Recommendations will also be 
made to how the news media might approach similar international events in future. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and recommendations  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the answers to the initial research questions will be summarised, the 
implications of the study in terms of professional practice will be discussed, and 
recommendations will be made for further study. The chapter will be concluded with 
final remarks. 
 
8.2  Concluding answers to research questions  
The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that the novel media policies 
implemented by the US during Gulf War II had resulted in pro-American coverage by 
South African newspapers. To achieve this aim, research questions were posed in 
Chapter 1.3. In terms of these questions, the following conclusions can be made: 
 
• War reporting is one of the earliest forms of news and the genre was instrumental 
to the development of the mass media, as merchants needed information about 
wars in regions they traded with or their wares had to pass through. Initially in the 
US, war correspondents were soldiers who sent letters notices about the hostilities 
to newspapers, but they were replaced by reporters employed by the press.  
• The relationship between the US and the media showed a definite oscillating 
pattern during wars prior to Gulf War II. These oscillations correspond with the 
slant of the war coverage, which in turn affected the US media policies. The 
general pattern that emerged was that when reporters operated outside the 
military's sphere of control, coverage of the wars cast the military in a negative 
light. This antagonises the US officialdom (government and military) and leads to 
a change in policy, restricting the media. Restrictive measures in turn alienate the 
media. New conflicts bring a reconsideration of media policies, which may result 
in an improvement of the relationship between the two institutions. This was the 
case in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which showed a distinct change in the media's 
reaction to the military, yet although the media's opinion was divided, the 
relationship with the military still followed the line of "positive coverage equals 
positive relations; negative coverage equals negative relations". 
• Most of the news reports published in South Africa originated from US sources – 
hardly any Iraqi officials, officers or experts were consulted. South African 
newspapers greatly relied on news agency reports, except for the Sunday Times, 
which sent their own correspondent to Iraq. Coverage by Bonny Schoonakker 
greatly influenced the slant of the Sunday Times' coverage. The newspapers 
augmented their war coverage with reports compiled from various sources, 
including other media, as well as the views of local experts. 
• The analysis of the transcripts of US government officials' speeches and news 
briefings shows that most of the fairytale elements identified for the story frame 
were present. By far the most salient element is the depiction of Saddam as the 
villain and the Iraqi people as the victims. This was not reflected in news agency 
reports, which overwhelmingly focused on Bush as the villain. The pattern varied 
in the South African newspapers: both The Star and Die Burger were critical of 
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Bush, while Sunday Times and Rapport were most critical of Saddam and/or Iraq. 
When Schoonakker's reports are removed from the Sunday Times, this newspaper 
was also most critical of Bush. 
• There was clearly no distinction between the content and orientation of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom reports printed in Afrikaans and English newspapers. In fact, the 
closest resemblance in news agenda is between The Star and Die Burger.  
• The daily newspapers The Star and Die Burger presented a similar profile in 
terms of content and orientation, which differed from that of the Sunday 
newspapers Sunday Times and Rapport. 
• In terms of agendasetting, the war itself represented the first level, with the 
attributes assigned to the two leaders mostly constituting the second level. 
According to the US officials, Saddam was treacherous, cruel and a menace that 
had to be eliminated. The US represented leadership, heroism and an 
incontrovertible right to act as global policeman. All the news agencies promoted 
an agenda that was very critical of the US, but the newspaper agendas were 
divergent. The Rapport agenda emphasised the power of the US, while the 
Sunday Times focused on criticism of Saddam and the Iraqi government. 
However, when Schoonakker's reports are removed from the Sunday Times 
coverage, this newspaper's agenda corresponds to that of The Star and Die 
Burger, which portrayed the US as powerful, but abusing its power. The Star 
barely mentioned Saddam's misdeeds, while Die Burger was much more balanced 
in its criticism of both Bush and Saddam. 
 
While it was expected that this study would show that the US message about the war in 
Iraq had largely found its way to South African newspapers, resulting in coverage 
leaning towards the American government's point of view, the news analyses 
indisputably showed that this was not the case. Even Rapport, which followed the most 
pro-American line of all the newspapers, arrived at their conclusion on its own and not 
because of the information that flowed to the newspaper from predominantly US 
sources and through various nodes of gatekeeping. 
 
The conventional view of the theories of news flow and multiple gatekeeping create the 
expectation that the reports that were ultimately published by the South African 
newspapers would at least be a semblance of the way the sources presented the 
situation. According to the Propp based story frame the US officials strongly depicted 
the war as a fairytale, with either Bush or the US military as the heroes, but this version 
of the "story" did not reach the South African readership. Generally, Bush was at best 
portrayed as an anti-hero – a strong man with probably good intentions, but with a 
severely flawed take on reality. At worst, he was depicted as the villain of the story. 
Frankly, there is little evidence of the war being presented by South African newspapers 
as "a Hollywood action movie or a kid’s video game" (Knightley, 2007). 
 
This shows that gatekeeping, especially multiple gatekeeping, is not a linear process, 
where bundles of information that survive the impact of the gatekeepers flow from 
source to audience without serious integral changes. What transpired, was that while the 
basic content of message, the "who, what, where, when, why and how", might have 
survived throughout the news flow channel, the orientation, or "so what", could change 
at every gate, and often did. It would be interesting to examine this phenomenon by 
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tracing specific news items from source to its publication in various newspapers, and 
note the way the message changes along the way. 
 
8.3 Recommendations 
The story frame designed in this study proved to be a versatile tool for content analysis 
as well as an indicator of changes in the news flow process. To test the validity of the 
frame, the same analyses should be done using multiple coders and also a wider range 
of media. It might further be interesting to test the frame in coverage of the war in Iraq 
after the studied period to see whether the trends continued. It would also be expedient 
to test this frame in other situations of conflict. One that comes to mind is the perpetual 
hostility between Israel and the Palestinians, or locally, to analyse coverage of the 
building tension between the ANC and the South African Communist Party. Because of 
similarities between this study and the research programme undertaken by Robinson et 
al. (2006) – who is collaborating with Professor Steven Livingston from the George 
Washington University in the US – co-operation may be sought on an international 
level.  
 
8.4 Final remarks 
If this study proves anything, it is that newspapers are like living organisms with their 
own choices, preferences and views of the world. No newspaper that takes any pride in 
what it stands for, would allow itself to be force-fed with information from any source.  
 
Each one of the newspapers that were studied presented the material in its own 
individualistic way. In the final analysis, the local media's ability to remain independent 
in thought and report – despite the concerted effort by the US government to manage 
the flow and content of reports about the war in Iraq to international audiences by acting 
as source, gatekeepers, agendasetters and framers of news content – is exemplary. Of 
course there are a multitude of external forces that exert pressure on the newspapers, but 
in a relatively small media community like South Africa, forces impacting on news 
coverage are fairly homogenous for all the publications: the media all function under the 
same laws, advertisers are similar and even if the target markets may be somewhat 
different in terms of language preference and culture, it had no impact on the way that 
the war was covered.  
 
On a different level, this study managed to prove by quoting directly from the 
Department of Defense policy documents that there was indeed a carefully planned and 
executed strategy by the US government and Pentagon to use the news media as a 
"weapon" in their war against Iraq.  
 
Considering that US sources abounded in reports while few Iraqi sources were quoted in 
any of the newspapers, the US succeeded in its mission to "occupy the media territory". 
However, while the US managed to fill the media space, in South Africa it was not 
filled in the way that the US probably would have preferred.  
 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom there was a rigorous attempt by the US government 
and/or military to get the American story told by the global media. Consciously or 
subconsciously the media – from the reporters on the ground through to editors and 
publishers – must have been aware of the dangers of propaganda from either side of the 
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war and were thus prepared for it. However, the US media strategy in Iraq defied all 
conventional understanding of propaganda as a concept. 
 
This argument is best made by Miller (2004:7):  
 
To say that it is about total propaganda control is to force the English 
language into contortions that the term propaganda simply cannot handle. 
Information dominance is not about the success of propaganda in the 
conventional sense with which we are all familiar. It is not about all those 
phrases "winning hearts and minds", about truth being "the first casualty", 
about "media manipulation", about "opinion control", or about 
"information war". Or, to be more exact - it is about these things, but none 
of them can quite stretch to accommodate the integrated conception of 
media and communication encapsulated in the phrase information 
dominance. 
 
The latter phrase, "information dominance", is key to understand what transpired 
through the US’s "media program" and how news flowed to the world’s media. One can 
safely conclude that "information dominance" by the US – or any other country or 
coalition – is a threat to global press freedom in the 21st century. Yet it is unseen, 
unheard-of and undebated. The gravity of this threat is illustrated by a US Department 
of Defense issue paper (Winters & Giffen, 1997) on information dominance which 
states:  
 
think of dominance in terms of "having our way" - "Overmatch" over all 
operational possibilities ... When dominance occurs, nothing done, makes 
any difference. We have sufficient knowledge to stop anything we don't want 
to occur, or do anything we want to do.  
 
Information dominance is obtained through strategic communication (see Chapter 
5:103; Chapter 7.1:164-167; Figure 25:167), which for the global media – including 
South Africa – means that the US uses both overt and covert organisations to feed 
information supporting the US way of thinking and promoting US interests into the 
international news channel. Of course, this does not end with the news media, but 
includes other media as well, such as the internet (e.g. web logs or "blogs"), Hollywood 
films (e.g. Top Gun, Black Hawk Down, Iron Man and Transformers) and television 
series (e.g. "24" and "CSI"), many of which are created in full co-operation with the 
Pentagon (Alvarez, 2006; Havenstein, 2007; Kosa, 2007; Miles, 2007). 
 
The Defense Science Board (2004b) recommended that strategic communication should 
be subcontracted to  
 
the commercial and academic sectors for a range of products and 
programs that communicate strategic themes and messages to appropriate 
target audiences. ... Examples of products would be a children’s TV series 
(Arabic Sesame Street); video and interactive games; support for the 
distribution and production of selected foreign films; and Web 
communications including blogs, chat rooms, and electronic journals. 
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Programs might include training and exchanging journalists; providing 
support for selected foreign television documentaries; maintaining 
databases of third-party validators and supporters for conferences; and 
designing and implementing country and regional campaigns to support 
themes and messages and delegitimize extremism and terrorism. Note that 
we expect the products to include entertainment. Strategic communication 
products must be embraced as part of daily life for the people with whom 
the United States wants to communicate. One way to do that is to include 
entertainment in the portfolio. It is not possible to capture the attention of 
individuals and achieve credibility in the days, weeks, or even months just 
before a crisis: audience share has to be achieved and sustained years in 
advance.  
 
This is an extremely important point for media managers in South Africa and the rest of 
the international media community to take note of. Without anybody noticing, the 
global community is slowly and purposefully being indoctrinated to "think like 
Americans" in order to support US interests. Purely for the benefit of the US and its 
citizens, the world is being Americanised.  
 
This prompts the question: Is Americanisation a bad thing? 
 
That is a question each news and media institution and each non-American government 
should answer for themselves. One could safely say that if they would prefer to remain 
independent and to maintain a media free from wilful attempts to sway the content of 
their coverage in favour of a foreign regime, a serious attempt should be made to put 
systems in place to consciously monitor the origin and flow of media content for the 
timely detection and countering of any endeavour to dominate the global information 
network. 
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Appendix I.1 Coding schedule 
 
1. Newspaper  
 Sunday Times 
 Rapport 
 The Star 
 Die Burger 
 
2. Date  
 Sunday Times:  23 March to 4 May 2003 
 Rapport:   23 March to 4 May 2003 
 The Star:   21 February to 2 May 2003 
 Die Burger:  21 February to 2 May 2003 
 
3. Headline 
 Full headline 
 
4. Author  
 Name of author plus affiliation where known 
 
5. Own, compiled, agency or unknown 
 Own   O 
 Compiled  C 
 Agency   A 
 Unknown  ? 
 
6. Sources of information 
 e.g.   Bush 
      civilian, military spokesman 
     Red Cross spokesman, Washington Post 
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7. Slant 
 + or – , plus indication of actant: Bush   B 
       USA   US 
       US military  US mil 
       Iraq   I 
       Saddam  S 
       Royal Guard   RG 
 
8. Story element   
 Hero    
 Villain 
 Victim 
 Magic agent 
 Quest 
 Donor 
 Victory 
 
 plus indication of actant (see point 7), e.g. 
 
 Hero B 
 Victim I 
 Magic agent US Mil 
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From: PArnett348@aol.com  
Sent: Thursday, December 01, 2005 1:27 AM 
 
 
New Zealand-born journalist Peter Arnett has more than 40 years experience 
of reporting from 17 war zones globally (PBS, 2003; HWA, 2006). His 
Vietnam reportage earned him a Pulitzer Prize in 1966. In 1991 during Gulf 
War I he reported live from Baghdad, including an interview with President 
Saddam Hussein, for the fledgling Cable News Network company. For this, 
CNN was awarded both the Golden Cable ACE Award and George Foster 
Peabody Award. Arnett returned to Baghdad in 2003 to report on Gulf War 
II, but NBC, MSNBC and National Geographic severed their relationship 
with him after he criticised the US invasion of Iraq in an interview with the 
Iraqi state TV. 
 
Arnett answered the questions (in bold) sent to him via e-mail: 
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Vietnam 
 
Apparently, the relationship between the military and the media initially was quite 
congenial. How were you and the other correspondents treated by the military 
(commanders and troops)? 
 
At the beginning, the media in Vietnam benefited from the congenial relationship 
developed with officials in World War Two and the Korean War. In both those wars US 
media organizations cooperated with the government and the military because both wars 
were seen as "patriotic" and deserving of popular support. Censorship in those wars was 
not challenged by the media. 
  
Also, most of the many hundreds of US reporters who would work in Vietnam had 
earlier served at least two years in the military prior to entering journalism, compulsory 
service being required for all American males in that era. This shared 
experience engendered an easy familiarity between the media and the soldiers at the 
basic level. 
  
It is important to remember that unlike in Iraq where war began with the "shock and 
awe" bombardments of Baghdad, the US basically "slid" into Vietnam over several 
years with actions that were often clandestine. Only by 1962 did America publicly tip 
its hand with the commitment of several thousand military "advisers". These grew in 
number until 1965 when the first of half a million regular ground troops were 
committed to battle and the main war began. The troop numbers began decreasing in 
1969, and by 1973 the last of US ground forces were pulled out, leaving the field back 
to a small number of advisers. The war ended in April 30, 1975, when the last 
US officials were pulled to safety from the roof of the Embassy in Saigon.   
  
Major press coverage of Vietnam began in 1962 when reporters for the AP, UPI, the 
New York Times, the Washington Post, Time and Newsweek magazines, and NBC and 
CBS TV took up residence in Saigon. These dozen or so young reporters dominated the 
coverage of the story for the first two years. Saigon then was a very different city to 
Baghdad today.  Vietnamese urban society was open and hedonistic, a heritage of 100 
years of French colonialism. The South Vietnamese city dwellers, many business-
oriented, were generally supportive of American military initiatives and welcoming to 
foreigners. Many had fled the North when the communist government consolidated its 
power. Many were to flee again after the war, nearly two million of them, to the US and 
other western nations. For the reporters working in Saigon, the exciting environment 
gave them an enjoyable private life in addition to the challenging professional 
requirements. Many married local women and stayed for years. 
 
Would you say that the television coverage of the Tet offensive was solely 
responsible for the military's changed attitude towards the media, as is often 
suggested? 
 
The first conflicts between the media and the US Government came in the "advisory" 
period of the war, from 1962 to mid-1965. But the momentum of these conflicts carried 
over into the bigger war to come and in the disastrous aftermath. At the beginning the 
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Kennedy Administration was anxious to portray success in its policy against the then 
secretive Vietcong guerrillas. But the reporters were discovering that the 
"counterinsurgency" campaign was seriously flawed because of corruption and the 
ineptness of South Vietnamese army. Reflecting the exasperation of the authorities, at a 
press conference in Saigon late in 1962 the then commander of US Forces in the 
Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, demanded that I "get on the team" when I insisted in 
asking challenging questions. This "get on the team" philosophy flowed from the 
military's World War Two experience where everyone, including the reporters, was 
anxious to "get on the team."  This phrase became a frequent challenge to reporters from 
the military as the war widened and worsened. 
  
You might ask why the reporters didn't "get on the team" when to do so would have 
brought approval from and entree into US military and political circles in Vietnam? 
After all, it would also have aligned them with the actions of the reporters who had 
covered America's two previous wars. The answer to that is in the unique attributes the 
reporters took with them to Vietnam. They were the harbingers of a new generation of 
media, much better educated than in the past, and witnesses to important political and 
social changes taking place in the United States. Most had covered the black civil rights 
struggle in the south they had watched American policy falter over Cuba, particularly 
with the abortive "Bay of Pigs" invasion. They had lived through the Senator McCarthy 
"red" scare campaign. They took to Vietnam a great desire to discover the truth about 
American policy effectiveness and to demand accountability of those who were making 
the political and military decisions. They were also taking the craft of reporting to a 
hitherto unreached level of criticism of a nation going to war. 
  
Reaction to such dynamic reporting came quickly. Establishment journalists such as 
Joseph Alsop and Marguerite Higgins ridiculed the Saigon media's "youthfulness and 
inexperience." They and others questioned our patriotism. When a major religious crisis 
threatened to destabilize the US-backed government of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 
1963, President Kennedy unsuccessfully endeavoured to persuade the New York Times 
to reassign their brilliant Saigon reporter David Halberstam back to the US. By mid-
year, however, the reporting from the war theatre and from the political scene in Saigon 
pretty much discredited official claims of optimism. The machinery was set in place for 
a government change that came with a coup d'etat in November. 
  
There are two issues that sometimes emerge from this period. One is that the media 
plotted to deliberately overthrow the Diem Government by exaggerating the 
effectiveness of the Vietcong guerrillas in the field and the Buddhist demonstrators in 
the cities. The other is that the reporters in those early years did not challenge the 
entirety of America's ambitions in Vietnam  but were in fact supportive, challenging  the 
policy only to improve efforts to bring success. The first issue can be dismissed out of 
hand because the media did not champion an alternative leadership.  
 
The second issue has some validity. In those early years the American commitment to 
Vietnam was similar to actions in many post-colonial territories in the world. American 
assistance had helped the survival of an independent South Korea and a democratic 
Philippines, to name just two countries that had benefited. In 1962 through 1964 there 
seemed a chance that the South Vietnamese valued their freedom enough to fight for 
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it, particularly because at that time there was not great clarity about the intentions of the 
communist super powers, the Soviet Union and China. The reporters, and I was one of 
them, believed at that time that an honest aid effort could be an effective winning 
strategy in Vietnam. But neither the South Vietnamese authorities nor the US 
government would be honest about their future actions, or would prove to be capable of 
understanding the nature of the conflict. The media's growing awareness of these 
deficiencies led to the confrontations with the military that grew in fierceness as the war 
continued ... and in fact exist up to today. 
 
Another other issue was their message to management back in the States. Up to the late-
1960s the attitude was, "This is a patriotic war, we're all in this against the commies.  
Our boys are dying." You heard this message echoed about Iraq a few times by Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld. "We've lost a lot of people in Iraq; we're committed a lot to it."  
That's what Robert McNamara said in 1966.  He said, "We've lost a lot of people," to 
justify continuing the war. Rumsfeld has said, "We've lost fifteen hundred Americans.  
We're not going to betray their trust."  He used similar words. Of course Rumsfeld says 
a lot of things to justify his criticized policies. 
 
It's a little like the War on Terrorism today: Officials would say of the media, what are 
you bitching about, this is in our national interest to do what we have to do. Our view as 
journalists was, "Hey that's fine, but you're not doing it right. It's not working."   
     
How did the "Five O'Clock Follies" differ from the press briefings that we see 
today? 
 
The principle is the same; the briefings are a central location for the routine release of 
information relating to the war. However, the Baghdad briefings have not gained the 
notoriety of those given during the Vietnam war, not yet, anyway. 
 
The irreverent name "follies" was partly a reflection of the combativeness of the 
Vietnam press corps. By the time Saigon's daily five o'clock briefings were instituted in 
1965 relations were already bad between the media and US government officials. A 
year-long series of Saigon coup d'etats by competing South Vietnamese military 
officers, along with the rising capabilities of the Vietcong guerrillas, had meant a 
constant flow of bad news back to the public in the United States, resulting in a bunker 
mentality by the American officials in Saigon whose job it was to positively influence 
the reporting. From the beginning in Saigon there was a confrontational cast to the daily 
briefings. 
 
In Baghdad the US media was initially supportive of the war effort, accepting the 
government's assertion that the overthrow of Saddam was a necessary requirement for 
US security. The briefings for the first year or so, then, were basically a clearing-house 
for information supportive of the US effort.  
 
In Vietnam the media had unusually free access to American and South Vietnamese 
military operations. Unlike in earlier conflicts when military censorship was imposed on 
reporters, the US authorities allowed open coverage of the war because the Johnson 
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Administration was reluctant to concede that Vietnam required national mobilization, 
the only circumstance when press censorship could be implemented. 
 
This enabled accredited reporters to cover all aspects of the war, routinely 
accompanying troops into action with a military press ID. I personally wrote more than 
3,000 news stories on the war.                   
  
In Iraq a similar situation exists where reporters working for known news organizations 
are accredited to the US military command. But they must apply to be "embedded" with 
military units and sign an eight-page document that considerably restricts coverage. 
That's one sign of how the working climate has changed from the cautious tolerance of 
the media in the Vietnam years, to outright hostility and suspicion by the military in 
Iraq today. 
                         
The main reason the "five o'clock follies" became a synonym for US government 
deception was that in that pre-internet/cell phone era, the Saigon late afternoon briefing 
was the only occasion each day that the press corps could confront and demand answers 
from the officials running the war, that is the spokespersons from the US military, the 
US Embassy, and the South Vietnamese government. So in one often-explosive hour 
the media could, as it often did, challenge the official picture of the war. The media 
questions were fuelled from the findings of the many reporters who were reporting from 
the battlefields without the restraints of censorship.   These finding were often at 
loggerheads with the official picture. 
 
In Iraq today there is a central clearing house for official information at Baghdad's 
"Green Zone" press center, and regular briefings are held, but the physical environment 
is vastly different from Vietnam. Because of the real war dangers to a media that is 
directly targeted by the insurgents, there is a limited attendance at the Baghdad 
briefings, whereas in Saigon the "five o'clock follies" were a necessary part of a news 
organization's day and were always well attended. Saigon was never as dangerous in its 
worst days as Baghdad routinely is.   
 
In Baghdad media queries are often handled with email and cell phone calls to 
spokespeople at any time of the day or night, necessitated also to some degree by 
today's 24-hour news cycle. This limits the potential for public confrontation between 
the media and US spokespeople. 
 
I mentioned earlier that for the first year or so the Baghdad media was not that inclined 
to challenge the official picture of the war. That began to change with the revelations of 
the Abu Gharib prison abuses last year. The US media has since been much more 
challenging of the official picture, in line with the American public's growing discontent 
with the war.                                                
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Gulf War I 
 
You were allowed to remain in Baghdad after the other correspondents were 
ordered out. What was the reaction of the American military towards you during 
this time?  
 
A lot of those who discussed my coverage of the first Gulf War, of being the only TV 
correspondent in Baghdad during that time, speculate that CNN made a deal with the 
Iraqi government.  I'll try to set the record straight. 
 
CNN had a very smart producer, Robert Wiener, who was sent to Baghdad a few weeks 
after the invasion of Kuwait late in 1990. He, like all producers, sought access.  Some of 
what he did was in the HBO TV movie "Live from Baghdad." Wiener lobbied the Iraqi 
officials involved with the media, and persuaded them to cooperate and allow CNN to 
stay during the war. 
 
One reason was that CNN was the only international television organization in 
existence at that time.  The Iraqis could watch CNN in the foreign ministry and the 
information ministry.  They could see the reports.  So when they had a demonstration in 
the streets opposing American policy, there it was, on CNN.  When they gave an 
interview, it was on CNN.  So they knew the informational potential of the network in 
the propaganda war with the United States. 
 
The Iraqis learned that they could get their viewpoint across on CNN, with their live 
press conferences and interviews with Saddam Hussein.  They became familiar with 
CNN's operations and realized the potential. Peter Jennings of ABC came in to 
interview Saddam as did Dan Rather of CBS, but the Iraqis had no immediate access to 
watch the broadcasts. 
But they could watch CNN's broadcasts on satellite. So they became comfortable with 
it, particularly as they could see that CNN was having an impact internationally on the 
news. 
 
As the war approached, producer Weiner talked the Iraqis authorities into letting us 
stay, and he obtained visas for a dozen or so staffers. It wasn't a matter of money; the 
Iraqis didn't need the money.  They had so much money.  The authorities could clearly 
see that CNN would be a very important opportunity for them to counter American 
commentary.   
 
There were some dollar costs. CNN made a deal to pay for a hard line communication 
link between Baghdad and Amman.  It was part of a military link, and cost $4,000 to 
$5000 a month, but this was in fact much less than normal commercial rates.  The other 
networks didn't even plan anything like this, they were doing their two- minutes-a-day 
reports only. The network news organizations, as was CNN, were primarily covering 
the whole American build-up in the Gulf.   
   
My involvement came when CNN asked me at the beginning of January to cover the 
Baghdad end of the war. I was the CNN correspondent in Jerusalem at the time. The 
CNN team that had earlier agreed to stay in Baghdad had decided to leave.  I initially 
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used a satellite phone to cover the opening days of the war and shipped out video by 
taxi. Within ten days CNN shipped in a video uplink for live coverage, another major 
concession by the Iraqis to the demands of 24-hour news. Our coverage included an 
interview with Saddam Hussein  
 
The official US military reaction was negative to my covering Iraq. The view of 
military spokesmen was that any coverage from the enemy side would hurt the US 
because it would give the Iraqis an opportunity to communicate to the world through a 
credible news organization. The CNN view was that as long as that viewpoint was 
clearly established that it came from the Iraqis, there could be no great harm in it. 
 
After the war several senior US officers told me that they enjoyed the CNN coverage 
because it allowed them a close-up view of their targets, particularly in Baghdad. 
 
To what extent was your coverage censored by the Iraqi government? 
 
As far as censorship was concerned, the Iraqis would not allow me anywhere near any 
military units, something I pointed out regularly in my broadcasts. They did let me visit 
bombing sites in Baghdad and elsewhere in the countryside, and photograph downed 
bridges and civilian casualties. Initially the Iraqis insisted on my submitting written 
accounts of my reports, but later they permitted me to freely comment on live TV about 
what was going on in the war. 
 
The perception was created in and by the media that Saddam Hussein is a brutish 
thug, a demon, a monster, a "miniature Hitler, cut-price Nero", and not exactly 
intelligent. What was your personal impression of him?  
 
Saddam was an ally of the US up to his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and was visited 
regularly by high Washington officials and congressmen. He was invariably friendly 
with visitors when he greeted them in his elaborate palaces and homes. He was equally 
cordial with me when I interviewed him during the war and answered all my questions, 
later posing for pictures with me and sending the prints to my hotel the following day. 
As far as he had to be, Saddam easily played the role of respectable international leader. 
 
Of course, that was the face Saddam revealed to foreigners. With his family, staff and 
Iraqis, however, Saddam played the traditional Arab tribal leader, at times generous to a 
fault to those who pleased him, handing out houses and automobiles to brave soldiers or 
even to the poor when their cases moved him. At other times, Saddam played the thug, 
as his trial in Baghdad is, and will probably continue to, reveal. He saw himself 
embodying Iraq the Nation, and justified brutal repression against the Kurd and the 
Shiite populations who attempted to gain their own political footholds. There is little 
doubt that Saddam created a security/intelligence apparatus that successfully crushed 
any form of political opposition. 
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Why do you think do people still refer to the baby milk factory incident as if you 
did something wrong, even though the CIA itself has admitted that it was indeed 
an infant formula plant? 
 
This story turned out to be one of the most controversial I have ever done, a fact that 
surprises me because it was just routine coverage. 
 
On Day Six of the first Gulf War the Iraqi authorities took me and a camera crew to an 
industrial site west of Baghdad near the Abu Gharib prison. The small signpost at the 
entrance bore a crudely lettered sign "Baby Milk Plant" in English and Arabic. The 
structure beyond was barely recognizable as a building. The sheet aluminium walls and 
roof had been ripped off and scattered across the yard. The steel roof girders were 
twisted and blackened. The machinery underneath was tangled molten pile. 
 
Officials at the scene claimed that this baby milk plant had produced twenty tons of 
milk formula each day, and had been destroyed in US bombing raids the previous 
Sunday and Monday. The officials asserted that President George H. Bush had reneged 
on his promises not to hit civilian targets, and this was proof of American indifference 
to the Iraqi people.  
 
After I reported the story that evening, the White House responded publicly with anger, 
asserting that the plant was a cover for producing biological weapons and that Peter 
Arnett was playing into the hands of the Iraqi Government.  
 
This statement from the White House spokesman was repeated by Republican Party 
senators and the conservative media. There was enormous pressure on CNN to pull me 
out of Baghdad, but the company stood firm. I stayed. 
 
History has clearly shown that the plant was simply producing baby formula. But the 
charges against me tend to stick. 
 
I believe that US officials put enormous pressure on me and CNN because they feared 
that credible reporting would reflect negatively on their war effort. 
 
Gulf War II 
 
The Pentagon is increasingly regarding the media as a strategic tool, or weapon. 
One military study refers to PR advisor John Rendon who said that the media is 
territory to be conquered, and if "we" (the USA) do not do it, "they" (Iraq) will. 
What is your opinion of this move to "conquer" the media? Was the Pentagon 
successful?  
 
There was a lot more official censorship of information, controlling of information, and 
manufacturing of information post-Vietnam, during Gulf One and the Iraq War than 
during Vietnam.  
 
For example, today for a reporter in Iraq or Afghanistan to get embedded with an 
American military unit he has to sign an eight-page closely typed document in which he 
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agrees to have all material looked at and all and pictures approved. It started at one 
page, now it's up to eight. There was no such documentary requirement at any time 
during the Vietnam War. 
 
Of course, much of the news in Iraq today is self evident, particularly the car and other 
suicide bombings that are publicly visible. But overall, the US authorities are in a 
position to control information, particularly reports on troop morale and tactical and 
strategic assessments.   
 
While this system is working to some degree in the US, with news organizations more 
willing to be sympathetic to government policies than they were in the past, the controls 
are failing elsewhere in the world. 
 
In today's media-savvy world, the insurgents have their own cameramen who send 
reports surreptitiously and routinely to Al Jazeera and Al Arabia and other Arab TV 
outlets and viewed by millions. This is a new factor that has emerged to limit the 
Pentagon's efforts to control the flow of information from Iraq. Often these reports end 
up on US TV. 
 
What are the main differences between the stories filed by embedded and non-
embedded reporters? 
 
Non-embedded reporters cover the Iraqi side of the story. They will write about politics, 
tribal and ethnic issues, human interest stories about Iraqis impacted by the war and so 
forth. Main stream news organizations will embed their western reporters to cover the 
US military operations, and use local Iraqis or Arab staff to cover the Iraqi side.  
 
What were the greatest challenges to reporters in Iraq? 
 
By far the greatest problem for reporters is the sheer danger of working in Iraq. Vietnam 
was never as dangerous as the streets of Baghdad. In Saigon life went on, restaurants 
were open and bombs were few. The war was in the countryside. In Iraq the primary 
battlefield of the war is Baghdad itself. 
 
More than 50 journalists have died in Iraq since the war began in March of 2003. In 
Vietnam 64 journalists died during the whole ten year war. I move around Baghdad and 
the countryside discreetly because I don't have the immediate pressure of a deadline. 
But I am well aware that the unexpected could happen, and I could be injured or 
kidnapped.  
 
The task is made tougher by the controversial nature of the conflict, the question of its 
international legality, the WMD and terrorist issues that quickly evaporated only to be 
replaced by concerns about the nature of the new Iraqi government.  
 
Trying each day to track the direction Iraq is heading is an impossible task for the media 
to achieve with the security situation remaining as dangerous as it is, but it is still 
expected to do it. Consequently the Baghdad reporters for the US media have been in 
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the firing line from the political left and the right, just as they have been literally in the 
field.   
 
The physical restraints, the political sensitivity of the coverage in these post 9/11 times, 
means that Iraqi reporting falls short of the ideal, and this is not meant to disparage the 
bravery or the ability of the many reporters based there. I live there myself but I've got 
no allusions that if I were with the mainstream media I'd be doing a better job. 
           
To what do you attribute the flak you have received over the years from not only 
the government and the military, but your colleagues in the media as well?  
 
The recent history of journalism and its confrontational approach to reporting on 
government and military activities often brings controversy because the journalist 
challenges the message put out by the authorities. I think in my comments on my early 
career it was clear that often what I wrote was on a collision course with the picture that 
US officialdom was painting. 
 
As in Vietnam, so too in Central America in the 1980s where the US Government was 
supporting military dictatorships against local rebels. Reporters who drew attention to 
these actions were criticized – particularly when the Reagan Administration was found 
to be secretly supporting the Contra guerrillas against the Sandinista Government in 
Nicaragua. 
 
In the first Gulf War, of course, there was my interview with Saddam Hussein, and the 
Baby Milk Plant story. 
 
Was your contract with NBC terminated because of the company's misgivings 
about The Interview, public pressure, or maybe the fact that NBC is part of the 
GE stable, which is a major supplier to the Department of Defense?  
 
I was in Baghdad at the time of the second Gulf War for National Geographic Explorer, 
a newly-established documentary group that marketed its stories on MSNBC, a cable 
news TV company owned by NBC. I'd done several documentary-style TV stories on 
the Afghanistan war for a satellite TV company and was doing the same in Iraq. 
   
When the war began we were following three Iraqi families in Baghdad, planning to 
document their experiences before, during and after the conflict. I had no intention of 
covering the war on a daily basis, as I had for CNN in the first Gulf War. When the 
NBC news team,  along with CNN, CBS and ABC, left Baghdad when the war started, 
NBC asked me to "help them out" with on-the-spot coverage. I did so initially on a 
limited basis, but as the war progressed I was drawn into coverage and commentary 
around the clock.  
 
While most American journalists left Baghdad, many from other countries remained 
behind. Because of my earlier experience I was often interviewed by news teams in 
Iraq, sometimes four or five interviews each day. Iraqi Government satellite TV asked 
me for an interview about ten days into the war and I complied. I had been interviewed 
on Iraqi TV many times over the 13 years I had been covering that country.  
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The interview was only a few minutes long. In it I suggested that the US military drive 
towards Baghdad was being unexpectedly delayed at Nasariyah where suicide bombers 
and guerrillas were killing American troops. I thought the US might have to rewrite its 
war strategy. I also expressed concern about the possibility of growing Iraqi civilian 
casualties having a negative impact on the US war effort.   
 
The AP picked up the broadcast from its monitoring station in Cairo and wrote a story. 
It was widely used in the US. Initially NBC put out a statement of support saying, 
"Peter Arnett can say what he likes.  We don't feel his interview was that terribly 
outrageous and we're going to stick with him."  I talked with NBC executives and the 
senior vice president said, "We're concerned about one thing, the reaction of Fox News, 
otherwise, you're clear."  
 
It turned out Fox News did a whole hour attacking me; all day they were verbally 
kicking me to pieces. Next evening NBC called me and said, "Look, we're going to 
announce that we're not using you. It's just too hot."  They got 30,000 emails in an hour 
from all their affiliates.  They said, "The problem is not public relations, our affiliates 
don't want to use you. If our affiliates won't use you, they won't use the Today Show, 
it's that serious now."  So I said, "OK," and then I said, "Look, I want to bow out on the 
Today Show," because I felt that I had a pretty good relationship with the network. It 
had really been a bold and exciting ten days. And they said, "What are you going to 
say?" I said, "I'm sorry that this happened."  
When I was waiting to go on the Today Show that morning, the co-host Katie Couric 
was interviewing the wife of a serviceman who had been killed in Nasariya and she was 
crying and saying, "I'm pregnant and I'm going to have a baby in two months, but I 
know my husband died for a great cause." It was just the most soul-wrenching 
interview.  So when the other co-host Matt Lauer came out and said, "I have to 
announce that we're not going to use any of Peter Arnett's material anymore.  He did an 
interview with Iraqi television." It was with that woman's face in my mind that I said, 
"I'm sorry I did it, I'm sorry I made everyone so unhappy." I was ready to apologize.  It 
was easy, it got through and I think it cut back any more controversy.   
 
How do you see the road ahead regarding the relationship between the military 
and the media? The Department of Defense seems very happy with the embedding 
exercise, and will probably repeat it in future conflicts, but were the media equally 
happy with the arrangement, and did they get value for money? 
 
Here are a few points on US journalism today and in the future.  Today's new generation 
of reporters had an enormous amount of journalistic history to consider as they 
developed their careers.  When I was a kid, the war correspondent Ernie Pyle and the 
British reporters who covered World War Two were heroic in my mind because they 
covered a war to save mankind.  Some died doing it, further ennobling them in my 
mind. 
 
Today's new generation of journalists is probably aware of the great World War II 
reporters as journalist icons. But now they have as examples the Morley Safers, the 
David Halberstams, the Dan Rathers, the Sy Hershes and the others important to 
journalism in the past 40 years, all of whom have been controversial for one reason or 
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another. These reporters were primarily products of Vietnam War coverage and later the 
Watergate investigation and its ramifications.   This model challenged government and 
demanded accountability of officials in foreign affairs in particular. The earlier model of 
journalism, the patriotic model, tended to be uncritical and supportive of international 
government policies. 
 
Looking back on my career, I've often thought what it would have been like if I'd been 
15 years younger when I started my career, and may have been  a reporter in World War 
II.  As I looked into the history of World War II, I discovered there were some reporters 
at the AP, for example, and elsewhere, who had problems over their news coverage. 
 
One AP newsman reported the official end of the war twenty-four hours before General 
Eisenhower had arranged to announce it. The reporter was fired and looked upon as 
having betrayed his profession. What did he really do?  He reported the end of the war 
accurately, but twenty-four hours before the authorities had permitted. He was my kind 
of guy. There were other reporters in World War II who had problems, but overall, it 
was seen as a great patriotic war with journalists playing a very supportive role. 
 
This was very different in the wars in Vietnam and Central America that followed over 
the next forty years. The reporters covering those new, smaller wars were aggressive in 
their approach, demanding accountability of the government and the generals fighting 
the war. This was a period of American involvement in wars that many saw as 
questionable, even illegal, activities. 
 
So I don't think it's easy for young journalists today to pick a model.  What model are 
they going to choose? The patriotic model of World War II? The critical model of 
Vietnam?  I sometimes talk to journalism institutions. Students often ask, "Where do I 
go, how do I become a reporter? How can I be like you?"  I don't think I am an adequate 
model. My career is admired by some who feel that it would be great getting out there 
and stirring up controversy.  But I'm sure there are just as many who feel, "What he's 
done, who would we want to be there in his shoes?"   
 
As far as the future for the American media is concerned, advances in technology have 
made information a very big business. Television news programs are more immediate 
and newspapers and magazines more attractive and interesting.  The internet has added 
a whole new dimension to news dissemination by feeding news into personal computers 
and cell phones and other electronic devices.  
 
The American media tended to cover the recent Iraq war in patriotic mode, mainly 
because of the shock of 9/11. But growing public discontent with the war has tended to 
bring the media back to a moderate, more critical course. The Bush Administration has 
tended to be secretive and uncooperative with the media, but with a congressional 
election due later this year the government has been forced to 'fess up to mistakes in 
Iraq and other policies. The future will continue to be confrontational between the 
government and the media. Which I believe is a good, necessary thing. 
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Where do you think the next conflict will be? 
 
The "war on terrorism" is likely to be with us for the foreseeable future. Both Iraq and 
Afghanistan will require the continuing attention of US ground forces. While the US is 
signalling a gradual exodus from Iraq, this is expected to take several years.  
 
President Bush has talked of Iran and North Korea as evil empires, and government 
spokesmen have issued threats, but I don't think the administration is in any position to 
attack either country. At this time any such US action would pre-emptive without much 
international help, and I think America has learned its lesson in Iraq against going to 
war again in this way. 
 
However if Iran continues on a course towards building a nuclear weapon, you can 
expect a more belligerent attitude not only from the US but also from allies in Europe, 
and of course, Israel.  
 
In talking about future conflicts that may involve the US, you need to consider the 
impact of the media, particularly the effect of twenty-four hour TV news. Policy is 
shaped on cable news in a way that it was never shaped during the Vietnam era. In 
Vietnam, I'd write controversial story and it would be two days before there'd be a 
reaction from Washington. Now, the reaction is instant. 
 
A lot of shaping of controversial policy for public consumption is done on cable TV by 
senior government officials or ideologically inclined reporters or commentators.  One 
feeds on the other.  It's often been said, and I think it's true, that 24-hour news speeds up 
decision-making enormously. Whether this is a negative or a positive is open to 
question but I think it's inevitable.  It speeds up reaction and it doesn't always bring the 
correct reaction, but you can't turn back technology. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
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Appendix II.2 Paul Watson 
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From:  Paul.Watson@latimes.com 
Sent:  Tuesday, July 26, 2005 12:14 PM 
 
Canadian Paul Watson is a seasoned journalist with almost 20 years 
experience of international and war reporting (McClelland & Stewart Limited, 
2006). His social and cultural reporting earned him numerous National 
Newspaper awards while working for the Toronto Star. However, it was his 
photograph of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu that won him international acclaim as well as a Pulitzer Prize in 
1994. He currently covers Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as the South 
Asia bureau chief of The Los Angeles Times. 
 
Watson answered the questions (in bold) sent to him via e-mail: 
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According to Mark Bowden of "Black Hawk Down" fame, there weren't any 
American reporters in Mogadishu at the time (to his knowledge). Do you know if 
this is true, and if so, why? 
 
I believe there were not any American reporters there at the time. Reuters evacuated its 
office following the murder of journalists in July 93 as they tried to report on what was 
effectively a massacre of Somali clan and religious leaders by US Apache helicopters, 
which destroyed the house they were meeting in. 
 
When reporters and photographers showed up, an enraged mob killed them. Of course, 
the story became murdered reporters instead of massacred Somalis. AP evacuated its 
office some weeks after July--I can't recall precisely when--because the State 
department put out a warning that it had "credible evidence" of a threat to kidnap 
Americans. AP suffered badly in Beirut, so they ordered their people out. 
 
By September, I was there, along with three Brits, a Greek woman with Agence France 
Presse, and an unknown number of Italians in North Mogadishu, a small zone under a 
different, pro-Italian warlord who wasn't relevant to the events of Oct. 3. 
  
Were there any other reporters on the scene, apart from the Somali stringer who 
shot the video footage? 
 
I was the only foreign reporter on the scene that I photographed. I didn't see any 
colleagues on the street that day. I always worked alone (with locals I trusted and 
worked a long time with), and usually still do. 
  
 
 
Were you and that stringer in fact at the same scene? That is the general 
impression I get from reading various accounts, but Major David B. Stockwell 
(1995) wrote: 
  
Canadian Paul Watson, correspondent for the Toronto Star, took this photograph 
with a pocket camera (he is a print journalist, not a photojournalist) of Somalis 
dragging the body of a dead U.S. soldier in Mogadishu after the Baffle of October 
3, l993. 
 
and then 
  
A Somali stringer had filmed a group of Somalis triumphantly dragging the body 
of an dead American soldier through Mogadishu streets on the morning of 
October 4 and an "interview" with captured American pilot Chief Warrant 
Officer Mike Durant. 
 
I was never with the Somali stringer you mention. I worked with a Somali journalist 
who wrote for a local newspaper printed by mimeograph. 
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Why did you use a pocket camera? 
 
Stockwell is also wrong about the camera. I used a Nikon SLR. I think its called an 
N8008. It's in storage at my home in New Delhi, but I'm in Pakistan now. If you can 
wait until mid-August, I can give you the precise model name. 
  
How did the crowd react to your presence on the scene? In South Africa, during 
our tumultuous past, mobs often turned more violent in the presence of the media, 
posturing for the camera, so to speak. Did you personally feel endangered? 
 
I worked with good fixers in Mogadishu, and had covered the place for a long time 
before Oct., 93, so I and my car were pretty well recognized. That helped, but did not 
guarantee safety. I had two body guards armed with assault rifles (I usually only 
travelled with one) and the fixer was armed that day too. But the whole crew didn't want 
to be on the streets and that it was suicidal. After telling the crowd who I was, they 
agreed to let me photograph and I got out of the car. I took a few frames before others 
arrived and the crowd got angry. My guards pulled me back into the car, but I realized 
the full-body pictures I'd taken were probably unusable because the corpse's green army 
underwear was slightly askew, exposing a bit of his genitals. I jumped out of the car, 
took a few more frames of half the body only, and those were moved by AP, which later 
told me they wouldn't have touched the full-body pictures. I definitely felt endangered, 
but was determined to get photographic proof to report desecration of American bodies. 
I'd reported it before, in September, and the Pentagon denied it. 
  
How did the military react to your photographs? 
 
The military, on various levels, denounced me and the photographs. 
  
Generally speaking, what was the relationship between the military (UN and/or 
US) and the media like in Somalia? According to some accounts, the military 
supported the media in various ways, but according to others, the old resentment 
still remained.  
 
When the foreign press corps got down to around a dozen people, the media was very 
adversarial. The afternoon briefings frequently erupted in shouting matches over the 
latest killing of civilians by U.S.-led forces, for instance. Stockwell was friendly behind 
the scenes, but reporters were angry at the lies and since we moved on our own, taking 
risks just to get back and fort from the daily briefings, I think most of took personal 
offence to being treated as if we were blind and deaf to the reality we lived with outside 
the walls of the U.S. compound every day and night. 
  
 
Were you on the beach outside Mogadishu when the Marines and Seals landed in 
December 1992? If so, what were your impressions of the event? 
 
 I was on the beach the night the US troops landed and I thought it was a circus. I'll 
never forget the SEAL digging into the beach only to be surrounded by reporters, in the 
glare of TV lights, and being asked questions like what his name was, and where he was 
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from--no small humiliation for a Special Forces commando trained for covert missions. 
Of course it was a show put on for media consumption. We were alerted to likely 
landing time well in advance. And since there was a huge contingent of unarmed 
journalists who moved around Mogadishu every day, and the US forces' arrival had 
been discussed with and approved by the main militia leaders, there was no need for a 
dramatic landing in the middle of the night.  
 
But, I'll admit, I'm not a general. So maybe they knew something I didn't. 
 
Thanks for your questions. There is a lot of bad information out there about that day, so 
I appreciate you're checking with someone who was there. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
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Appendix II.3 Martin Savidge 
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From:  martin.savidge@nbcuni.com 
Sent:  Tuesday, January 24, 2006 6:35 AM 
 
 
American journalist Martin Savidge has more that two decades of television 
reporting experience. He has won various awards for his work, including nine 
local Emmy awards, six Associated Press awards, two United Press 
International awards, two Women in Communication awards as well as the 
prestigious Edward R. Murrow award. Working for CNN, he covered the 
American invasion of Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the 
US and became the first television reporter to accompany US troops during 
Operation Anaconda. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Savidge was 
embedded with the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines.  He joined NBC News as 
a correspondent in March 2004 and reports for all the networks of NBC, 
including MSNBC and CNBC. 
 
Savidge answered the questions (in bold) sent to him via e-mail: 
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Afghanistan 
 
In the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, your access to the battlefield 
was practically non-existent. What would you say were the military's real reasons 
for preventing the media from reporting on the goings-on? And looking back, 
would you say that any of those reasons were valid?   
 
The real reasons varied...  
 
First of all remember what kind of military operation Afghanistan was... 
primarily Special Forces working with Afghan "friendly forces". These were not large 
set piece operations. The U-S military has always been reluctant if not down right 
opposed to allowing the media along on such missions. It might compromise the 
operation to have members of the media inserted awkwardly into a small team of 
professionals that have been together in some cases for years. It could be dangerous 
since such missions are risky. And there simply may not be space to add people. Finally 
the U-S would not want to give away how such units operate believing secrecy is part of 
their success.  
 
I think in addition to these logical issues there was still a hesitancy with in the military 
command of allowing the media such close access... these are long standing issues of 
how the media might over emphasize the negative of combat and as a result harm 
morale in the military and on the home front.  
 
What were your biggest frustrations?  
 
The biggest frustration of course was the lack of access. I was living on base at the 
airfield in Khandahar. Those journalists who were with me were not imbedded but even 
so we lived just as the Marines and soldiers did. We were immersed in the daily activity 
on base but not in the operations. We could see helicopters come and go as well as 
witness the transfer of prisoners to aircraft for their journey to the states. (We were 
never allowed to film these up close) Such transfers were often done under the cover of 
darkness at the far end of the airfield. 
 
The military PAO's often had very limited information even when we knew an 
operation was underway. Details were usually released in Pentagon briefings in 
Washington. This was a never ending aggravation. Here we were living under harsh 
conditions while our counter parts stayed at their Washington homes and continually 
scooped us. We had a saying ... "Khandahar. So close and yet so clueless".  
  
The invitation to accompany the troops on their secret mission into the mountains 
must have come as quite a surprise. Can you tell me a little about that?   
 
It began when an officer in Khandahar one day pulled me aside and said, "let's go look 
at the mountains". If you have ever been to that part of Afghanistan you would know 
they are nothing worth looking at, so it was clearly just a ruse to get me outside to talk 
in private away from the other journalists. 
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Once alone he said, "There's going to be a mission" and if I wanted to be on it I could 
tell no one. Not fellow journalists not even my bosses. If I did I would be "out". Of 
course I agreed. I said CNN would have to be told something I couldn't just very well 
vanish without a trace...  he agreed and said my producer who would remain behind 
could notify them that I had gone on a mission, but only after we had departed. 
 
The night before the appointed departure day I had the most difficult task of all... not 
telling my family anything. I knew once I failed to call my wife as I'd managed each 
day, she would become sick with fear... it was heart wrenching.  
 
The initial agreement was I would file no reports or have any contact with them or CNN 
until the mission was completed. Operation Anaconda was to last 48 to 72 hours … 
instead it went on for nearly 2 weeks. Eventually that part of the rules had to change. 
  
Why do you think did the military suddenly decided to allow access to the 
battlefield and more specifically, why were you the chosen one?  
 
I believe because this was "the big one" a real conclusive battle of the war... while its 
decisiveness is open to question it was certainly the biggest battle of the Afghanistan 
campaign. An air brigade assault had not been done since Vietnam. I think it was the 
size of the operation, its presumed success and constant pressure from media outlets for 
access that had the military give in.  
 
They were aware that if an operation of this size were not open to some members of the 
press there would be media complaints. And when it was first revealed on Monday 
morning in a Pentagon briefing there were howls. To which Donald Rumsfeld smiling 
replied they had 6 journalists imbedded as he was speaking. Of course I was one of 
them.  
 
As for why me... I was told because I was one of the few who had toughed it out by 
living on base. All of the 6 had been living in Khandahar for some time. I also 
represented CNN which of course can be seen and is respected round the world. Beyond 
that I'm not sure why I was chosen.  
 
How did the troops and officers react to you during the mission? Did they trust 
you and did they hold your resistance to carrying a gun against you? Did you ever 
during the mission feel the need to be at least close to your gun?  
 
I was originally placed with "Charlie Company" with the 10th Mountain. The Captain 
was very opposed to media presence within his unit. He was quite clear on this. He also 
had no choice. Distrust is always the greatest gap in these circumstances. I had been 
embedded with Australian forces in East Timor during that very violent uprising. So I 
was aware of this divide. The men and women in these units have trained together for 
months ... we, the cameraman and I, drop in over night. That isn't easy. So 
we immediately moved in with the unit, sleeping eating and training with them. This 
eased the situation a great deal. We began to lay the foundation of trust.  
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The weapon became a huge issue ... The argument was by accepting us the unit would 
be down two armed soldiers. To make up for this shortfall and because it was known the 
Taliban did not take prisoners for our safety and the safety of everyone else we had to 
be armed.  
 
This violated everything I knew of journalism.  I argued that and also it was not 
physically possible to carry a rifle along with the necessary TV gear. Then they offered 
an m-9 pistol which I could strap on. I refused again. This threatened to become a "deal 
breaker". Eventually we struck a deal, we would be instructed how to use the weapons 
but would not carry any. The thinking being if it came down to a life and death defence 
we would have basic instruction.  
 
As for being close to a gun ... being imbedded with the military someone carrying a gun 
is always nearby ... my greatest concern on the battlefield in those conditions is 
"friendly fire" – so sometimes you can feel too close. 
 
After being trained to handle a gun, do you think that next time around it would 
be easier for you to carry or even use one? (This question only because I was 
highly amused by your very honest comment to Paula Zahn that "if it really comes 
down to Marty armed with a pistol saving the day, things are pretty grim". While 
this is true for all of us ordinary folk, few would admit it!)   
 
Not in my case. I have the greatest respect for guns and the greatest fear. I have too 
often seen what they can do. I don't like them personally so I am just as opposed now to 
carrying one as a journalist as I have ever been.   
 
During the mission, did you ever feel that things were kept from you, or that you 
were in any way being manipulated to create a specific perception of the war, or at 
least Operation Anaconda?  
 
No and yes. I found the access to Operation Anaconda to be extraordinary... in fact it 
was stunning. We were not only allowed to sit in on intelligence reporting and mission 
planning meetings but we were also allowed to film them. This was top down driven 
access, allowed because the agreement was not a single report would be made until the 
mission's completion.  
 
Regarding manipulation, of course the purpose of the government in allowing media 
access was to show and witness an anticipated outstanding America success to be 
transmitted to the American people and the world. I do not believe such access would 
have been given if the US military had any doubts about the outcome of the operation. 
No one knowingly invites spectators to their own disaster.  
  
How did your inclusion in the mission affect the way the rest of the media was 
accommodated afterwards? In other words: were you used as a guinea pig, and did 
this successful experiment result in better access for your colleagues?   
 
I do believe media inclusion during Operation Anaconda became a model for 
embedding of journalists in the war in Iraq. And from the stand-point of the U-S 
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military they must have been pleased with the initial outcome from the Afghan 
experiment. From 6 journalists the number was expanded to well over 600 by the time 
the ground war began in Iraq. As I joked the media was no longer imbedded instead, 
there were so many journalists it was more as though soldiers were embedded with the 
media.  
 
Iraq 
 
What would you say caused the military's radical change in policy about access to 
the media?  
 
I think it was understood that images transmitted from the battlefield of U-S forces in 
action would send a very powerful message to the Iraqi leadership as well as other 
potential U-S foes. In addition I do believe the Pentagon had concerns that Saddam 
might use his own troops dressed in American uniforms to commit atrocities and blame 
them on the United States as part of a propaganda campaign. Media presence with all U-
S forces could be used to discredit any such claims. 
 
I also believe like Anaconda the US had no doubt of success so why not let 
everyone see the result. At this point regardless of the self promotion aspect of the US 
government's decision I believe it was a very bold and laudable action. There are very 
few militaries in the world that would have made such allowances in the face of real 
combat. Everyone knows war is not pretty. I think the Pentagon believed that the 
dedication and good of the American soldier would come through more vividly then the 
horrible images of combat. In the beginning I believe they were right. At least to a home 
front audience. I hope the embed practice will continue. 
  
What did it take to win the trust of the unit that you were embedded with?  
 
Again trust is earned only over time. As you live an expose yourself to the same 
conditions and dangers as the troops you eventually begin to earn their trust ... assuming 
you don't do anything stupid to jeopardize the unit. Talk with the officers and 
the soldiers or Marines.  
 
As an embedded reporter, was there ever a situation where you really felt morally 
torn between loyalty towards your adoptive unit, and your professional duty as a 
reporter? If so, how did you deal with it, and how did your unit react to it?  
 
Every day. It is not possible to live and face danger with a unit and not developed a 
deep personal connection with those who are a part of it. Under those circumstances it is 
extremely difficult if not impossible to maintain the objectivity a journalist normally 
tries to have. I struggled with this every single day and I know I did not always succeed. 
That is part of the reason I believe that embedded journalism by a news organization 
must be done in conjunction with independent reporting whenever possible. I would try 
to carefully monitor my words and reports to guard against bias but it's damn difficult.  
 
There was a specific incident regarding the questionable shooting deaths of two armed 
Iraqi's which we filmed. We transmitted the material back to CNN in Atlanta cautioning 
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about the graphic nature and circumstances of the deaths. For reasons I do not know  
CNN did not transmit those images at that time, but did use them months later as the 
subject of an hour long documentary.  
 
Would you have agreed to be embedded with Iraqi forces and if so, do you think 
your attitude towards those soldiers would have differed?  
 
No. Not specifically with the Iraqi forces. I would have had my doubts regarding 
personal safety or the intentions of the Iraqi government to allow access while not 
intentionally and overtly using my presence for strategic gain. I also would have serious 
concern for my well being, knowing the training and weaponry the United States was 
capable of using. Your survival chances would have been very low.  
 
That is not to say there would never be an instance when I would agree to being 
embedded with an opposing force. I did this in East Timor for a time living under the 
shelter and protection of Indonesian forces. The TNI was suspected of actually abetting 
and taking part with the militias ravaging the island... this arrangement lasted for just 
over 24-hours until our lives were threatened and we were forced to flee. 
 
How does being shot at affect one's objectivity/bias/sense of fairness? Does it 
influence your perception of, and reporting on, the "others"?  
 
This may sound weird, but for me it did not alter my feelings or turn me against the 
others. Perhaps because I had been reporting for many years prior to this embed. Maybe 
also because by that time being shot at was not a new experience. Objectivity has been 
strongly imbedded in my practices as a journalist. I also understood that in conflict that 
is their "job". It is a consequence of war and I had purposefully chosen to put myself in 
the position of danger. So in times of fear... I often just cursed my own foolishness. 
 
Did the troops in your unit ever discuss the reasons for the war, and if so, what 
were their opinions?  
 
Very seldom. Most were simply concerned with the task or the day or the object at 
hand. The broader geopolitical issues rarely were discussed. For them it didn't matter 
but most felt they had a duty to do and were proud to be a part of the fight.   
 
On March 22, 2003 you described how Safwan Hill was hit with napalm. Did the 
military react to this report in any way?  
 
The U-S military denied that napalm was used. The Pentagon says it does not have 
"napalm" in its arsenal.  
 
To what extent were you 'kept in line' by your unit? Did you at times get the 
feeling that you were expected to act as a 'cheerleader'?  
 
No. There was never any time I was told or pressured to report anything other than what 
I saw or experienced by members of the unit or commanders or officers. 
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What would you say were the strengths and weaknesses of the practise of 
embedding?  
 
The strengths of course are access to US forces and the battlefield that is rarely possible 
unilaterally covering a conflict. The downfall can be as I mentioned above the natural 
allegiance a journalist might feel to members of the unit which he or she is embedded 
with and how this could compromise objective reporting.  
 
There is always the ability of the military to deny access at a moments notice or in 
retribution to a report the US might onside unfavourable. There is the possibility that 
any protection offered by the military would be withdrawn if they didn't like your 
reporting ... In other words the soldiers could look the other way rather than run to assist 
you. I never experienced this with US forces ... but it could be a possibility in any 
conflict.   
 
On several occasions at the outset of the war I was restricted or prevented from 
reporting over concerns the device or means of communicating my reports might give 
the unit's position away or expose it to attack. This was a great frustration though 
understandable concern. After all it's my butt that's on the line as well and I am not fond 
of risking it any more than I have to... but I was aware that the Army was allowing its 
embedded journalists to file while the Marines who I was with said I could not. This 
was eventually resolved. 
 
Apart from the protection offered by the military, would you say that embedded 
reporters had an advantage over unilaterals in terms of the story they were able to 
tell?  
 
Access, access, access. Often the images are much closer to the action and I can 
question the US forces involved. In addition many logistical issues are taken care off, 
such as food, housing and transportation.  
 
Generally, how do you feel about the military's attitude towards the media, and 
vice versa?   
 
I think outside the embed process there is a background level of distrust, which is 
healthy. But that distrust often fades in the heat of battle in the close confines of far off 
places where lives and not professions often count more.  
 
When one Googles "Martin Savidge", you are inundated with hits referring to an 
incident where you reportedly offered your satellite phone to four troops, who 
chose to use it to phone the parents of a fallen comrade. Did this happen, and if so, 
what is the real story?   
 
No. The specific story was written as a transcript of an actual live report I supposedly 
did. There was never any such incident nor would I have made report out of such a 
thing. However, every day we would make our satellite phones available to soldiers to 
use to call home. Who got to speak when was a decision process we left up to sergeants 
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or officers. We did not listen in ... and would immediately make a phone available for 
hardship or emergency needs. Many journalists did this.  
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
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Appendix II.4 Robert Fisk 
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British journalist Robert Fisk is a veteran foreign correspondent with more 
than 30 years experience reporting from the Middle East (University of 
Adelaide, 2005; Lannan Foundation, 2007). He is Britain's most highly 
decorated international journalist, having received 28 British and foreign 
press awards, including two Amnesty International UK Press Awards and 
seven "British International Journalist of the Year" awards. Based in Beirut 
since 1976, he is a correspondent for The Independent newspaper in 
London, writing about troubled regions such as Ireland, Lebanon, Bosnia, 
and Iraq.  He holds a doctorate in Political Science, as well as honorary 
doctorates from University of Lancaster, England, and the American 
University of Beirut, Lebanon. 
 
Fisk answered the questions (in bold) during a telephone interview on 
Wednesday 23 March 2006: 
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What was the attitude of the military (soldiers as well as officers) towards the 
media in general, and to you in particular, during the war in Kosovo? 
 
I was is in Serbia and Kosovo throughout that war, for virtually all if it, and therefore 
my contact with the British and Americans was very little – I mean, the contact would 
be bombed by them fairly regularly, like all day and all night. And so I was very much 
writing about the consequences of what NATO was doing, which was what I intended 
to. That's what my editor wanted me to be doing. We had people with the military – I 
wasn't one of them.  
 
But I didn't have any problems with the Brits. I hardly talked to them. When they were 
coming into Kosovo there was a ceasefire between the Yugoslav army and NATO and I 
left the Yugoslav army to the sound of the very first British paratroopers with 
helicopters over them physically marching down the road towards Pristina from all over 
Albania. I captured that moment for The Independent, the whole story about the very 
first British soldier walking down the road to Pristina. What we had there in fact was a 
situation in which he was so excited and that was it.  
 
Afterwards once they got into Pristina there was a shooting of a Serb policeman. I found 
at once the same old situation applied that journalists would go along with what the 
British wanted. I remember that an officer came down and said "A Serb policeman had 
been shot. He'd endangered the lives of British paratroopers". This was the First 
Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, who were known in Northern Ireland for being 
pretty brutal. I was covering Northern Ireland, so I knew this regiment pretty well from 
far away.  
 
The situation was that a sergeant said "No more questions!", and the cameras 
immediately went down and all the journalists started leaving immediately. And I said 
"Why no questions? What have you got to hide? Why no questions? Had he been 
armed? How many shots were fired?" And the cameras just went up again and the 
officer was forced to continue talking. But there was a classic example. The journalists 
were prepared to lower their cameras when told "no more questions". Our job is to ask 
questions - not accept tamely when we are not allowed to.  
A few of the embedded correspondents were quite rude to me. They had already taken 
the side of NATO, you see. I remember one of them coming in and castigating me for 
writing about Serb civilians as if I had not also been writing about Kosovo Albanian 
civilians, which indeed I had at great length. 
 
I had a very interesting experience. At one point I was going out of Pristina with a Serb 
family and we were being stoned by Albanian Muslims in front of British troops, who 
didn't do anything. It was an interesting experience to see what it was like being a Serb. 
My interpreter was a Muslim Albanian. I had many people working with me on the 
other side. 
 
By and large, I did not find any overt hostility from the Brits or the Americans. I don't 
think they even knew who the reporters were who were reporting from the other side of 
the line so to speak. 
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In Serbia, we could travel more freely than you would imagine. The only thing we did 
have was press cards. We were authorized to work as journalists by the government and 
also by the military. I had a military press card because that helped getting through 
checkpoints, but it didn't mean that we were embedded in the sense that we were living 
with the Yugoslav army. I can't imagine that you would want to do that with all the 
bombing. But I was with them when they were bombed, of course. The key thing if you 
wanted to report from the Serb side was not that they would force you to write what 
they wanted you to write, but what they wanted to be sure of, is that you were not a spy 
working for NATO. Once they were sure that you were not sending military 
information to NATO, they gave you a lot a freedom and left you alone to do as you 
wished.  
 
Do you have any idea what had happened at the village of Racak? 
 
I was not in Kosovo then and I did not report on that. I was actually doing a story in the 
Middle East. I am aware that a French journalist took great issue with the version of the 
British journalist and of the OSCE monitors, but I did not investigate that story, and 
although I had been to Racak, I was not there on that occasion, so I am the wrong 
person to ask. 
 
Much was written about the camp in Trnopolje. Most sources alleged that it was a 
"concentration camp", while some others refuted this. How did you experience it? 
 
The incident was that they filmed them from the wrong side of the wire or that they 
filmed people who weren't actually in prison but they made them look as if they were 
behind the wire. I was at Trnopolje about the same time but I was not there when the 
crew was there and I did not actually work on the story of how they did that. You are 
aware that there was in fact a legal case in London about that, in which they appeared to 
win the legal case. But again I found a man who said they filmed these people through a 
wire that did not actually divide them from the prisoner. They just asked the prisoner to 
talk through the wire. Again, I wasn't there and I don't believe in commenting on things 
that I haven't actually investigated or reported. 
 
Certainly, when I was at Trnopolje, the prisoners could walk out of the camp if they 
wanted. By and large, they were so frightened of the Serbs outside the camp that they 
chose not to. But it was an open door and I could go in and out as many times as I 
wanted, indeed. The Serb guards sat on the road opposite. But there were prisoners 
walking out and walking down the road and talking and going back in again. It clearly 
wasn't a prison camp like some of the other concentration camps where the most 
barbarous killings were carried out. 
 
What can you tell me about the incident where a Larry King interview with 
Serbian Information Minister Vucic was arranged to take place at the time when 
the Serbian television station was eventually bombed? 
 
I don't know if it was Larry King. It was certainly CNN, and they would have had one 
of the Serb ministers, who were a close ally of Milosovic, in the studio at the time. I 
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wrote about this at considerable length and you can look it up no doubt, through the 
Web, CNN's response was that they gave a different date. But of course, if I remember 
the situation again – look I'm driving in a car in Beirut, talking about something that 
happened years ago … 
 
As I remember, CNN's get-out clause was that it was on a different date. In fact it 
wasn't. The missile hit the building in the early hours of the morning. And in America, 
of course, it was still the previous day. So they said he wasn't asked to go to the studio 
on this day. It was the previous day he was asked, but in fact, that previous day in Yugo 
time was the day the missile hit. So they tried to get out of it by manipulating the date 
issue and in fact it was all about the international time-line. It wasn't anything to do with 
a different date at all; it was exactly the same time 
 
If you're telling me did CNN set this up with the US security authorities, I'm sure they'll 
tell you no. But I was given CNN's request to the minister by the minister's people 
themselves, so that I would see it. I still have copies of it. They asked him to be there at 
a time during or after make-up when the missile would have hit. In fact, he turned the 
interview down, so it didn't matter.   
  
You are probably aware that the families of the dead are now trying to sue the 
authorities of the time, because they claim that Milosovic's people were warned by 
NATO that their building would be bombed and that the authorities decided that they 
needed some martyrs. So they did not tell the staff to get out in time.  
 
I think that quite possibly true, because on the previous evening they had also had a 
warning and they invited the international press, including me, to go and look at the 
studios and talk to the staff. And I think that they probably thought that if the missile 
came, we too would be in the building and we would die as well. And they'd kill all the 
international press, so I think they quite possibly did know in advance and NATO did 
warn them, but I can't prove it. You should keep that in mind – you shouldn't be too 
naïve or romantic about the Serb authorities or the Serb forces.  
 
In Afghanistan during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, media 
access to the battlefield was practically non-existent. What would you say were the 
military's real reasons for preventing the media from reporting on what was going 
on?  
 
You have to realize something. In Afghanistan as in Iraq, journalists can't move around 
freely. Some journalists are very pro the American government and will only report on 
what the Americans want, but because of the dangers of moving freely around in the 
Kandahar region, for example, journalists can't go there without armed guards. In Iraq 
they can go virtually nowhere even with armed guards. The mere fact that we now had 
two incidents in Iraq of the Americans apparently murdering civilians and getting away 
with it was because there were no journalists to go and check out the story afterwards. 
We couldn't get there. When I travel outside Baghdad now – I am one of the few 
journalists who does, though I'm not the only one - I need two weeks to arrange it. I 
don't travel with armed men. I don't have security protection. But that's how bad it is. 
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The Americans benefit from this, because they can do things outside the watchful eye of 
the press, knowing that the journalists are more at risk than they are of being killed. 
 
Apparently, some reporters camped outside the airport at Kandahar, hoping for a 
story, while others snuck into the country via Pakistan. What was your approach? 
 
I travelled on my own with Afghan friends who where also my translators, because I 
don't speak Pashtu. When we wanted to go to a particular village far out in the desert we 
would go to the local Afghan governor and ask if he could send some guards with us. 
This is not to protect us from kidnapping or Al Qaida. It was to protect us from being 
robbed by bandits who had weapons. In many cases the guards who were paid by the 
governor knew we would give them lots of watermelons when we finished the journey. 
It wasn't a question of hiring armed guards. I actually sent in to my expenses in London 
a photograph of all these bearded and armed men holding their watermelons and smiling 
into the camera. Weirdly, the people in the accounts department said "Oh, well", and 
saved it as a further document to prove that Bob was spending the money on 
watermelons. It just went in the file with everything else. They didn't feel there's 
anything odd about handing out watermelons on behalf of The Independent. So there 
you go!  
 
I also had people in the American military who knew what was going on, who 
disapproved of their mission. Because of them we could prove people were being 
tortured. They would come to me, sometimes not wearing uniform, in the villa where I 
was staying, to talk about what was going on. So no, neither in Afghanistan nor in Iraq 
do I have any armed protection. 
 
Indeed, I paid the price for that when I was badly beaten on the Afghan/Pakistan border 
in December of 2001. 
 
Have you recovered from that sufficiently to go on with what you are doing? 
 
Oh, yes, I went back to the village the next day to try to find the people who did it. I've 
been working normally ever since. I still have headaches from time to time, and I had a 
slight vision impairment with my right eye which is now gone. I don't have that problem 
anymore. But I still have scars on top of my head and on my forehead.  
 
And psychologically? How do you cope with this? 
 
What is there to "cope" with? You've got beaten by people who lost all their family. 
They were much worse off than I was. When you are going to the Middle East you have 
to "cope" with the sticks and stones occasionally. Sometimes the real ones. I did knock 
a tooth out of someone when I started fighting back. I regret it very much, but I had to. 
It was the only way to survive. If you have to work in a place like this you've got to be 
strong. You've got to be tough. You can't go around talking about "coming to terms 
with", and "counseling", and all this bullshit. The people who are trapped there, the 
civilians, who have to live under the American bombs, they're the people you should 
ask how they cope with it psychologically. Not moderately well paid journalists who 
can fly home Club Class with a glass of champagne if they don't like the war. 
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I see the US military's large-scale embedding of the media with their units in Iraq 
as a strategic move to further their case. Do you agree with that? 
 
Yes of course, of course. The mere fact that the press use "embedding" as their word for 
it, that they accept that phrase "embedding", tells you a lot about the osmotic, parasitic 
relationship between the journalists and the military when they perform these tasks.  
 
The same thing happened during the 1991 Gulf Wars when journalists fought like tigers 
to be on duty with "pools". "Pools" meant that you were taken with the military and 
lived with them, and you had to fight to get onto them. Once you did, there was such 
censorship, delays and filing of copy, and so on. Once again I travelled on my own and 
I saw things for myself so I had no censorship and I didn't have any soldier delaying my 
copy. I was in the paper every day.  
 
Ever since Vietnam the American military have tried to prevent the press reporting 
those elements of the war that would bring public opinion against the president, who is 
their commander-in-chief, and the military forces. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
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From: skrikvirniks@hotmail.com  
Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 11:10 AM 
 
Bonny Schoonakker was the only South African newspaper reporter in Iraq 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Working for the Sunday Times, he 
operated as a unilateral reporter from the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad. He 
currently resides in Hong Kong, China. 
 
Schoonakker answered the questions (in bold) sent to him via e-mail: 
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Having been an independent reporter in Iraq, what is your view of the US 
military's large-scale embedding of the media with their units?  
 
It worked two ways: on the one hand it gave embedded reporters far greater access to 
the fighting, the war on the ground, but on the other it allowed the embedders to dictate 
how the war was covered. They saw lots more action than what I did, from behind the 
safety of American armour plating, whereas those like myself were kept in the dark by 
the Ba'athists and had to hope that the American bombs and ordinance were accurate, 
and did not fall on the Palestine Hotel. Unfortunately, once it did get hit, killing two 
journalists. However, as to the accuracy of reports from embedded journalists, I don't 
think that is the salient point. The Western media that sent their reporters off for 
embedding with the coalition had already accepted the US administration's rationale for 
invading Iraq. The great failure of journalism in the case of the invasion of Iraq was the 
lack of any critique as to why the US should invade in the first place. I know it is easy 
to say this with hindsight, but the lie on which the war was premised was there to be 
exposed long before the first shots were fired. In fact, the western media, including the 
newspaper that sent me, WANTED a war. Rather than seeking to intimidate the Iraqi 
regime, Rumsfeld's promise of "shock and awe" was intended to seduce the media – 
which wanted the show – and they (we) bought it hook, line and sinker. 
 
When you returned to Baghdad after its "fall", did the military treat you and the 
other unilaterals the same as the embeds?  
 
The Americans did not make anything especially difficult for me. In so far as they could 
help, they did. The commanding officer of Delta Force, whom I literally bumped into in 
Baghdad, when trying to find out about the apparent looting of the museum of 
antiquities, was particularly helpful. When I told him that I was from South Africa, he 
(a colonel) mentioned that one of his soldiers (one out of several thousand) was from 
South Africa, and I was impressed by the way he knew a lot about Private Billy Viljoen, 
from Alberton. The colonel knew that Viljoen's grandparents had been murdered in 
Durban, and stuff like that. He was also very co-operative in wanting me to find 
Viljoen, but I had already done so a few days earlier. The Americans behaved like they 
had nothing to hide, and as soon as I could satisfy them that I was a journalist, they 
were always co-operative. Getting to that point could be tricky, though. They kept their 
firearms pointed at you, fingers on the trigger, while you tried to explain and 
demonstrate. One night I came within a split second of being shot at a roadblock, when 
my driver panicked and reached under the dashboard for his passport. The nervous 
solider (about 18, 19) thought my was reaching for a car bomb switch. The only reason 
he did not open fire was because I called him "dude", as in "Hey, dude, take it easy, 
when he lifted up his rifle to start shooting. I don't think the American authorities cared 
too much whether you were embedded or not. The worst trouble that any journalist 
could make for the US military would be in Washington, or London, not in Baghdad, 
where you needed their protection and assistance no matter how sceptical you were 
about their reasons for their presence in the city. 
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How do you feel about the military's attitude towards the media, and vice versa?  
 
On the ground, the military I came across (whether US or Iraqi) looked at us people just 
doing their jobs, there was not much animosity or hostility. They were quite 
approachable. The journalists loved the military for the most part, except people like the 
hysterical Robert Fisk, who I remember on several occasions trying to provoke US 
soldiers into arresting him. He was determined to be a martyr. To this day, I am 
extremely grateful to the US Marines, because I think they saved me from being 
kidnapped when I sort of got lost in central Baghdad. The suspicious men in long 
leather coats and with AK-47s sticking out, who had trapped me and my guide in an 
alley way quickly disappeared when two Humvees drove into an adjoining street. But, 
much as I was grateful to the soldiers, I despise the likes of Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney 
for sending them there in the first place. 
 
Do you think the US military had set out to target unilateral reporters?  
 
No, not really. They could just ignore us and hope the night would swallow us up if we 
became a nuisance. 
 
What was your agreement with the newspaper regarding your angle of coverage?  
 
There was no clear brief before I went, but it was always going to be the case that I 
would look for human interest type stories on the ground. Names, faces, situations. 
When I got back, however, I was dismayed by the manner in which some of my stories 
were presented. To this day, I cannot bear to look at those back copies. My complaints 
and criticisms in this regard were not taken seriously, and sometimes with irritation. 
Ultimately, this led to a situation in which it became impossible for me to continue 
working at the Sunday Times. I do not regret going, though. Even though I still have far 
too much to learn, the two months I spent in Baghdad taught me a lot about myself and 
the people whom I live among, even if these lessons can sometimes be sad and 
unpleasant. 
 
How were your reports presented and how would you have liked it to be 
presented?  
 
In some cases it seemed to me that there was a tendency to present the reports in a 
manner which emphasized trivial and sensational aspects. For example, while I was in 
Baghdad, the newspaper printed posters saying "Our man in Baghdad" or something 
like that, with a photograph of myself. I felt embarrassed and that this was absurd, 
particularly as I had requested before I left for Iraq that they do not use any photo 
bylines with any of my reports. In the end, someone took a photograph of myself and a 
friend that I had posted above my desk back in Cape Town and then cropped my face 
out of it. I pointed this out the Sunday Times' new editor some months later, but this 
criticism was not appreciated. In any case, I would have preferred the newspaper to 
focus more on what was happening in Iraq and put less emphasis on the "our man on the 
spot" approach, which is illusory. Given the nature of the circumstances in Baghdad at 
the time, "being on the spot" sometimes meant that you were less aware of what was 
going on than those elsewhere. Which is not to say that being there did not give you a 
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unique view, but it's just a matter of emphasis. I did not say anything immediately on 
returning from Iraq because everyone was being so hugely complimentary and nice to 
me when I got back. On the first day I got back, the editor of the newspaper at the time 
proclaimed to the assembled staff that "I had raised the standard of journalism on this 
newspaper", which was hugely flattering. Except, two weeks after that there began what 
I now regard as a long process of constructive dismissal. All that flattery made it 
difficult to think clearly at the time, I suppose, which made if difficult to understand 
what was happening and what people's true intentions were. Over the subsequent 
months things became more clear. Unfortunately, in these situations, hindsight is pretty 
useless as a form of insight or consolation. 
 
Can you tell me how it happened that Sunday Times sent you to Iraq? Did you ask 
to go, and if so, why? Or did they ask you to go, and why? 
 
Early in February 2003 an e-mail was sent to all staff stating that the newspaper was 
considering sending someone to Iraq, in anticipation of what by then seemed a likely 
invasion by a US-led coalition. I was among the many that applied, and got lucky. The 
assignment was offered on these terms so that, if anything went wrong in Baghdad, the 
newspaper could say, quite rightly, to the reporter's family/dependents/friends that 
he/she had volunteered for the assignment and should therefore accept some 
responsibility for any mishap. If, instead of a general offer to staff, someone had been 
chosen and asked to go, it may have exposed the newspaper to a greater liability. So 
whoever went would have to accept some responsibility for going. In any case, I was 
hugely excited to go, and willing to accept the risks and these terms. I still have 
absolutely no regrets about going there, and am still grateful for the opportunity, even 
though, ultimately, it led to a situation that made it impossible for me to continue 
working at the Sunday Times. 
 
Did they have any concerns regarding cost, insurance or your safety? 
 
Costs were a consideration, but to what extent I am not sure. I was given enough money 
to cover my expenses, which were significant for all sorts of reasons. This was at least 
partly because the Ba'athists imposed a heavy tax on those journalists lucky enough to 
get into Baghdad before the invasion, around US$100 a day including a levy on those 
with a satellite phone, if I remember correctly. I was hoping that, after the US-led 
coalition took over, those of us who had lasted until then would be excused from paying 
the tax. But as I was expelled four days before Baghdad fell, in the final days of 
Ba'athist control, I had to pay this tax in order to get an exit visa. Either that, or find 
myself in Abu Ghraib. In the end, I think that the whole excursion cost the Sunday 
Times something of the order of US$7 000, if I remember correctly, excluding the cost 
of a buying a satellite phone (the only way to transmit text and pictures out of Iraq at the 
time) and personal insurance for myself in the event of death or accident. It seemed to 
me at the time that the newspaper was being generous in funding such an assignment, 
but later it became clear that the Sunday Times' expenses were much less than those of 
media represented in Baghdad, particularly the TV services, who spend millions of 
dollars on deploying journalists in Iraq, which include the costs of security consultants, 
bodyguards and armoured vehicles. I had to make do as best I could on expenses that 
would have been paid had I gone, for example, on a wine-tasting freebie to Australia. 
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I never knew how much the premiums of the insurance policy came to, and often told 
my handler that I did not think it was necessary to pay for this. If I got maimed there 
was no way I could have been flown out and would have to seek the help of the Red 
Cross in Baghdad, which was free. If killed, I saw no point to flying a corpse home. But 
they insisted on taking out this insurance, which I was told was very expensive. I would 
guess that it was something of the order of US$200 a day. As for my safety, I am sure 
everyone was concerned as it would look bad for the newspaper if something tragic 
happened.  
 
What would you have liked to do differently?  
 
To have read more about Iraq's history before I went, to have placed more trust in my 
own judgments rather than seek corroboration from other journalists. The media 
contingent in Baghdad tended to consult with one another, to make sure we were all of a 
similar mind on things. It's a common phenomenon among journalists, but in Baghdad 
the stakes were higher. I was never afraid while being there, and only long after I got 
back to South Africa did I realize the risks that were in play there, and how easily it 
could all have gone wrong. It also became apparent to me that those who make it home 
from war may find that the most difficult battles and most dangerous treacheries still 
await them. 
 
Have you ever spoken to any of the formerly embedded reporters, and if so, how 
did they feel about being embedded? Do you (or did they) feel they were in any 
way manipulated by the US military to project a certain image of the war?  
 
I had very little contact with embedded journalists, if any. I only ever saw them from a 
distance. 
 
What would you say were the strengths and weaknesses of the embedding 
exercise?  
 
As I said above, access to information is the prize but being led astray is the risk. It's 
like, if you want to dance to the music you will need a partner. 
 
Do you have any other comments about the relationship between the US military 
and the media in Iraq, or the flow of news from Iraq to the South African media 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom?  
 
Ever since Vietnam, the US military has learnt how to deal with the media far more 
intelligently (in terms of achieving their goals) than the media have learnt how to deal 
with the military. Journalism is a flawed and superficial business. Overall, the coverage 
of the Iraq war reminds me of something someone once said about bribing journalists: 
why pay them when you see what you can make them do for free. 
 
 
*   *   *   *   * 
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As the use of jargon is inherent to both the military and the media as social institutions, 
some of the terms used may be unclear to members of either community. This glossary 
will provide a list of media and military terms relevant to this present study.  
 
Except where stated differently, definitions will be taken directly from three 
publications, namely  
 
• Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Department of Defense, 2005) 
• Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies (Watson & Hill, 2003) 
• Key Concepts in Journalism Studies (Franklin et al., 2005) 
 
Entries are edited to conform to South African spelling and abbreviated to give the 
essence of each term. 
 
accountability – In a democracy, media organisations and the journalists who work in 
them are accountable to their audience and to wider society in various ways. They 
are accountable to the law of courts, for example, if they libel someone or commit 
contempt of court (Franklin et al., 2005:4-5). 
 
audience – Students of media communication recognise the term audience as 
overarching all the reception processes of message sending. Thus there is the 
audience for theatre, television and cinema; there is the radio listener. There is the 
audience for a pop concert or at a public meeting. Communicators shape their 
messages to fit the perceived needs of their audience: they calculate the level of 
receptiveness, the degree of readiness to accept the message and the mode of 
delivery. Audience is readership too and the success in meeting 
audience/readership needs relies extensively on feedback (Watson & Hill, 
2003:14). 
 
bias – Implies that the "real world" constitutes an objective reality which the media 
persistently fail to represent accurately (Franklin et al., 2005:24-25). 
  
by-line – Use of the journalist's/author's name on a report or article. These are very 
common now in the press but at one time the granting of by-lines was a rare 
honour, to distinguish top writers or as a reward for outstanding reportage 
(Watson & Hill, 2003:31).  
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 221
censorship  
• armed forces censorship – The examination and control of personal 
communications to or from persons in the Armed Forces of the United States and 
persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Department of Defense, 2005:44). 
• civil censorship – Censorship of civilian communications, such as messages, 
printed matter, and films entering, leaving, or circulating within areas or territories 
occupied or controlled by armed forces (Department of Defense, 2005:87). 
• field press censorship –  The security review of news material subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States, including all information or 
material intended for dissemination to the public. Also called FPC (Department of 
Defense, 2005:200). 
• national censorship – The examination and control under civil authority of 
communications entering, leaving, or transiting the borders of the United States, 
its territories, or its possessions (Department of Defense, 2005:359). 
• primary censorship – Armed forces censorship performed by personnel of a 
company, battery, squadron, ship, station, base, or similar unit on the personal 
communications of persons assigned, attached, or otherwise under the jurisdiction 
of a unit (Department of Defense, 2005:423). 
• prisoner of war censorship – The censorship of the communications to and from 
enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees held by the United States Armed 
Forces (Department of Defense, 2005:87). 
• secondary censorship – Armed forces censorship performed on the personal 
communications of officers, civilian employees, and accompanying civilians of 
the Armed Forces of the United States, and on those personal communications of 
enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces not subject to Armed Forces primary 
censorship or those requiring re-examination (Department of Defense, 2005:87). 
 
circulation – The number of copies of an edition in a particular print medium (e.g. a 
newspaper, a magazine, a book, etc.) sold or otherwise distributed (Franklin et al., 
2005:36). 
 
civil affairs – Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organised, 
trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support 
civil-military operations. Also called CA (Department of Defense, 2005:86). 
 
civil-military operations – The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace 
in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military 
operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military 
operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions 
normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These 
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They 
may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. 
Civil/military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other 
military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called 
CMO (Department of Defense, 2005:88).    
 222
 
conflict – An armed struggle or clash between organised groups within a nation or 
between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. 
Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently 
predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, 
and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military 
power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while 
supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be 
achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force (Department of 
Defense, 2005:113).  
 
content analysis – Research into mass media content identifies, categorises, describes 
and quantifies short-term and long-term trends ... Content analysis serves an 
important function by comparing the same material as presented in different 
media within a nation, or between different nations; or by comparing media 
content with some explicit set of standards or abstract categories  (Watson & Hill, 
2003:64-65).   
 
context – The situation(s) in which a message is conveyed and received, or in which a 
text is produced and consumed (Franklin et al., 2005:48). 
 
counterdeception – Efforts to negate, neutralise, diminish the effects of, or gain 
advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include 
the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations (Department 
of Defense, 2005:126). 
 
counterintelligence – Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by 
or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI (Department of 
Defense, 2005:127). 
 
counterpropaganda operations – Those psychological operations activities that 
identify adversary propaganda, contribute to situational awareness, and serve to 
expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces 
(Department of Defense, 2005:130).    
 
deception – Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, 
distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner 
prejudicial to the enemy’s interests (Department of Defense, 2005:145). 
 
disinformation – Derives from the Russian, Dezinformatsiya, a term especially 
associated with the former Soviet Union's secret service, the KGB. It is applied to 
the use of forgery and other techniques to discredit targeted governments, persons 
or policies. The process of disinformation is, of course, as old as mankind, and 
sowing the seeds of disinformation is matched by accusing the opposition of 
spreading disinformation (Watson & Hill, 2003:88). 
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effects of mass communication – Can be broadly defined as any change induced 
directly or indirectly by the recording, filming or reporting of events. Analysts of 
effects, or impact, are concerned with the modification of attitudes and of 
behaviour of individuals and GROUPS, and the process of measuring these 
effects is immensely complicated, as the ground on which the measurements are 
taken is constantly shifting (Watson & Hill, 2003:93). 
 
embargo – restriction set upon a news item, indicating when that item can be published 
or broadcast (Watson & Hill, 2003:96). 
 
embedded journalist – journalists who live, work and travel as part of the units with 
which they are embedded to facilitate maximum in-depth coverage of US forces 
in combat (Franklin et al., 2005:72). 
 
fixer – In reporter-speak, a fixer is a translator, navigator and person finder for a 
journalist on unfamiliar ground. But in Iraq, where the streets are perilous, the 
fixer often is the unsung reporter who asks the questions and brings the answers 
back to his journalist boss. A great fixer can even save your life (Gladstone, 
2006:p.n). 
 
gag/gagging order – Issued by judges to restrain the publication or broadcast of 
information where it is considered that such information breaches the law 
(Watson & Hill, 2003:114). 
 
genre – Term deriving from the French, meaning type or classification (Watson & Hill, 
2003:116). 
 
Hollywoodisation – By the time of writing, no clear definition existed for the term 
"Hollywoodisation" but it is understood by this author as the presentation of 
newsworthy events as a story, or Hollywood film, in order to make it more 
comprehensible to the public (No reference). 
 
jargon – The specialist speech of groups of people with common identity – of religion, 
science, medicine, art, trade, professional, political party, etc. (Watson & Hill, 
2003:149). 
 
joint information bureau – Facility established by the joint force commander to serve 
as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the 
conduct of joint operations. When operated in support of multinational 
operations, a joint information bureau is called a “combined information bureau” 
or an “allied press information centre.” Also called JIB (Department of Defense, 
2005:285).    
 
Klieg light - a powerful carbon-arc light formerly used in making movies (Compact 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2007). 
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news management – Refers to the tactics employed by those – usually in government 
or important positions in society – who wish to shape the news to their own 
advantage, or to control events in such a way as to win favourable publicity. In 
recent years the operative word to describe news management is spin. The so-
termed spin doctors, drawn almost invariably from the ranks of professional 
journalism, are essentially in the business of propaganda, that is talking up the 
good news and concealing as far as possible the bad  (Watson & Hill, 2003:195). 
 
news media representative – An individual employed by a civilian radio or television 
station, newspaper, newsmagazine, periodical, or news agency to gather and 
report on a newsworthy event. Also called NMR (Department of Defense, 
2005:370).    
 
node – A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, 
processed for onward movement, or terminated (Department of Defense, 
2005:370). 
 
operation  
• A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, 
training, or administrative military mission.  
• The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, 
and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign 
(Department of Defense, 2005:388). 
 
peacekeeping operations – Peacekeeping operations are also conducted with the 
consent of one or all sides of the conflict and fall into one of two categories. The 
first includes operations that are a sort of logical or practical continuation of 
peacemaking operations. After an armistice has been signed, negotiations begin in 
order to bring about the peaceful resolution of the conflict (Demurenko & Nikitin, 
1997).  
 
perception management – Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective 
reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence 
official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviours and official actions 
favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management 
combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and 
psychological operations (Department of Defense, 2005:407). 
 
pool 
• Maintenance and control of a supply of resources or personnel upon which other 
activities may draw. The primary purpose of a pool is to promote maximum 
efficiency of use of the pooled resources or personnel, e.g., a petroleum pool or a 
labour and equipment pool.  
• Any combination of resources which serves a common purpose (Department of 
Defense, 2005:415).    
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pool system – Practice, particularly in wartime, of governments channelling media 
access to news events through a regulated "pool" of reporters; and consequently 
the "pooling" of information for publication or broadcasting. This strategy of 
news management effectively censors journalists by corralling them, while at the 
same time claiming to offer prompt and reliable information on events (Watson & 
Hill, 2003:221). 
 
propaganda – Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed 
to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any group in order 
to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (Department of Defense, 
2005:430).   
 
psychological operations – Planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, 
groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favorable to the originator’s objectives. 
Also called PSYOP (Department of Defense, 2005:432).  
 
physical security – That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to 
safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorised access to equipment, installations, 
material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, 
damage and theft (Department of Defense, 2005:411). 
 
public affairs – Those public information, command information, and community 
relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with 
interest in the Department of Defense (Department of Defense, 2005:433).  
 
public affairs ground rules – Conditions established by a military command to govern 
the conduct of news gathering and the release and/or use of specified information 
during an operation or during a specific period of time (Department of Defense, 
2005:433).    
 
public diplomacy – Those overt international public information activities of the 
United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy 
objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and 
opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and 
institutions and their counterparts abroad (Department of Defense, 2005:433).    
 
public information – Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which 
through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of 
which is considered desirable or non-objectionable to the responsible releasing 
agency (Department of Defense, 2005:433). 
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security 
• communications security – The protection resulting from all measures designed 
to deny unauthorised persons information of value that might be derived from the 
possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorised persons 
in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called 
COMSEC. Communications security includes:  
• cryptosecurity – The component of communications security that results from the 
provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use.  
• transmission security – The component of communications security that results 
from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and 
exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.  
• emission security – The component of communications security that results from 
all measures taken to deny unauthorised persons information of value that might 
be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto-
equipment and telecommunications systems.  
• physical security – The component of communications security that results from 
all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and 
documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorised persons 
(Department of Defense, 2005:108). 
 
security review – The process of reviewing news media products at some point, usually 
before transmission, to ensure that no oral, written, or visual information is filed 
for publication or broadcast that would divulge national security information or 
would jeopardise ongoing or future operations or that would threaten the safety of 
the members of the force (Department of Defense, 2005:478).    
 
sources – The people, places and organizations that supply journalists with ideas and 
general information (and often quotes) for potential news stories and features 
(Franklin et al., 2005:248). 
 
special activities – Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives 
that are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not 
apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such 
activities but are not intended to influence US political processes, public opinion, 
policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and 
production of intelligence or related support functions (Department of Defense, 
2005:493).     
 
strategic communication (2004 definition) – The transmission of integrated and 
coordinated United States Government themes and messages that advance United 
States interests and policies through a synchronised interagency effort that 
includes public diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations, in concert 
with other political, economic, and military actions (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2004:GL-16). 
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strategic communication (2006 definition) – Focused United States Government 
(USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, 
strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, 
policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, 
messages, and products synchronised with the actions of all elements of national 
power (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006:GL-12). 
 
stringer – Name given in the news reporting business to a non-staff reporter (Watson & 
Hill, 2003:279). 
 
target audience – The individual(s) whom a speaker intends or desires to address with 
a text (Franklin et al., 2005:260). 
 
war – conflict  between the armed forces of two or more states or coalitions, with this 
conflict being conducted in order to achieve certain political goals (Demurenko & 
Nikitin, 1997). 
 
war  
• general war – Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources 
of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is 
in jeopardy (Department of Defense, 2005:223). 
• limited war — Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, 
involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations 
(Department of Defense, 2005:309). 
 
